Jatto, Adavize Emmanuel
Department of History and International Studies
Federal University Lokoja, Kogi State
Emmanuel.jatto@fulokoja.edu.ng
Abstract
Inter-communal crisis is one of the challenges in Nigeria. A challenge that has and still continues to claim lives and properties in several communities across the country, among which is the Offa/Erin-Ile communities which is noted for incessant violent clashes as revealed in incidents of violent clashes that have bedevilled the communities since at least the 1970s. One basic feature of the conflict however, is the massive deployment of Commissions of inquiry into the crisis, as typical of many Nigerian governments in such cases and instances. This paper therefore attempts an appraisal of specifically the 2008 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the 2006 clash, focusing on key issues addressed by the reports of the commission on root causes of the crises, and the tacit roles or supports given by traditional rulers and community leaders of the parties in conflict to the clashes. This paper deployed historical and analytical tool in the appraisal of the White paper on the report of the judicial commission of inquiry as contained in the Kwara State of Nigeria Gazette. This paper argued that a lack of proper understanding of erstwhile efforts and issues that accentuated the conflict, influenced the decision of the government in her directive on the 2008 commission’s report, hence the failure of the measures taken by that government to yield a lasting solution to the conflict. Furthermore, that while the report indicated tacit involvement of traditional rulers in support of their people against each other hence calling for an admonishment of the rulers, a better approach and measure by the government could have been how best can the tool of facilitated negotiation be employed by the government in aiding dialogues between the rulers, who then as important member of traditional institution can help aid conflict management.
Keyword: Conflict Management, Inter-communal Crisis, Judicial Commission of inquiry.
Introduction
Studies on security in Nigeria have revealed inter-communal crisis as one of the major forms of crises that bedevils communities across many areas of Nigeria. These conflicts can take the form of indigene-settler community crisis, religious crises or disagreements, or even conflicts over boundaries for instance, Ezza/Ezillo crisis[1], Ife-Modakeke crisis[2], Share-Tsharagi Crisis[3] and Offa/Erin-Ile[4] crisis to mention a few. Conflicts between communities such as mentioned above have claimed many lives, and also orchestrated the destructions of properties, as some studies claimed that these crises have even led to colossal economic losses.[5] Not only this, but the fact that most of these conflicts have the characteristics of re-occurring at any given instances has been a source of long term concern for policy makers especially in the consideration of the best approaches to managing such conflicts and transform the crisis situation.
The Offa and Erin-Ile case has not been an exception to the above factor or issue. The two communities have over the years engaged in many forms of violent encounters over land, leaving scores dead and properties destroyed. The foundation of the animosity which have been traced to events pre-dating colonial era in Nigeria[6] have led to at least about five confrontations which took place in 1970, 1982, 2006, 2013 and 2021. Needless to say that these conflict have been violent, hence making it a source of serious concern to respective administrators of the state, many of which reverted to setting up several commissions of enquiries in the bid to find lasting solutions to the problem, among which were the Adaramola commission of enquiry on the Offa-Erin-Ile boundary 1972, and the judicial commission of inquiry 2008 which is presently being interrogated in this paper. An appraisal of the conflict however, even after several efforts and reports on the crisis by the various commissions, reveals the incessant nature and resurgence of violence between the two communities, an incident which have brought further cause for concern and the need to evaluate the effectiveness of boundary commissions, and their reports, in the attempts to manage the conflict, by taking a case study of the report of the 2008 Judicial Commission of inquiry and government’s decisions and actions on their recommendations. An appraisal such as this could help explain the efficiency or lack thereof of various commissions or inquiries often set up by governments in an attempt to manage conflicts such as the Offa-Erin-Ile conflict.
Conflict management can be simply defined as all measures of steps aimed at preventing or in some cases transforming conflict or crisis situations into peaceful ones.[7] The term conflict management is often employed to describe the various forms of conflict interventions. The term have been used to generally describe the various forms of positive conflict handling approaches for instance resolution and transformation of conflicts, as well as the various efforts at containing violent conflicts such as described by Lund as the act of necessary intervention to achieve political settlements, especially by those powerful actors who possess the power and resources to bring pressure on the conflicting parties in order to induce them to settle. Similarly, it is also the art of creating necessary institutions to guide the inevitable conflict into appropriate channels with the aim of stopping degeneration into violence.[8] From the explanation above, it can be deduced that a key focus of conflict management is the settlement of crisis especially through the use of existing institutions, and this can mean the involvement of appropriate powerful or influential authorities who are powerful and influential enough to use pressure or their influence on conflicting parties to ensure that there is peace.
In the attempt to manage conflict, often times several mechanisms have been explored by scholars, including mechanisms such as involving institutions like the laws, diplomatic procedures, domestic organisations, international institutions as well as any group indigenous or foreign that is capable enough to influence a change of violent actions in the parties in conflict and can influence them on addressing their differences through other means than the use of arms or violence. The roles of institutions in conflict management have made some scholars classify many peacekeeping and support operations of international bodies like Economic Community of West Africa, and United Nations as conflict management efforts.[9] However, the effects and roles of indigenous traditional institutions and practices such as that employed known as Gacaca in Rwanda[10] have also not been left out as key conflict management mechanism, but rather have reinforced the roles of African traditional institutions and practices in the management of conflicts.
A History of Offa/Erin-Ile conflict
Several studies on the Offa/Erin-Ile conflict as well as legal documents on the crisis have attributed it largely to boundary dispute between the two neighbouring communities.[11] While several other factors such as feuds or animosity deeply rooted in their respective narrations of their historical antecedents which proofs a struggle for hegemony is a key factor, as can be seen from claims and counter-claims by the two communities about their ages of settlements, and their over lordship over one another prior to the advent of colonialism.[12] However, the major points of collusion have often been in a designated location between the two communities, which is mutually claimed by them to the exclusion of the other. Oral accounts portrayed the possibilities of several skirmishes between the two communities long before any known written records especially over the issue of supremacy and control.
The first, officially documented clash between Offa and Erin-Ile was in the 1970s, the origin of which was attributed to an alleged assault on a convoy of Offa dignitaries passing through Erin-Ile, an assault which degenerated into violence claiming lives and destroying properties.[13] While the source of the clash was not clear, a major fact was that it was a bloody one forcing government’s intervention, and subsequently leading to the formation of the first boundary commission headed by Dr. Funsho Adaramola in 1972. This commission was saddled with the responsibility of investigation into the crisis and mapping out the said area of dispute between the two communities. The Commission after its efforts presented its reports, and indicated a demarcation of the boundary for both communities, which largely favoured the Erin-Ile community giving them ownership of the land far into the interior of Offa community, precisely the area around the present Offa Descendant Union Secretariat. However, the decision of the Commission was challenged by the Offa people at the Supreme Court; challenging among other things, the legality of the commission and its headship, Dr. Adaramola in carrying out the task. While the judgement of the supreme court did not end in favour of the Offa people, as it affirmed the Adaramola boundary reports and the identification of the boundary between the two communities to be around the present day Ibadan Electrical Distribution Office (formerly NEPA) office or the present day Offa Descendants Union’s secretariat which is far into the hinterland of the place being claimed by Offa community. Subsequently, it would seem from the incessant uprisings and clashes that the issue from thence on became more violent and clashes more frequent for instance the outbreak of violence in 1982, 2006 and 2013 among others.
The next major outbreak of violence between the two communities was in 1982 and 2006 respectively, still on the issue of boundary and land ownership, the violence which broke out as a result of trespasses over the disputed land especially with attempts to construct structures on the disputed area by people from the either sides of the communities led to several bloody skirmishes claiming lives and destroying properties. The June 2006 conflict for instance, was initiated by the attempt by some Offa indigenes to erect a structure on the disputed land, and the forceful eviction of the group from the area by some Erin-Ile indigenes, and concurrently the attempt by some Erin-Ile indigenes and labourers to also construct an alleged ‘Galilee’ praying ground, which led to confrontations between them and some Offa indigenes and sparked the violence.
The immediate cause of the civil disturbance was the construction of the Galilee fence by Erin-Ile people besides the Federal Polytechnic fence, Offa, which is beyond the buffer zone on the side of Offa and into Offa land. Added to this is the demolition of the iron structures opposite the Galilee site by Erin-Ile people, which is also beyond the Buffer Zone, on Offa side.[14]
The above assertion was corroborated in an interview with the then Offa local government chairman who was physically present at the scene as an active participant.[15] The skirmishes which lasted for about two days led to about 25 recorded deaths and the destruction of infrastructures and properties such as shopping complexes, places of worship, and several cars both packed at the Mechanic workshop and some plying the road during the incident.[16] The magnitude of the incident within the state, which was not the first of its kind, prompted the formation of a seven man judicial commission of inquiry by the Governor Bukola Saraki led administration.
The 2008 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa-Erin-Ile dispute
While it was not the first, nor the last commission set up in response to crisis within the area, the 2008 Judicial Commission was unique for being a judicial commission, aimed at making a judicial enquiry into the 2006 crisis, and while it is not the first commission set up to examine the conflict, the commission focused much attention on the root and immediate causes of the crisis, as well as the historical antecedents of the crisis, furthermore, given the level of carnage of the 2006 conflict, the commission was also saddled with the responsibility of recommending possible solution to the crisis,[17] so as to aid government’s effort at judicial intervention into the crisis, and also at management of the crisis. The commission had six point terms of reference which were:
1. To investigate and ascertain the immediate and remote cause and causes that led to the violent civil disturbances that began at Offa/Erin-Ile on 20th June, 2006.
2. To determine circumstances leading to loss of lives during the course of disturbance and determine whether any person or group of persons and association by conduct or in anyways caused or contributed to the loss of lives of any other person or persons and make recommendations as to measures to be taken against such person or group of persons or associations.
3. To investigate and identify persons other than security personnel, who possessed firearms during the civil disturbance.
4. To ascertain the extent of loss and damage to property following the civil disturbance.
5. To make recommendations on how to avoid such disturbance in Kwara state in future
6. To make recommendations on other matters incidental to the foregoing and make recommendation generally.[18]
Findings Of The Commission In Accordance With Its Mandate Include:
The Remote causes of the violent crisis in 2006
The immediate causes of the 2006 crisis
Tacit supports given by the traditional rulers of the two communities to their people in the 2006 crisis
The Remote Causes of the Violent Crisis in 2006
Historical antecedents linked to age-long boundary dispute dated to sometimes around 1907 which has resulted into intermittent clashes with loss of lives and wanton destruction of properties, notable among which were those of 1982, and 2006 (the main subject of inquiry).
Secondly, is the mutual animosity and suspicion between the two communities over the years which has been so intense and bottled up that at the slightest provocation there could be chaos, crisis, killings and wanton destruction of properties such as was the case on June 20 2006.
Thirdly, while there had been previous decisions between the two communities, edicts and legal notifications by past administrations in the state, about the issue, there has been a lack of consensus on the boundary line which put the boundary between the communities before the location of the present Offa Federal Polytechnic. And that from memoranda submitted, evidence adduced in court, its history and general belief, Erin-Ile community is of the feeling that it settled in its present location long before Offa. This has brought about its feelings that it is being cheated from its inheritance in the ownership of the land into Offa township. And
Finally the lukewarm attitude of successive administrations in Kwara state dating back to the time of the land dispute particularly after the acquisition of the disputed area in not making it presence felt at the Buffer Zone has in no small measure been a part of the remote cause of the unfortunate crisis. This is because there has been nothing done by the successive regimes to secure the created buffer zone and to ward off encroachment into the zone.
The commission on the point above however made no recommendation to the government.[19]
APPRAISAL OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE VIOLENCE AS DESCRIBED BY THE COMMISSION’S REPORT
Evidences from research or findings of the commission revealed that the crisis between the two communities is rooted in age-long struggle that predated even the boundary disputes, for right from oral tradition about their emergence and settlements, the argument of supremacy is well entrenched and this accounts are even backed up by traditionally revered personalities and custodians of the Yoruba culture like the Alaafin of Oyo.[20] Also, the fact that there had not been a mutually satisfactory agreement between the two communities since the official efforts have been commenced to ensure a settlement, even though there was a peace accord signed by representatives of the two communities in 1975 and the establishment of a buffer zone between the two communities by the administration of Colonel Peter Ogar in 1998.[21] The two communities have not ceased hostilities against each other and this factor fuelled by the inability of the government to consolidate on subsequent agreements and efforts all points to a good summation by the commission on the causes of the crisis. However, the response and decision of the then Kwara state government on the issues raised by the Commission, raises concern especially judging from the government’s decision about the commission’s report, contained in a white paper, stating that about the said land in dispute;
The parcel of land in the buffer zone measuring about 1732.258 hectares be shared equally between the two communities-Offa and Erin-Ile, that is 859, 754 hectares each. The share of Offa should include the 428.218 hectares already developed by Offa Community. The Ministry of lands and Housing should handle appropriately[22]
A cursory examination of the government’s directive above about the commission’s report reveals apparent lack of consciousness of history of the crisis as well as the root causes of the event and the previous attempts at managing the crisis which this study discuss below
Lack of consideration of erstwhile attempts to settle the conflict: Erstwhile attempts such as the formation of Daramola boundary commission which had the mandate to mark demarcations and did the same, had been as pointed out above a major source of fuel for the existing animousity, and his findings have remained a major source of contestation, struggles, fighting and clashes both legal and physical hence resulting into serious recurring clashes between the two parties. A cursory look into history could have made this obvious to the then 2006 Bukola Saraki administration that tolling such line of action again as it did, to create a marked spot for each of the communities will not only raised the existing tension, but is more likely to start fresh skirmishes, which it actually did as would be observed in the major issues and factors responsible for future skirmishes like the 2013, 2016 clashes respectively.[23]
Another factor that demonstrated a lack of adherence to the lessons from historical antecedents by the government of the time was the issue of the creation of buffer zone in 1997, which was done with a stated intension to allow for peace, initiated and established by the then government of Colonel Peter Ogar[24], which instead of apportioning the disputed lands to any of the two communities, decided to make the said land a buffer zone or what was called in local dialect “Kere Ipinle”. The government of Colonel Peter used the Land Use Act of 1978, to acquire the piece of land between the two community for which they were in conflict, and designated it for commercial and industrial purposes.[25] The Edict read thus:
There is hereby created a buffer zone between Offa and Erin-Ile Towns in Kwara state of Nigeria to be known as Kere-Ipinle Buffer Zone and The piece of land which is hereby acquired shall be used for industrial and commercial purposes. Thirdly, the boundary lines demarcating the said buffer zone hereby created shall be as described in the schedule to this order which maybe cited as the Kere-Ipinle Buffer Zone order 1997.[26]
The decision was made to create a mutual points of peace between the two communities, although the Col. Ogar’s administration was not able to live up to its promise of making the zone an industrial area for mutual benefits of the two communities, its decision to establish and maintain a buffer zone was identified by the Judicial Commission of enquiry as a key to managing the conflict only if it was worked upon.[27] Although the report never stated in clear terms how the Colonel Peter Ogar’s edict can be used to manage the crisis, the then Kwara state government under Governor Bukola Saraki in 2008 decided to share the said land between the two communities rather than retaining the buffer zone initiated by its predecessor the Col. Peter Ogar’s administration. Thus the struggle over land ownership by the two communities soon resurfaced as the communities started encroaching on each other’s sides of the land divide again thereby leading to subsequent conflicts such as the 2013 and 2016 conflicts.[28] Hence the decision of the government after the 2008 report to share the land between the two communities did more to escalate the tension instead of de-escalating it.
The 2008 Government’s Decision to Build Kwara Unity Road between the Two Communities
Another major area of concern to us in this study, was the decision of the Kwara state government to construct a unity road between the two communities in conflict in 2008, after it assessment of the Judicial commission of enquiry’s report. The Bukola Saraki administration choose to settle the land dispute by stating that
the shared parcels of land between Offa and Erin-Ile should be properly demarcated with a boundary road to be named KWARA UNITY ROAD that will use up the balance of 12.75 hectares of land… The road should be surface dressed, as a permanent demarcation and with other boundary features, e.g trees on both sides of the road. It should equally be properly surveyed. The Ministries of Works and Transport, Lands and Housing and Environment and Tourism should handle accordingly.[29]
The decision of the government on the 2008 commission’s recommendation above which was presented under the guise of reducing the tension by instead of maintaining the previous Buffer zone arrangement of Colonel Peter’s government decided on creation of a Kwara Unity road, also in no small way accentuated the conflict instead of dousing it.
One of the major challenges with this decision lies in it vagueness, the decision which is indicated in the government’s white paper on the commission’s report[30] could not state clearly what use or what purpose the created unity road will serve, except what can be described as an unguided spending spree by government. Also, while the said road was constructed, between the two communities, it was not connected to any major economic spot, industry or farmlands that can economically serve the area, or even serve its people, rather the street was there and left unattended to as it really connected no major parts of the communities in conflict. Thirdly, while the directive was that other boundary demarcating features be placed on the land, and proper survey be done, there was no further instruction on what these features should be and what purpose they should serve. For instance, demarcating features like sign-posts, and peace oriented figurines could have been more descriptive of a well-planned structure aimed at achieving peace. Furthermore, the directive begs the questions of what the effect both developmental and physically spending huge amount of money constructing a road between two warring communities could be in managing conflict.
Financial burden of the road construction
Among the many areas of noticeable flaws of the decision of the government in 2008 to construct a Unity road, was its decision on how the construction of the Kwara Unity road would be financed. The State government’s decision on the funding for the construction of the unity road was that the fund be provided by both the state government and the two local governments. The white paper stated thus:
The construction of the road should be co-funded by the State and the two affected Local Government Councils of Offa and Oyun. The contract of the construction of road should be awarded and construction work on same should commence in earnest. The Ministries of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs Works and Transport should arrange accordingly.[31]
The above directive and action of the government reflects the weak judgement of the administration about the nature and root and better ways of managing the said conflict. As previously noted above, the fact that the Unity road has no known or stipulated economic or social advantage to the people in conflict is a major flaw in the decision, which is further accentuated by the fact that huge amount of the cost of constructing the road have to be bore by the state government and local government, an amount which arguably should have gone into other productive economic ventures or better still into securing an industrially viable buffer zone that can help bring the conflict under control.
THE 2008 JUDICIAL COMMISSION’S FINDINGS ON THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS
On the immediate incident that triggered the conflict on June 20, 2006, the report indicated thus:
The immediate cause of the civil disturbance was the construction of the Galilee fence by Erin-Ile people besides the Federal Polytechnic fence, Offa, which is beyond the buffer zone on the side of Offa and into Offa land. Added to this is the demolition of the iron structures opposite the Galilee site by Erin-Ile people, which is also beyond the Buffer Zone, on Offa side[32]
The response of the Kwara state government to this finding by the commission included the suspension of the two Local Government chairmen, and the use of conventional security operatives to man the zone of the conflict for a while. The white paper stated thus:
The buffer zone should be effectively manned by security operatives before commencement of construction works on the boundary road and for a minimum of four (4) weeks after completion of construction works to avert any unforeseen circumstances. The Special Adviser Security should implement this in liason with Security Agents in the state and that the ministry of justice should gazette the white paper appropriately. [33]
Appraisal of the government’s action on the immediate cause of the crisis
A probe into subsequent factors that led to the emergence of subsequent conflict reveals the roles of youths in the crisis as major actors, many of which became involved in such venture of perpetuating the violence due largely to factors like unemployment orchestrated by poor economic condition[34] which an industrially and economically viable venture in the area could have ameliorated. A major concern of the factors such as poor economic condition, youth unemployment and government’s neglect of infrastructural development serves to encourage future violence if not well attended to.
The directive of the government on the commission’s report above also reflects the tradition of dependence on conventional means of crisis settlement that have been a major feature of conflict management or containment efforts in Nigeria. The use of or reliance on police and other security agents in maintaining peace especially after immediate occurrence of violence is key, however, it should be noted as earlier argued that a key feature of conflict management involves the use of institutions not only law enforcement agents, but other institutions capable of convincing the parties in conflict to cease hostilities and embrace peace where and when necessary. It should also be noted that subsequent occurrences of outbreaks of violence between the two communities have proved the system of keeping security operatives at the boundary fringes of the two communities as largely ineffective at the long run. For instance, after the stipulated weeks and the departure of security officials such areas become volatile again and also, while the 2008 government’s directive made a provision for the construction of a police post by the road side of the Unity road constructed, the police post have largely been abandoned and not meaningfully manned enough to prevent future and incessant confrontations by the two communities for instance in 2013 and 2016.
THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION’S REPORT ON TACIT ENDORSEMENT GIVEN BY THE TWO TRADITIONAL RULERS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS TO THEIR PEOPLE IN THE CONFLICT
Among the areas considered by the commission and its report was the area of the involvement of and the actions of the traditional rulers of the two communities in the escalation of the violence. The report stated thus:
The commission found from all the available evidence both documentary and oral that, the two traditional rulers and community leaders of the two communities gave tacit approval to the actions of their people before and during the crisis. Evidence adduced reveal that the two traditional rulers were briefed and given on the spot reports of the situation before and during the crisis by the Chairmen of the two (2) Local Governments, the Police, Community Leaders and people of the two communities who in turn received instructions and approval to their actions from the traditional rulers which culminated into the civil disturbance.[35]
The above fact was presented by the judicial commission for necessary action by the government, and the following recommendation was also made; ‘The commission hereby recommends very strongly that the two traditional rulers be admonished and bonded to forestall a future occurrence at the risk of stiffer sanctions.’ [36]
The State Government’s Response to Tacit Endorsement by Traditional Rulers of Offa and Erin-Ile in the 2006 Crisis.
The government agreed to the recommendation and agreed to the admonishment of the traditional rulers to forestall future occurrence. This prompted the government’s directives to the two rulers, encouraging them to embrace more peaceful means of co-habiting and cautioning their people against violence and future violent clashes.
An Appraisal of the government’s response to the Tacit Endorsement given by the Two Traditional Rulers in the 2006 Crisis
A glaring fact as can be seen both from official evidences and studies on the 2006 Offa/Erin-Ile crisis reveals that a major factor in the communal clashes and struggles between the two communities is the influence and roles of its traditional leaders[37], a case to drive home this point is the fact that the rulers of both communities until recent times have no business sitting with each other in occasions, and neither do they agreed on matters or pay each other visits.[38] Traditional leaders in societies not only plays the roles of administration, but are often models, seen and acknowledged as custodians of traditions and representatives of their people,[39] position which gives them the advantage of serving as beacon of peace and hope especially in situation of chaos. As noted above, traditional rulers are even one of the prominent traditional institutions that can encourage successful conflict management, through actions like clearly dissociating themselves from narratives, events, and declarations that could be provocative, incisive shunning non-challant responses to knowledge of crisis as was the case in Offa and Erin-Ile as revealed in the report. This silence not only accentuated the violence but encouraged it.
However, while the government based on the recommendation of the commission took the step of admonishing the rulers, this paper argued that a better approach could have been to actively engage them in the conflict management/resolution venture to ensure a return of peace to the communities. For if their actions and inactions were powerful enough to incite or encourage the violence, then their involvement as traditional institution in the process of managing the conflict can also go a long way to stem the tide of violence and manage the conflict from re-occurring as it later did. The rulers can be engaged in the conflict by rather admonishing them to play ‘meditative’ roles in the conflicts, through getting the traditional rulers to come to terms via negotiation. Conflict management as an activity involves every process aimed at finding lasting solution to crisis by involving steps that can help mitigate violence. Among the various means of managing conflict is the process of Negotiation.[40]
And negotiation involves dialogue by parties in conflict.[41] It is essential that the traditional rulers of the two communities be effectively engaged in dialogue, an atmosphere which must be created by the institution of the state and the local government, to discuss the issues of differences between the two communities, as well as way forward and the best way of achieving peace. This form of intervention can help the traditional rulers reach a better agreement about the differences existing between the two communities, and further encourage them to in turn play the role of mediator in the conflict, for this role of traditional rulers is very important to the maintenance of peace and order in the society.[42]
Hence instead of the state government simply stopping at admonishment of the two rulers as it did based on the recommendation of the report, thereby depicting their understanding of the roles of such traditional rulers as merely traditional figures to be controlled by the government, an understanding of their key roles in traditional conflict resolution, and their power of influence should be annexed to the benefit of managing the re-occurring Offa/Erin-Ile conflicts.
Conclusion
This study examined the 2008 Judicial commission of inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Inter-communal conflicts of 2006 and the government’s response to them, and while acknowledging the fact that every identified directives in the government’s white paper on the crisis were promptly carried out by the government, points out noticeable flaws in the directives as well as the reports that could have probably prevented further violent crisis that later bedevilled the communities in subsequent years. And this paper proposes therefore that more attention and focus be placed on traditional rulers and their roles as mediators in communal conflicts, if only they themselves could be first employed to engage in negotiations with their rival party and reach a compromise on which their mediation and engagements with their own community members can be built and a basis for which the conflict can be managed.
[1] Dennis Agbo, ‘Brothers At War! The Story of the Ezza/Ezillo communal Strife.’Vanguard March 6, 2010. NP.
[2]J. B. Adekanye, Linking Conflict Diagnosis Conflict Prevention, to Conflict Management in Contemporary Africa. (Surulere: Apapa Press LTD, year)
[3] J. O. Toriola, ‘The Ife/ Modakeke Crisis: An Insider View’ IFE PschologI A Journal Vol. 9, No. 3, (2001): 21-29
[4] E. A. Jatto, ‘Offa/Erin-Ile Inter-communal Conflicts from 1970-2006: A Case study of 2006’, (B. A. Project, Federal University Lokoja, 2016)
[5] J. Gbenda, ‘Age-long land conflicts in Nigeria: A Case study for traditional Peacemaking Mechanism’ (MSc. dissertation Department of Political Science Benue State University, year),
[6] E. A. Jatto, ‘Offa/Erin-Ile Inter-communal Conflicts from 1970-2006: A Case study of 2006’,
[7] Gourlay, R. “Negotiation and Bargaining”. Management Decision Volume 25, Number 3. 1987: 20
[8] M. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflict, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Press 1999).
[9] H. Galadima, ‘Peace Support Operations in Africa’ in Best S. G. (ed), Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books. 2006). 61-76
[10] J. Rapper, The Gacaca Experiment Rwanda’s Restorative Dispute Resolution response to the genocide. (Ball Supra-PePP. Disp. Resol. 1994) NP
[11] Ojelabi, E. O. Akinwale, O.E. Uyieh, J. Communal Clash and Conflict Management in Nigeria: An Investigation of Erin-Ile and Offa Crisis, 2006-2018. Local Development and Society Vol. 2. Issue 1: 3-21.
[12] Oral Interview with Alhaji Tajudeen Aro, 65, Former Local Government Chairman Offa, and Captain Salami, Former National Chairman Erin-Ile Progressive Union, Erin-Ile,
[13] Y. S. Salawu, ‘Impact of Offa-Erin-Ile Crisis: Police Imposes Dust-to-Dawn-Curfew,’The Herald Sunday June 25, 2006: 3
[14]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives. Kwara State of Nigeria Gazette, No. 2, Vol. 42, 28th February, 2008. Ilorin: Government Printer: 5 – 6.
[15] Oral Interview with Alhaji Tajudeen Aro, 65, Former Local Government Chairman Offa Local Government, Offa, August 12, 2016, Direct
[16] Ojelabi, E. O. Akinwale, O.E. Uyieh, J. Communal Clash and Conflict Management in Nigeria: An Investigation of Erin-Ile and Offa Crisis, 2006-2018.
[17] Ojelabi, E. O. Akinwale, O.E. Uyieh, J. Communal Clash and Conflict Management in Nigeria: An Investigation of Erin-Ile and Offa Crisis, 2006-2018. 8
[18]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives. 2.
[19] White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives
[20]‘How Erin-Ile People got their land-Alafin’, Sunday Sketch November 14, 1971. NP.
[21]Offa Descendants’ Union ‘Open Letter to KWSG on Erin-Ile/Offa Boundary as Appeal Court Judgement Affirms Dr.Funsho Daramola Commission’s findings’ The Herald, Monday December 3, 2012.:8
[22]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives: 2
[23] See Ojelabi, E. O. Akinwale, O.E. Uyieh, J. Communal Clash and Conflict Management in Nigeria: An Investigation of Erin-Ile and Offa Crisis, 2006-2018.
[24] Colonel Peter Ogar was the Military administrator of Kwara state in 1997, and was instrumental in evoking the land use decree to establish a buffer zone between Offa and Erin-Ile with the aim of helping to manage the crisis.
[25] Akinnusi, A. Alao, O. and Mavalla, A. Interrogating Governments’ Interventions in Communal Clashes: The Erin-Ile/Offa Conflicts in Perspective. Global Journal of Human Social Science: A Arts and Humanities-Psychology, Vol. 19, Number 6, 2019: 27-31
[26]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives:5
[27] White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives
[28] Ojelabi, E. O. Akinwale, O.E. Uyieh, J. Communal Clash and Conflict Management in Nigeria: An Investigation of Erin-Ile and Offa Crisis, 2006-2018.. 10
[29]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives.: 5
[30] White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives: 6
[31]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives. 5
[32] White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives: 6
[33]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives. :5
[34] David Alao, ‘The Effects of Communal Clashes on Socio-Economic Development: A Study of Erin-Ile and Offa, Kwara State, Nigeria’. The International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies Vol. 7, Issue. 7, (year): 35-41
[35]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives.9
[36]White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Offa/Erin-Ile Disturbance Destruction of Property and Loss of Lives. 9
[37] E. A. Jatto, ‘Offa/Erin-Ile Inter-communal Conflicts from 1970-2006: A Case study of 2006’.
[38] Oral Interview with Chief Abolade, 67, Retired teacher, Offa, 20 June 2023
[39] S. J. Cookey, Traditional Rulers in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Safari Books LTD. 2010)
[40] Gourlay, R. “Negotiation and Bargaining”. 23
[41] Lax, D. A. and Sebenius, J. K. The Manager as Negotiator, (New York: Free Press. 1986)
[42] T. Falola, and S. Akinrinade, ‘The Role of Traditional Rulers in Society: A Case Study of Yoruba Obas and Chiefs before 1960’ In Aborisade, O. (ed.) Local Government and Traditional Rulers in Nigeria. (Ile Ife: Ile Ife University Press, Osun State 2005): 12