INTERROGATING THE DE-RADICALISATION AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMME OF OPERATION SAFE CORRIDOR UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT MUHAMMAD BUHARI SINCE 2016
John Odoh
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies
Federal University of Kashere, Kashere, Gombe State, Nigeria
&
Agbo Mathew Oga, PhD
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies
Federal University of Kashere, Kashere, Gombe State, Nigeria
&
Babayo Adamu Usman
Department of History and Diplomatic Studies
Federal University of Kashere, Kashere, Gombe State, Nigeria
Abstract
Northeastern Nigeria has been at the centre stage of violent conflicts between the deadly Boko Haram sect and the Nigerian government. Many people have lost their homes, means of livelihood and lives as a result of this conflict. The Nigerian security forces have been instrumental in combating the heinous activities of this sect. The massive onslaught carried out against the activities of Boko Haram members in recent times has made some of them to surrender their weapons while some of them have been arrested and detained in various prisons across the country. The paper argues that in as much as the de-radicalisation efforts of operation safe corridor have yielded some positive fruits, reintegrating the repentant fighters into the society have remained a herculean task. The paper relies on the use of primary and secondary sources to drive home its arguments. The primary sources involve oral interviews with eyewitnesses and newspaper reports while secondary sources consist of relevant materials from literature, newspapers, journals and books. Findings from the research revealed that the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and Non-Governmental Organizations have spent huge resources on the program with little to be desired. The society is apprehensive of accepting the ex-fighters in their fold as result of the crimes they perpetrated in the past. The paper concludes that for operation safe corridor to be successful there must be justice for the victims of Boko Haram activities.
Keywords: De-radicalisation, Boko Haram, Reintegration and Terrorism
Introduction
Insurgency is one of the major threats to the advancement and development of our modern day societies. Nigeria as a country has been grappling with the activities of terrorist groups from different sections of the country. The activities of the Niger Delta Militant became manifest and prominent during the early days of the Fourth Republic where they blew up oil installations and took expatriates and oil workers as hostages. In recent times too, the secessionists in the Eastern part of the country have also intensified their agitations destroying public properties and killing security personnel. This has pushed the government to declare them as a terrorist organisation (Usman, 2013). The major terrorist activities that has become cancerous to the soul of the Nigerian nation is the infamous Boko Haram group with its splinter group Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP). They have wreaked havoc in the Nigerian space, destroying lives and properties and rendering many innocent civilians homeless and refugees in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS’) camps spread across the north eastern part of the country. The massive onslaught of the security forces and the internal wrangling amongst the terrorists have forced some of them to lay down their weapons. The attention of the paper is focused on analysing the deradicalisation effort of the Federal Government under the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari and its attempt at reintegrating ex fighters into the larger society.
Conceptual Clarification
Some key operational concepts as used in the paper need to be clarified to give the paper a focus and deeper insights. Boko Haram is a group that began as a movement against western education. The literal meaning of the word means western education is forbidden (Anugwom, 2019). They began their activities in Borno State, North-Eastern Nigeria and it continued to spread to other parts of Nigeria until its impact became felt all over the country. The concept of Boko Haram as used in this paper refers to terrorist group that have threatened or undermined the corporate existence of Nigeria.
Deradicalisaton has been defined differently from different perspectives. It becomes important to clarify the meaning of radicalisation as a gateway to understanding deradicalisation. Radicalisation refers to the process or processes whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims. Some authors refer to ‘violent radicalisation’ in order to emphasise the violent outcome and distinguish the process from non-violent forms of ‘radical’ thinking (Neumann, 2010). The terms de-radicalisation and disengagement describe processes whereby individuals (or groups) cease their involvement in organised violence and/or terrorism through counselling and reorientation of their radical beliefs using logic and sound arguments.
However, while de-radicalisation aims for substantive changes in individuals’ (or groups’) ideology and attitudes, disengagement concentrates on facilitating behavioural change, that is, the rejection of violent means. According to John Horgan, ‘the disengaged terrorist may not be “deradicalized” or repentant at all (ibid). Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological support’. Additionally, many authors distinguish between collective and individual de-radicalisation and/or disengagement, depending on whether the process is led by, or aimed at, individuals or entire groups. Reintegration as used in the paper refers to settling the ex-terrorists into their former communities or different communities after they have been deradicalised. This also involves encouraging the people in the community to accept the ex-terrorists (Bertran, 2016). Terrorism as a key concept in the paper centres on a group of people who instill terror and fear into people by using the act of violence, threats and mass killings to compel the government into doing their bid.
Operation Safe Corridor constitutes one of the non-kinetic programmes established in 2015 by the Nigerian government which draws security personnel from the various security agencies in the country cutting across the Nigerian Military, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Nigerian Police and other sister agencies with the sole aim of de-radicalising, rehabilitating and reintegration repentant Boko Haram insurgents into the society (Ugwueze, e tal, 2021).Operation Safe Corridor is specifically for low-risk defectors who have surrendered their arms. It is the only sanctioned mechanism for combatants to exit the group. Men who are who are considered eligible go through several weeks of religious reeducation, psychosocial support, and vocational training at Mallam Sidi a military run facility in Gombe State (Brechenmacher, 2018). The study is anchored on interrogating the activities of Operation Safe Corridor under the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari with the aim of refocusing its activities.
Background to Terrorist Activities in North Eastern Nigeria
Terrorist activities in northern Nigeria became prominent with the rise Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihadalso known world over as Boko Haram (Walker, 2012). The group has a long history. One of its renowned leaders was Mohammed Yusuf who was a fearless preacher in Borno. His teachings attracted to the group followers from different parts of Borno. His approach of mobilising the locals through his preaching was consistent with the ideas of Mao Zedong who states that one of the principles of guerilla warfare is enlisting the support of the locals through the use of effective propaganda (Womack,2019).He indoctrinated his members by educating them about the ills in the society. His preaching appealed to the generality of the populace looking at the worsening case of poverty in the country especially in the north eastern part of the country (Ucha, 2010). The group earlier conducted themselves peacefully, until 2009 when their leader, Muhammad Yusuf was killed while in the custody of the police (Anugwom, 2019).This sparked outrage among his members who went on rampage killing and destroying public properties. From 2009 till present their activities have killed thousands of people and have rendered many people homeless with many internally displaced camps sprawling all over the city of Gombe (Anugwom, 2019).They constituted themselves into terror group whose targets were public institutions and security personnel. Not until later in the struggle when they began to kill innocent civilians both Christians and Muslims and destroying places of worship through suicide bomb attacks.
Some of their infamous attacks on a place of worship include the Madalla Bomb Blast of December 2011 where scores of worshippers were killed during a Christmas service (Anugwom, 2011:187), The attacks on Police Headquaters and UN building in Abuja. They also spearheaded coordinated attacks on places of worships both mosques and churches across the country. Security formations and their personnel became their central targets. They carried out coordinated attacks on military formations in Borno killing soldiers and also ransacking the barracks carting away military weapons. One of the devastating attacks was the attack on Metele where the 157 Task Force lost a large number of soldiers who were massacred by Boko Haram (Vanguard, 2018). The Nigeria Army put the total figure of those who lost their lives in the attack at 23. Available information from one of the surviving soldiers said no fewer than 200 people lost their lives in the incident, a figure Nigeria’s Defence Headquarters has debunked vehemently (Vanguard, 2018). Vulnerable rural communities are the worst hit. Being that they are far away from the capital the presence of security forces is minimal. Therefore, they are prone to Boko Haram attacks. Many villages in Borno have been sacked with many of them kidnapped and recruited into the rank and file of the sect. Women were not also spared as they were also kidnapped to attend to the needs of members of Boko Haram in their hideouts (Omenma etal, 2020). This brazen attacks on rural communities necessitated the massive migration of rural dwellers to the urban centres and other neighboring states with cases of Boko Haram attacks like Gombe, Adamawa and Bauchi.
Institutions of learning were not also spared. One of the infamous attacks on schools was the abduction of 276 school girls in Chibok during the administration of Goodluck Jonathan (ICG, 2018:2). This sparked outrage across the globe with the hashtag free our girls that went viral. Abductions became one of the major strategies of Boko Haram as they relied on their hostages as bargaining point with the federal government of which huge sums of money was paid to them and the release of some of their commanders in government custody in exchange for some of the girls. Similar scenario also played in the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari with the kidnap of over 200 Dapchi school girls (ibid). The mass abduction of school children became a source of concern to a government already battling with low rate of school enrolment and out of school children with the North East badly affected. Suicide bombings also became one their strategies in line with the activities of other global terrorist networks like Al-Quaeda and the Islamic State (IS). The troubling aspect of the suicide bombings was the use of children and women strapped with bombs to unleash mayhem on their targets (Omenma, 2020:11).
The basic ideology of Boko Haram is to spread their own brand of Islam across Nigeria and have the country come under their control. They have succeeded in indoctrinating their members with their wild ideology of spreading their brand of Islam which is extremist in all ramifications across the country and the belief that they could effectively conquer Nigeria (Brechenmacher, 2018). Lack of exposure on the part of their followers made them to accept this false ideology hook line and sinker. Information from some of the repentant Boko Haram fighters suggests that most of them were oblivious of the vastness of Nigeria until they were flown to Abuja for debriefing and to Gombe where they were camped for the deradicalisation program. Before now they thought Nigeria was limited to Borno (Anonymous, 2019). On a whole, the activities of Boko Haram have rendered a once bubbling region especially Borno State unattractive for economic activities (Borno State was popularly known for its production of fish which attracted traders from far and near) Education was also badly affected with many schools witnessing low student enrolment and teachers who fled Borno as a result of insecurity. University of Maiduguri also had its fair share of the insecurity challenge (Azubuike, 2021).
The Activities of Operation Safe Corridor Since 2016
Operation Safe Corridor is the result of several years of discussions within the Nigerian government about how to encourage voluntary defections from Boko Haram. As early as 2013, four years into the insurgency, the authorities started to recognise that a military response alone would be insufficient to dismantle the group. Available evidence suggests that the use of force or kinetic approach in crushing terrorism is ineffective (Roberts and Sean, 2012, Madobi, 2021). In September 2015, soon after his electoral victory, President Muhammadu Buhari set up a committee led by the defence chief to develop methods to persuade insurgents to defect. In 2016, federal authorities established Safe Corridor, a military –run and now partly donor funded program providing a way out for Boko Haram recruits (ICG, 2021:5). Its facility is at Mallam Sidi in Gombe State, not too close to the insurgency’s epicenter in Borno State. For what is supposed to be a period of six months, internees receive what the state calls “deradicalisation” instruction, as well as other education, vocational training and psychological support. The target of Safe Corridor are low-level insurgents, both combatant and non-combatant recruits integral to supporting Boko Haram factions’ operations. While casting a broad net, the program aims to draw in those recruits who are not tainted by atrocities that their reinsertion into society would cause backlash from those who might accuse the government of handing out amnesties to war criminals.
In as much as the target of Operation Safe Corridor are low-level insurgents there are cases of hardliners who claimed to have repented and found their way into the program and ended up relapsing into their deviant acts (Akhaine, 2020). But while some donors and officials hope the program might be able to facilitate thousands of defections, it has struggled to bring in the right people. To date, of the hundreds of individuals who have gone through or are currently in the program, many are not from the target group. Rather, they are civilians who threw off Boko Haram’s yoke and who, after detention by security forces, were mistakenly categorized as militants and channeled into Safe Corridor (ICG, 2019). Research conducted by International Crisis Group reveals that only one quarter of the cohort at Mallam Sidi are from the low level but committed jihadist recruits who form the program target group of defectors. Most of the others in the program at Mallam Sidi are civilians who fled areas controlled by Boko Haram and whom authorities then mistakenly categorized as jihadist and detained before sending them into Safe Corridor. Locals in Boko Haram controlled areas refer to these civilians as awam, a word derived from Arabic word for “commoners” (ibid). This is confirmation to the fact that more needed to be done by authorities to ensure that the right people recruited for the program so that the aim and objective of the program can be achieved.
Ali Ndume a serving Senator of the Federal Republic is one of fiercest critique of deradicalisation program. He drew the attention of the Federal Government to a repentant Boko Haram member who killed his father in Borno and stole his property (Akhaine, 2020). Ndume noted with dismay that many of the repentant Boko Haram have gone back to their bad ways. In his words: They are like Kharajites. Many among those released have since run away. They will never repent. The government should know what to do about them but not re-introducing someone who killed your parent or relations to you. Haba, not that he even apologized to the government. His thinking is that the Government has failed; hence they are being pampered (Akhaine, 2020).
The Borno State Governor has also expressed similar concern of some of graduates of the program rejoining Boko Haram faction (Akhaine, 2020) while some of the victims of Boko Haram have registered their dissatisfaction given the fact that they felt abandoned by the government while their assailants are treated like royalties. One of the victims of Boko Haram activities whose husband was killed by Boko Haram expressed her pains in an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC): This thing is hurting. They killed my husband and son in my presence. I am left suffering with four young orphans. Till death, I will never forget that day. Look at the kind of care given to Boko Haram members. We that have suffered for six years now are not taken care of. Truly government has not done justice here (Akhaine, 2020).
In a related development a male victim also told the BBC that Boko Haram killed his relations and chased them out of their home. He recounts his experience as follows: They killed four of my close relations. In what capacity are we going to live with them again? Or do they want us to meet them and take revenge? There will be a serious problem. Go to Gwoza and Bama; many of the repentant terrorists have rejoined the bandits. There is nothing you can do to change a Boko Haram member (Akhaine, 2020).
On the contrary, authorities in charge of the Operation Safe Corridor Program are of the firm belief that deradicalising repentant Boko Haram members will essentially strip Boko Haram of as many of its recruits that were cajoled to join their ranks, while military operations continue against the hardline core. Mallam Sidi Camp Commander, General Musa Ibrahim insists that Safe Corridor is “a non-kinetic approach to warfare, not an amnesty program” (ICG, 2021). This is contrary to the widespread belief by generality of the people in the society who equated the deradicalisation program to the amnesty granted to ex-Niger Delta militants to lay down their arms during the administration of Umaru Musa Yaradua in exchange for State pardon and cash payments in 2009 ( Okonofua, 2016 and Rice, 2009)
Operation Safe Coridor works closely with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO’S) who are their major international donors. One of such NGO’s is the International Organisation for Migration (I.O.M.). I.O.M. has been very instrumental in the deradicalisation process of ex- Boko Haram members whom they refer to as clients. They organised sessions for them aside the literacy classes, psychological sessions and vocational training skills such as; carpentry, tailoring and shoemaking lessons they receive in the camp (anonymous, 2019). During such sessions they have one on one interactions with their clients where they try to reorient them on the true meaning of Islam as a religion of peace and how to be better citizens of the society. Such interactive sessions have yielded results as many of the clients were barely educated and were obviously ignorant of the cause they were fighting for. Many of them were either forced to join the sect or were induced with financial gains. The useful advice they get from the interactive session played a significant role in shaping their perspective on religion and responsible citizenship.
In addition to the interactive sessions, the International Organisation for Migration also make arrangements for the family members of their clients to meet with them in the camp. The necessary logistics for such visits are organised by the I.O.M. The Organisation identify the address of the parents or relatives of their clients and make necessary arrangements to transport them from Borno to Gombe (ibid). They also make provision for hotel accommodation and also make arrangements for them to meet with their wards in the camp. The financial cost is shouldered by the Organisation. During such visits they get to spend time with their parents and relations who also assisted in the deradicalisation process through words of advice and encouragement which go a long way in boosting their morale. Such visits were necessary in creating a sense of belonging among the ex-Boko Haram fighters and also boosting their morale. Stipends were also given to the parents of the ex-Boko Haram members on such visits, ranging from 60,000-70,000 naira (anonymous, 2019). This serves as a source of motivation for their parents who were hitherto persuaded to go such visits.
The deradicalisation process does not just end in the camp. Funds and tools for the various skills they have learnt in the camp are provided for them. The money they receive from Safe Corridor is barely enough for them to set up businesses on getting back to the society. They receive about 20,000 naira upon exiting Mallam Sidi and a bit more from Borno State Government of about 5,000 naira as well as foodstuffs and basic necessities (clothes, cooking utensils, a mat and a tarpaulin). Borno State Authorities also gave the first graduates sewing machines to help to help them earn a living, but only one per grouping of three graduates; many sold the machines and split the money, as it was often impractical for the to start a business this way (ICG,2021). The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) has stepped in by giving graduates individual business kits to help them set up retail booths, shoemaker’s shops or hair salons. To encourage their acceptability by the host community IOM considered setting up vocational centres in host communities (ibid). They may not necessarily return to their former communities to startup businesses but to a different community where they will not be recognized. This is to guide against backlash from the society where they are known. Follow ups are organised for them so that they not go back to their former ways of life. A supervisor is attached to each person to follow up on progress and to also enquire on some of the challenges faced by their clients. In the end reports are made to the office for reevaluation of progress (anonymous, 2019).
In as much as the program has succeeded in deradicalising some of the ex-fighters to an extent, it is a general feeling among the generality of the public that the first point of call would have been the victims of the conflicts who are still wallowing in poverty in the various IDPs camps in the north east. In a study conducted by the International Crisis Group they argued that the program is missing its target (ICG, 2021). Most of the beneficiaries of the program are not the selected target. The selected target as explained earlier is supposed to consist of middle level Jihadists who are not neck deep in the activities of the terrorists. Evidence from field work suggest that some of the interns are civilians running away from the onslaught of Boko Haram who were wrongly tagged as Jihadists.
Conclusion
The paper has analysed the formation Boko Haram as a terrorist group that has wreaked havoc on the country especially Borno State and some north-eastern states and has also threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria as one indivisible entity. The formation of Operation Safe Corridor in 2016 became imperative as a non-kinetic approach of combating the menace of the group. This is consistent with the belief that kinetic approach alone is not enough to bring an end to the menace of Boko Haram. The formation of Operation Safe Corridor has also brought international donors to the centre stage of the deradicalisation process. One of the international donors that has played a central role identified in the paper is the International Organisation for Migration. The organisation has a leading role in providing funds and training for the program. The paper submits that despite the fact that the Operation Safe Corridor is an innovative program under the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari which has succeeded to a relative extent in the deradicalisation of some of its interns, more effort needs to be put in place to ensure that those captured for the program are the targeted people and more attention should be given to the victims of the crisis who have suffered badly from the activities of these terrorists and are widely spread in and outside Borno State.
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