Godwin Ichimi
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Email: drichimi@gmail.com
Abstract
This paper recognizes the bearings existing between Economic Intelligence (EI) and the war on terror in West Africa. Also, that terrorism and terrorist groups thrive on multiple sources of illicit incomes and criminal transactions. With Boko Haram as a reference point, it is shown that terrorists organisations generate incomesby means which includes but are not limited to arms trafficking, cattle rustling, extortions, bank robberies and receipts of financial assistance from Al Qaeda affiliates.The financial proceeds from such activities are moved around through complicated and dynamic hi-tech financial systems and then used to further the goals of terrorism. The paper posits that EI plays a critical role in national security, and, on that premise, held that EI – the collection, interpretation, and presentation of strategic information for decision-makers about how actors in national and international spaces produce, distribute, and utilize goods and services – bleeds into a state’s national security imperatives. As the leading behemoth in the West African region, it is argued that Nigeria’s Security and Foreign Policy machinery, leveraging a robust technology-driven EI system, should stultify and emasculate the financial live wires of terrorism in West Africa. The paper argues further that, since several international and regional Conventions and Protocol exist criminalizing terrorism financing and other illicit financial flows, Nigeria’s security and foreign policy agenda should encourage the other governments of West Africa to give more life to these regional arrangements, and deny terrorists the opportunity to exploit the region’s trade, immigration, domestic and international travel Systems.
Keywords; Economic Security, Economic Intelligence, Terrorism, National Security, Foreign Policy.
Introduction
The debate about the role of Economic Intelligence (EI) in achieving a country’s economic and security goals is ongoing. EI involves the collection, interpretation, and presentation of strategic information for decision-makers about how actors in national and international spaces produce, distribute, and utilize goods and services.[1]It is anintegral component of the national security architecture of countries. Its focus is on critical variables in the internal and external milieu of a country, especially in the context of high-risks and threats situations. This paper focuses on terrorism as one of such critical situations. This study is conducted against the backdrop of the immense humanitarian disasters that have accompanied the nefarious activities of terrorists marked by socio-economic dislocations, food insecurity occasioned by disruption of agriculture and other economic activities, displacement of large swaths of people, and general crippling of social and economic infrastructure. An estimated 24 million people in the Lake Chad region alone need humanitarian assistance. Attacks by Boko Haram and ISWAP continue to make matters worse as their activities have forced 5.3 million people to leave their homes.[2]
Terrorism and terrorist groups thrive on multiple sources of incomes and criminal transactions. The financial proceeds from such activities are moved around through complicated and dynamic hi-tech financial system and then used to further the goals of terrorism. With reference to the Boko Haram, the sect is said to generate income through means which includes but is not limited to sale of precious gold, farm products, arms trafficking, cattle rustling, extortions, bank robberies and receipts of financial assistance from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Islamic Maghreb.[3] In other words, Boko Haram, like other terrorist organisation, maintains a loose system of financing such that its cells could devise multiple sources of funding for their activities wherever they operate. It is in this regard that this paper attempts to contribute to the ongoing efforts to understand the economic and financial processes and forces driving terrorism in Nigeriain particular and West Africa in general. Further to this, the paper assesses the strategies and challenges associated with the application of EI to counter-terrorism efforts across the region.
Nature ofTerrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria
Terrorism aims to destroy the principles of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. It attacks the principles of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Charter of the United Nations. It is also contrary to the provisions of numerous international instruments including those pertaining to human rights, the rule of law, rules governing armed conflict and the protection of civilians under such as laws of war or international humanitarian law, tolerance among peoples and nations and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Terrorist activities destabilizes public order, undermine civil society, and impede social and economic development.
International and regional human rights laws make it clear that States have both a right and a duty to protect individuals under their jurisdiction from terrorist attacks[4]. This stems from the general duty of States to protect individuals under their jurisdiction against any interference with their enjoyment of human rights. More specifically, this duty is recognized as part of States’ obligations to ensure respect for the right to life and the right to security.[5]
Terrorism are acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aspirations. In 1994, the General Assembly’s Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism stated that terrorism includes:
criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, by a group of persons or persons for political purposes and that such acts are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them (set out in its resolution 49/60).
Terrorism has also been said to be the unlawful and intentional causing, attempting, or threatening to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or serious damage to public or private property, including places of public use, State or government facilities, public transportation systems, infrastructure facilities or the environments.Terrorism lead to damage of property, places, facilities, or systems, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.[6]
Boko Haram Terrorism has caused an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 deaths and displaced over 2.3 million people since 2009.[7] Insurgency-related conflicts claimed the lives of almost 35,000 lives in the North-eastern part of Nigeria up till the end of 2020.[8] Between 2009 and 2015, the group took control of extensive territories in north-eastern Nigeria, including major cities in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States in Nigeria. Their activities have also spread to the neighboring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroun. There have also been reports of interaction or cooperation between Boko Haram, ISWAP, and Jihadists in Mali and Burkina Faso. Boko Haram rebels have killed civilians in Nigerian villages and towns, they have also abducted thousands of people who are mostly schoolgirls and boys, forcibly marrying off women and girls to their fighters and conscripting the abducted boys into their group to become combatants. The group has conducted mass-casualty terrorist attacks against churches, mosques, markets, and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and their vicious attacks and their destructive potentials have gotten the attention of the international society.
Upon assumption of office, Muhammadu Buhari Nigeria’s former president, promised he would put an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. When asked about his performance on security, supporters of President Buhari said that the northeast is a lot safer than it was when he came into power. Still, Boko Haram and ISWAP can threaten the security in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe state. Even though they are not holding much territory, a large part of the region is still considered too dangerous to visit. Boko Haram is a serious manifestation of profound threats to Nigeria’s security. Unless the ECOWAS commission, and federal and state governments develop and implement comprehensive plans to tackle not only insecurity but also the injustice that encourages the predicaments, Boko Haram, ISWAP, and groups like them, will continue to destabilise Nigeria and the West Africa Region.[9]
Between 2015 and 2017, the efficacy of military campaigns in the Northeast of Nigeria improved, and the Nigerian government managed to recapture territories from Boko Haram. Although the military has secured remarkable victories in forcing the group to more marginal areas, the Nigerian military has struggled to effectively hold retaken territories. Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), continue to carry out attacks in the northeast and have revealed that they can expand their activities beyond the region to other regions like the Northwest and North Central. ISWAP carried out a high-profile attack on Kuje Correctional Centre within the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). About 900 inmates were set free during the Kuje Prison attack that led to the escape of 60 Boko Haram members.[10] Although authorities said some of the escapees were recaptured, security analysts underscored the involvement of Ansaru, another violent extremist group that also enjoys a close relationship with Boko Haram in the siege.
Boko Haram terrorists were also linked to the church killings in Ondo State and an attack on a train from Abuja to Kaduna. In the train incident, eight people were killed while 72 victims were kidnapped. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which splintered from Boko Haram, is becoming more threatening in Nigeria’s Northeast.[11] In 2022, they claimed the highest number of attacks since their formation and control of strategically important territory around Lake Chad. There is also evidence that the group’s area of activity has spread to the northwest of the country, where they’ve infiltrated kidnapping gangs. President Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu of the ruling APC intends to create highly trained and disciplined anti-terrorist battalions with special forces units. He also wants to win the hearts and minds of communities affected by the insurgency by offering them emergency and economic support.
It is imperative however to address the material basis of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism efforts by activating and prioritizing the nation’s EI machinery and deploying the same through the country’s national security and foreign policy architecture. The role of the material bases of livid experiences is crucial. It is a (de)motivator of diverse human behavioural patterns, including but not limited to extreme violence.
Theoretical Framework
This paper subscribes to a perspective driven by the tenets of classical economic theories. The perspective does not discriminate between good or bad actors in the society to understand and/or anticipate human actions, interactions, and behaviours that are considered purposeful and deliberate. Scientific economics is an appropriate framework source for this study because it provides an understanding of human action concerning resources, allocations, and conflicts over resources, grievances, or political control. Based on the works of Adam Smith and his inquiry into human nature, morality, virtue, and other dynamics of decision-making, this study will draw inferences on patterns of economic behaviours of terrorists that can be monitored and exploited by security operatives in Nigeria.
Adam Smith’s work, An Inquiry into the Nature, and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776/1904) was a continuation of his publication, The Theory of Moral Sentiments where he confronted issues such as human judgment, appropriate approbation, virtue, and moral philosophy. In the Wealth of Nations Smith was concerned with fundamental human nature and how people make decisions and wealth creation. He also inquired why some have more wealth than others. Smith showed that at the foundations of economics is a science that provides insight into human decision-making upon the conditions of scarcity.
This perspective argues further that human beings act with purpose and must exchange with others to achieve individual goals, as shown by the significance of the division of labour. Global security in this regard is then a byproduct of human decision-making under conditions of scarcity. Division of labor is not directly the effects of human wisdom but became necessary through a very slow and gradual consequence of a sudden propensity in human nature.[12] Smith suggested that division of labor is not taught to humanity in secular, religious, or cultural institutions but after human nature itself, every human can trade in one thing or the other. Therefore, modeling people’s actions and reactions can occur where we can observe previous actions and reactions.
Stakeholders contemplating the application of economics to security must work from observed human behavior. Understanding essential aspects of human nature begins with observing the human traits that they tend to trade. While explaining why all individuals must trade, Smith held that man has almost constant occasion for the help or assistance of others, and it would be in vain to expect that help for benevolence only.
People in this regard will get more help from others if they can interest the person’s self-love in favor of the individual’s needs. Smith argued that this can be achieved by showing others that it is for their own advantage or economic well-being to do what is required of them. He explained the hypothetical offer as a situation of “give me what I want so that you may have what you need”. He used a very popular analogy he created thus: “It is not the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner but from their regard to their interests”. With this statement, Smith made it clear that people address themselves and so, it is not their humanity but self-love that motivates most human actions. In that regard, an individual advantage is more recognised than humanity when trade or services are required.
To terrorize a society or threaten the constituted government, terrorists require suppliers, workers, and followers or constituents. The economics of security then starts with the observed phenomenon of division of labor, and then trade. Self-interest motivates the marketplace and economic exchange process. This is a powerful tool in the hands of the right executives to anticipate the extremists’ actions and reactions. It will also help to influence national or global security concerns.
In the exchange process of goods and services, preferences and choice patterns are revealed, and those patterns can be instructive for the security and intelligence community. The economic perspective on security as established by this study argues strongly that every human interaction includes the explicit or implicit formulation of “give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want”. Humans behave in predictable ways; we seek goals, betterment, and good things while avoiding undesirable or bad things.
To understand and change the behavior of terrorists, we must propose a bargain: to offer something in exchange (something they would prefer). We can offer a good or the avoidance of something bad.[13] A bargain must be proposed, and the incentives must be sufficient to gain acceptance. The economic incentives that are applicable in restraining insecurity include goals, resources, constraints, institutional constraints, information, and time horizons.
Economic Intelligence and National Security: Connecting the Dots in the War on Terror
There is a growing body of literature that argues the case that EI plays a critical role in national security.[14] For a state to adequately keep its territory from all forms of external aggression and internal insurrection, it requires a considerable level of economic power. It is thus safe to assert that EI bleeds into a state’s national security. Further argument to support this position hinges on the fact that security has evolved from a nation-state based solely on military power to soft forms of power. Therefore, states that have often refused to realize this evolving reality are often left in a quagmire of myriad threats and risks to their national security.
Jeffrey Wright argued that the correlation between national security and economic issues had increased due to changes in the world political environment at the end of the Cold War. He proposed redirecting spending from arms to programmes important for security and growth, known as the “peace dividend.”[15] Other authors also called for a shift in the structure of the Intelligence Community to adapt to a new economic order. William Agrell stated that intelligence agencies were still focusing too much on military security, despite the need for broader intelligence coverage, as the concept of security was evolving to include all of society.[16]
There exist arguments against EI as a tool of national security. Abram Shulsky argued that the debate over the use of intelligence agencies for collecting economic information is a proxy for a larger debate over the government’s role in directing a country’s economic future. Stanley Kolber critiqued that economic espionage missions are based on flawed assumptions and that the focus on commercial espionage leads to a narrow perspective, diverting funds from more traditional security issues.
As a result of the foregoing, scholars have attempted to clearly define the role and objectives of economic intelligence gathering. Some of these objectives are expatiated under three dimensions. The first dimension of Economic Intelligence operations involves the gathering of strategic information through various methods that comply with laws and regulations. This information is then useful in the areas of economy, finance, trade, and industry. Additionally, having access to reliable knowledge about important economic processes and phenomena can reduce uncertainty in decision-making and improve the competitiveness of states and companies in the global economy.[17] Economic Intelligence’s second dimension focuses on security and involves monitoring strategic sectors of the economy. It aims to neutralize threats to economic policy efficiency, such as external factors that impact global financial markets and disrupt market mechanisms. Additionally, an economic intelligence system is crucial in counteracting the negative effects of transnational organized crime and terrorism. Finally, offensive operations in economic intelligence involve actively seeking to gain an advantage in the global economy through various means. This can include influencing markets and industries that are deemed strategic or important to the national interest.
The intelligence gathered through EI systems is used to identify opportunities for the state to gain a competitive advantage, such as by targeting specific markets, resources, or investments. One example of an offensive operation could be a government using economic intelligence to identify a country with a large and growing market for a certain product or service.[18] The government could then use this information to invest in or support domestic companies that produce that product or render that service, to increase the competitiveness of those companies in the international market. This can help create jobs and increase the overall economic growth of the country. Another example could be a government engaging the tool of economic intelligence to identify opportunities for foreign investment, such as a country with abundant natural resources and a growing economy, the government would use this information to encourage domestic companies to invest in that country and gain access to those resources. The goal of these offensive operations is to create a competitive advantage for the state and national entities in the global economy. This can help to improve the overall efficiency of the national economy and increase the country’s economic power and influence in the world.
Funding Boko Haram and other Terrorists’ activities
Terrorism is an expensive venture and violent extremist organisations have developed immense fundraising capacities to underwrite the costs of operations and membership recruitment. Terrorist financing is the monetary backing of the activities of a terrorist organization by individuals, state and non-state actors who are either members of the terrorist group or its sympathizers.[19] This internationally recognized crime is concerned with directly or indirectly providing or collecting funds for use, in full or in part, to engage in activities intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in situations of armed conflict. It is also the financing of terrorism if the funding is for an act that translates into the intimidation of a population or compels a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.[20]
The sources of terrorist funding continue to be as elusive as terrorists themselves.[21] Most tactical counterterrorism strategies must therefore involve national and international intelligence and law enforcement institutions because the schemes that are contrived to generate the resources for underwriting terrorist activities occur within both the jurisdictions of nation-states as well as the purviews of functional international bodies. The entire focus of tactical counterterrorism – catching and frustrating the efforts of terrorists and the disruption of their operations – hinges on, among other things, the capacity to stultify and emasculate the sources of their funding streams.
State as well as the international community, in recognition of the fact that countering the financing of terrorism is an important aspect of global counterterrorism efforts, have been focusing efforts on cutting off the fiscal resources available to terrorist groups.[22] Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provide that people or corporate entities who, directly or indirectly, and willingly provide, solicit, acquire, collect, receive, possess, or makes available property, funds or other services, or attempts to provide, acquire, collect, receive, possess or make available property, funds or other services with the intention or knowledge, or having reasonable grounds to believe that it will beused, in full or in part to finance a terrorist or terrorist group.[23] This provision is also concerned with individuals or groups who commit any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or any other person not taking an active part in hostilities in situations of armed conflict, when the purpose of that act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a group of people or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act, commits an offence.
People indicted on the charges of this provision are liable on conviction to life imprisonment; or in the case of a body corporate a fine of at least N200,000,000, imprisonment of principal officer for a term of at least 20 years, and up to a maximum of life imprisonment, and the winding up of the body corporate, and its prohibition from reconstitution or incorporation under any form or guise. This provision that mobilises economic security and intelligence is interested in people who knowingly or intentionally enters or becomes involved in arrangements that facilitates the acquisition, retention, or control of terrorist fund, by or on behalf of another person, by concealment, removal out of jurisdiction, transfer to a nominee or in any other way, or as a result of which funds or other property is to be made available for the purposes of terrorism or for the benefit of a specified entity or proscribed entity, commits an offence.[24]
It is instructive that myriad international anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws exist as context from which attempts are being made to cut-off the economic and financial oxygen for terrorists and their organisations. At the global level, there is the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (199).[25] Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) emplaced the Anti-Money Laundering which after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was expanded to Combatting the Financing of Terrorism rule. The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA)[26] was established in 1999by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS. The main focus of which was initially the protection of West African economies and financial systems against money laundering. But, like the case of IMF, GIABA had its statute revised to reflect the growing link between money laundering and terrorism financing after the 2011 terrorist attack.
Boko Haram allegedly received funding from Osama Bin Laden, the mind behind Al Qaida’s 911 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, USA. Outcomes of verifiable studies echoed that in 2002 Bin Laden sent an aide of US$3 million to Nigeria for distribution among groups that shared al-Qaeda’s objective to impose Islamic rule. Between 2006 and 2011, reports suggested that the group was able to secure roughly US$70 million from various illicit sources, operating as part of an illicit and informal criminal economy network that sustained violence on the continent.[27] The group has also been known to raise funds from imposed taxes on communities through trade and regulation of agricultural activities in affected communities. More recently Boko Haram insurgents are funded through multiple sources that include extortion, taxes, protection fees, bank robberies, highway robberies, banditry, charitable donations, smuggling, foreign remittances and kidnapping. The insurgents are also involved in arms and human trafficking to raise funds. They are believed by many security experts to also receive support from domestic religious sympathizers and wealthy members of the larger society. Boko Haram still covertly gets sponsorship from some Nigerians and foreigners who provide them with both logistic and financial supports against the Nigerian government. In November 2020, 6 Nigerians were found guilty of funding of Boko Haram to the tune of $782,000 by a Federal Court of Appeals in the United Arab Emirates. Two of the convicts were sentenced to life imprisonment, while the remaining four were jailed for ten years.[28] It was equally alleged that there was evidence that some of the money collected by Al-Shabaab in Somalia is used in financing terror groups in Nigeria with increased activity of Boko Haram and ISWAP.[29]
Boko Haram and other terrorist groups continue to circumvent concerted international pressure on terrorist financing by shifting their source of funding from formal financial institutions to local sources of funding. Book Haram need money to achieve so many purposes relating to supplies and logistics, such as recruiting members, buying equipment, as well as paying the salaries of their fighters and the informants who supply them intelligence. Meeting those obligations is so imperative that without consistent funding of the terrorist group, they may be unable to meet their daily obligations of maintaining their cells, paying the remuneration of fighters in different locations, and buying sophisticated weapons desperately needed for their illegal operations. This situation is borne out by Levitt and Jacobson’s conclusion that money is at the heart of terrorism.[30]In the final analysis, Boko Haram, like other terrorist organisations, use both legitimate and illegitimate means to raise funds, and formal and informal channels to move the cash around.
Combatting Terrorism Financing – Rethinking Nigeria’s National Security and Foreign Policy Engagements in West African
In the West Africa region, there are growing concerns about the traceability and transparency of financial flows. The more opaque the financial system the easier it is for terrorists and their financiers to generate and move around the resources they need to perpetuate their heinous crimes. The world of finance is both complex and dynamic. It can hardly be effectively and efficiently circumnavigated completely by any one state or agency of government. It is imperative therefore that Nigeria not only cultivates the necessary diplomatic and security collaborations with other states, particularly in the West Africa region but also periodically upscale the functional capacities of such international arrangements so as to:
1. share information on efforts made to counter terrorism financing and the results achieved and,
2. share lessons learned and good practices in financial intelligence and investigations.
More than ever before it must be realised that Actionable Intelligence predicated on an efficacious EI systems is critical to the outcome of the ongoing war on terror. Huge human and material resource capabilities, including state of the art technologies – both for communication and war – are now readily available to terrorists and their organisations and affiliates world wide. Finance – a veritable live wire for Boko Haram and other terrorist organisations – is increasingly being managed and deployed from within hi-tech environments. Nigeria’s national security and foreign policy machineriesy must similarly continue to deploy EI methodologies which leverages technology to trace and deny access to funds meant for terrorism financing.
Nigeria’s counterterrorism EI efforts must not lose sight of the growing tendency of terrorists to operate in and generate massive resources from the local milieu. As noted, terrorist have resorted to kidnappings for ransom, bank robberies, extortions and tax levies on occupied communities, etc, by which they have raked in billions. EI must also device approaches which focus on traceability and transparency of humanitarian aid including charitable undertakings or donations, and wire transfers and other assistance to societies affected by crisis or insurgency. Sometimes these are the conduit pipes through which resources double back to serve the original terrorist agenda for which they were intended.
EI must be deployed more deliberately to prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from entering or operating in the ECOWAS region, and denying them the opportunity to exploit the region’s trade, immigration, domestic and international travel Systems. Nigeria, as the regional behemoth, has a leading role to play in this regard. The country’s national security and foreign policy machinery, working in synergywith national Agencies and Departments of Governmentas well as in active collaboration with those of other countries in the region, must close the gaps in the relevant extant Agreements and Protocols that drive integration arrangements in the region.The recent Nigeria’s closure of her borders was initiated with this goal in mind. Whilst it is the case that discondant tunes greeted the border closure policy, there can be no gainsaying the associated positives, at least from a national security standpoint. It is indisputeable that the unintended consequences of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movem.As the al-Qaida, ISIS and other terror groups’ spaces continue to shrink in the Middle East and other terrorists’ hotbeds across the world, they (the terrorists) are in desperate search for other countries to move their operations to.
The relative decline in crossborder crimes as well as in the flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons, the drop in the rate of smuggling of all kinds, the reduction in the volume of trafficking both of contrabands and humans can be rightly attributed, if not wholy then at least in part, to the closure of the borders.
However, the point needs to be made that terrorists activities continued unabated at that time. From an EI standpoint, a retooloing of the national security and foreign policy machinery is called for. Information and Communication Technology needs to be frequently and routinely deployed not just through formalized institutions and processes of public administration, but perhaps even more importantly, through informal and communal media. Well over 72 per cent of non-agricultural labour force in sub-saharan Africa.[31]Nigeria’s national security and foreign policy driven EI systems must therefore targeted trade and pricing information, investment strategy, contract details, supplier lists, planning documents, research and development data, technical drawings, and computer databases that deals even more extensively with the informal sector.
Nigeria’s pursuit of Economic Diplomacy must be done in the most circumspect manner. A state battling insurgency, terrorism and other manifestations of insecurity must be careful about international collaborations and support that it craves and the foreign investment that it seeks to attract. Foreign partners and their institutions and structures may try to infiltrate or manipulate the political life of the state for their own benefit. Such meddling may be directed not only by foreign governments, but by foreign political groups and organisations that have the capacity to influence domestic affairs of other states. Hostile foreign powers or business entities may attempt to infiltrate governmental authorities or exert pressure on public officials. In many cases foreign agents interfere with the affairs of ethnic communities within other states by threatening aliens who have relatives abroad to execute certain programs on their behalf. Clandestine attempts at interference in internal affairs especially when it involves threats of coercion or blackmail, constitute threats to national security. Many democratic countries face acute threat of economically prompted international organised crimes or trans-national crimes. Members of highly sophisticated and organised criminal syndicates are now able to pursue a complex web of lucrative legal and illegal actions world-wide. Trans-national criminal syndicates are not afraid to work globally and in any country where legal or bureaucratic loopholes allow them to take advantage of the system.
In effect, EI components of Nigeria’s national security apparatus must be embedded in Nigeria’s foreign economic policy in general and economic diplomacy in particular.
Conclusion
In order to fulfil their obligations to protect the life and security of individuals, States have a right and a duty to take effective counter-terrorism measures, to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and to prosecute those that are responsible for carrying out such acts. EI is one such counterterrorism measures which states have being deploying in this regard.
States in the West Africa region and security agencies of the Nigerian government need to collaborate better on closing the gaps in the relevant Agreements, Conventions and Protocols that guide regional ingtegration arrangements in the areas of trade, immigration, domestic and international traveland financial systems, amongs others.Nigeria must also make it a primary foreign and security policy imperative to further the development of themechanisms that enhance EI sharing in the ECOWAS region. EI is an area that requires expertise and knowledge. The governments must ensure that they recruit and deploy highly trained workforces who have relevant skills and trainings required to respond to the various aspects of national security and the exigencies of EI. There is a critical need for Nigeria to expend appropriate resources in harnessing her EI capabilities and potentials if she is to secure the upper hand vis-a-vis terrorist organisations operating in the region.
[1]HediehNasheri, Economic Espionage and Industrial Spying (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 16. See also Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security (Ottawa: Carleton University Press and the Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1998).
[2]ReliefWeb. 2023. Norway increases support to Lake Chad region. Available online at: https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/norway-increases-support-lake-chad-region
[3]Adisa, Waziri (2021) “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorist Financing and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria,” Journal of Terrorism Studies: Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 1.
DOI: 10.7454/jts.v3i1.1028
[4] UNODC. International Law Aspects of Countering Terrorism. 2009. United Nations. Available online at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FAQ/English.pdf
[5] 1999 constitution of the federal republic
[6] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2008. Human Rights, Terrorism and Counterterrorism. Fact Sheet No. 32. Geneva: United Nations. Available online at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdfP6
[7]Felbab-Brown Vanda. 2018. In Nigeria, we don’t want them back”. Brookings Institute. Available online at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/in-nigeria-we-dont-want-them-back/
[8]Sanni Kunle. 2021. Boko Haram: 350,000 dead in Nigeria — UN. Available online at: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/470476-insurgency-has-killed-almost-350000-in-north-east-undp.html?tztc=1
[9] ICG. 2014. Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. Available online at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/curbing-violence-nigeria-ii-boko-haram-insurgency.
[10] HRW. 2022. Nigeria Events of 2022. Available online at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/nigeria
[11] Jones Mayeni. 2023. Nigeria election 2023: Has Buhari tackled Boko Haram threat? BBC News. Available online at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64667959
[12] Schiffman Gari, economic security in Alan Collins, editor, contemporary security studies toward addition, Oxford University press, 2013. p 210
[13] Schiffman Gari, economic security in Alan Collins, editor, contemporary security studies toward addition, Oxford University press, 2013.
[14]Retter Lucia, Frinking Erik, Hoorens Stijn, Lynch Alice, Nederveen Fook and Phillips William. Relationships between the economy and national security. 2020. RAND Corporation. Available online at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR4200/RR4287/RAND_RR4287.pdf
[15]Jeffrey W. Wright, ‘‘Intelligence and Economic Security,’’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 203–221.
[17]G. Małecki, KomentarzMiędzynarodowyPułaskiego, Pulaski Policy Papers, The economic intelligence system as a crucial factor in the success of the Responsible Development Plan, https://pulaski.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Pulaski_Policy_Paper_No_11_17_EN.pdf.
[18]Ibid
[19] FATF (2016) Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa, Paris, Financial Action Task Force
[20] GIABA (2013) The Nexus between Small and Light Weapons and Money Laundering
in West Africa, Senegal (Dakar), Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa
[21]Igwe, Uche. 2021. We must understand terrorist financing to defeat Boko Haram and Nigeria’s Insurgents. Available online at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/08/03/terrorist-financing-economy-defeat-boko-haram-nigeria-insurgents/.
[22] GCTF. 2021. Countering the Financing of Terrorism in West Africa. Global Counterterrorism Forum Available online at: https://www.thegctf.org/What-we-do/Working-Group-Activities/Detail/ArtMID/840/ArticleID/165/Countering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism-in-West-Africa
[23] Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette. Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022. No. 91, Vol. 109.
[24]Ibid.
[25] United Nations (1999). International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Adopted by the general Assembly of the Uniterd Nations in resolution 54/109 of December 1999. Available at: https://www.un.org/law/cod/finterr.htm
[26] Available at: https://ecowas.int/institutions/the-inter-governmental-action-group-against-money-laundering-and-terrorism-financing-in-africa-giaba/
[27]Igwe, Uche. 2021. We must understand terrorist financing to defeat Boko Haram and Nigeria’s Insurgents. Available online at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2021/08/03/terrorist-financing-economy-defeat-boko-haram-nigeria-insurgents/
[28] Daily Trust (2020) 6 Nigerians Convicted in UAE over B/Haram Funding, Daily Trust. Available online at: https://dailytrust.com/6-nigerians-convicted-in-uae-over-b-haram-funding
[29]Odunsi Wale. 2022. NEWSBoko Haram, ISWAP: Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabaab funding terrorists in Nigeria – Somalia’s President Mohamud. Available online at: https://dailypost.ng/2022/07/07/boko-haram-iswap-al-qaeda-affiliate-al-shabaab-funding-terrorists-in-nigeria-somalias-president-mohamud/
[30] Levitt, Mattew and Jacobson, Michael. 2008. The Money Trail: Finding, Following and Freezing Finances, Washington D.C, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
[31] International Labour Organization 2009 First published 2009. The informal economy in Africa: Promoting transition to formality: Challenges and strategies. International Labour Office, Geneva. Availableat:
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_emp/—emp_policy/documents/publication/wcms_127814.pdf. Date Accessed: 07/04/2021.