AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRADICTIONS OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Jude K. Cocodia
Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Nigeria and Department of Political Studies and Governance, University of the Free State, South Africa
Email: jcocodia41@gmail.com
Abstract
Authors are of different views on what the aims of peace operations really are. One group takes a neo-realist approach and contends that the fundamental role of peace operations is as regulator of the state-based international system hence the emphasis for peacebuilding. Another hinges its position on the provision of negative peace and argues that the function of peace operations is to manage and resolve conflict hence they advocate peace management. A third group sees it as humanitarian action aimed at reducing suffering and so opt for peace support.But what really is the role of peace operations? What do peace operations serve to achieve? Who benefits? The Top-bottom approach of peace operations has ensured, unfortunately, that what is achieved is often negative peace – the cessation of violence. This approach does not erase the tensions that led to the war in the first place. This makes the possibility of a relapse probable. Conversely, a bottom-up approach where the locals, through Civil Society Organisations, are part of the peace operations process, increases the sense of ownership of the peace process and holds greater prospects for positive peace which is durable. Using discourse analysis, this paperre-examines the major debates and contradictions that have ensured the existence of gaps between objectives and outcomes, and challenges the concept of peace operations as well as offers insights on ways to improve.
Keywords: Peace Operations, Success, Failure, Intervention, Responsibility to Protect
Introduction
Much of the conflicts in the world today, latent and violent, seem to defy the need for peace operations and makes the concept look like some moribund or outdated peace strategy like the balance of power. Scholars are easily drawn to the analysis of new events and theories and old issues quickly become outdated and almost insignificant. Following the Kuhnian tradition (see Stanford Encyclopedia, 2019) that no matter how important it is to keep abreast with events and propound new theories that explain the present and serve the future, it is necessary to keep in touch with the past. This is one of the major reasons behind this research. So, the aim is not to provide new insights about peace operations, but to remind on the aims of peace operations. In doing this, this paper also examines the contradictions that have ensured the existence of gaps between objectives and outcomes, and challenged the very concept of peace operations. This does not imply that this paper treats peace operations as moribund or dated strategies, but given the increasing conflict scenarios where peace operations cannot deploy (or have been prevented), before the chapter closes on this strategy that has existed for over half a century, it is necessary to examine the issues that made it popular and yet not trusted.
Military oriented peace operations have had a chequered history. For its successes some scholars see it as a core component of the international community’s conflict resolution mechanism that has come to stay. This position does not deny the failures of peace operations, which when they occur, taint the image of the organisation in charge. Other scholars consider it an illogical attempt at neo-imperialism. The controversies that trail peace operations extend from theory, to practice and to its norms, and provide gaps between expectation and outcome.
Scholars are of different views on what the basic aims of military oriented peace operations really are. One group contends that the fundamental role of peace operations is as regulator of the state-based international system. The point scholars in this school of thought make is that preservation of the international system by the maintenance, or the replacement, of its basic state building blocks is the principal classical function of peace operations (MacQueen, 2006). Another school sees the function of peace operations to basically be the management and resolution of conflict, which has largely been intrastate since the end of the cold war (Fortna, 2004). Others contend that it should function for humanitarian purposes and so provide security and reduce suffering (O’Neil and Rees, 2005). This position contends that the role of peace operations should be to prevent the worsening of civil strife which inflicts irreparable harm to the lives of those left behind (Flores, 2009:3). This view argues that peace operations should guard against the prolongation of suffering. While not providing novel insights to knowledge, this paper captures major debates in peace literature, probes what is, and highlights the flaws inherent in the exercise and then attempts to address these deficits.
Common Morality and the Justification for Humanitarian Intervention:
The humanitarian view points of preventing loss of lives and reducing human suffering have been offered as the reasons for intervention. In the face of unnecessary human suffering brought about by intra state wars, humanitarian intervention is the answer to the challenge of what needs to be done (Dannreuther, 2008:14). Though too little of international law supports intervention on humanitarian grounds especially in the face of respect for sovereignty as specified in Article 2 of the UN Charter, in the struggle between respecting sovereignty or responding to humanitarian needs, the latter trumps the former (Finnemore, 2003:79). In view of the lack of support from international law, Terry Nardin (2003) contends that though the principle of sovereignty which prohibits external intervention finds firm support in international law and Article 2 of the UN Charter, there is an older practice where force is applied to penalise wrongs and justify protection of the innocent. This tradition which he defines as natural law or common morality, holds that it is permissible to ensure standards of civil disobedience when leaders trample on the rights of citizens. This custom and not international law best explains the ethical basis for humanitarian intervention. Nardin (2003) and Finnemore (2003) agree that the legitimacy of such intervention is heightened when it consists of states acting multilaterally.
Failure to apply this common morality has led to catastrophic consequences. Koffi Annan (in Oliver 2002: 100) notes that ‘we have found ourselves standing by, in impotent horror, while the most appalling crimes were committed … Sometimes peace has to be made – or enforced – before it can be kept.’ MacQueen (2006) and Alex Bellamy (2008) argue that there have been efforts to galvanise the international community into prompt intervention on humanitarian grounds through avenues such as the Responsibility to Protect Principle (R2P), but the tendency of states to jealously guard their sovereignty against intrusion has been a cog in the wheel. The international community defers to peace operations because of the need to protect human rights. ‘States have a responsibility to protect their own population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. When they manifestly fail to do so, the international community acquires a duty to protect vulnerable populations’ (Bellamy et al, 2010: 4). Acting on this maxim, the sanctity of sovereignty is overridden and the preservation and protection of life takes precedence. So, ‘state sovereignty is considered contingent on unthreatening behaviour, human rights adherence and good governance’ (Pugh, 2013:394).
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Belligerents in today’s wars, rather than target other militia groups or government forces, usually target civilian populations. This brings to the fore the need to protect civilians in conflict, whether they are refugees or internally displaced persons (IDP’s). The use of the R2P connotes two interpretations. One interpretation sees the R2P as the responsibility of a state to its citizens. This interpretation contends that the ability to respect and protect the rights of populations in its care determines a state’s sovereignty and legitimacy (Bellamy et al, 2010: 29-30: Glanville, 2011:233). Another interpretation sees it as stemming from a global recognition to avoid widespread acts of inhumaneness like genocide and ethnic cleansing (Evans, 2008:284; Pattison, 2008: 128; Hultman, 2013:60).
This second conception of the R2P challenges the Westphalian tradition by contending that sovereignty is a privilege earned by states by protecting their people, and not some entitlement (Robiliard, 2011:25). As such, criticisms have arisen against the R2P and prominent among these critiques is the moral hazard theory. In economics, moral hazard is the phenomenon in which the provision of protection against risk unintentionally promotes irresponsible or fraudulent risk-taking, and thereby perversely increases the likelihood of the undesired outcome (Kuperman, 2008:50). The moral hazard theory holds that the R2P promotes and incites genocide and mass atrocities rather than prevent them.
Despite genocide being a common outcome of rebellions, groups ignore the danger of stoking violent state response and embark on rebellions in a bid to attract international intervention that is exploited to prop and accentuate the rebellion. While these interventions sometimes help rebellions succeed, other times, the rebellions fail and it is difficult to avert the catastrophe that emanates from state retaliation (Kuperman, 2008b:219). Another critique of the R2P contends that by instigating aggrieved parties or groups to forge armed resistance and reject mediated peace deals, suffering is prolonged. This is exemplified in the conflict in Darfur where armed groups attacked certain government installations and the response of the government was classified a genocide. (Kuperman, 2009:285-286; Robiliard, 2011:23).
Another critique against the R2P is that nations in conflict become too dependent on international assistance. This is even stretched to the point where civil society abdicates THE role they could play in securing lives and advocating peace. This school of thought contends that the R2P should consist more of the international community compelling people to adopt self-help (comunal) strategies of protecting themselves against intense violence (Mégret, 2009: 580)
It has been argued that the moral hazard theory reduces the explanation of complex and multilevel phenomena to a single key variable and misinterprets significant pieces of information that do not correspond to the theory (Bellamy and Williams, 2012:541). The moral hazard theory ignores that part of the R2P that ties sovereignty to state responsibility. If states try to adhere to their responsibilities towards their populations, there would rarely be the need for violent rebellions or secession bids in the first place. In Botswana for example, the state has managed resources for the wellbeing of its people and has been one of Africa’s most stable and peaceful states since its independence in 1966 (Meredith,2006:285 and 386).
The R2P focuses on the wellbeing of individuals, communities, and that part of their social existence that is focuses on averting threats and concentrates on protection at the grassroots or communal levels (Glasius, 2008:32). In keeping with this principle, the last two decades have seen peace missions deployed to areas in civil conflict with the aim of establishing peace. Even when building the peace fails, peace operations have the responsibility of averting the worst deprivations at the least (Melander, 2009:390). This second connotation of the R2P is at the core of the Constitutive Act (Article 4h) of the African Union (AU). Under this Act, the organisation reserves the right to intervene in crisis arising from a member state’s inability to guarantee the safety of the population within its borders.
Coincidentally, there has been a parallel rise in the prominence of regional organisations such as the AU and the spread and acceptance of the R2P. Between 1945 and 1967, no resolution mentioned the humanitarian dimension of any conflict. The UNSC gave humanitarian aspects of armed conflict, limited priority, but the early 1990’s found a new watershed (Weiss,2004: 136). Likewise, between 1945 and 1990 UNSC resolutions barely contained references to regional organisations. This situation changed dramatically after 1991 for two major reasons. First was the clamour for regional solutions to regional problems (Bellamy, 2011: 145). Secondly was the UN’s acknowledgement of its limitations in providing security which prompted it to encourage the development of regional organisations to defend international security through their regional activities (Haastrup, 2013: 50).
This was a better alternative for the UN, in its bid to live up to its responsibility as the world’s conflict arbiter. So, rather than withdraw entirely from Africa in view of its scathing experiences, it opted to shore up the legitimacy of, and its reliance on the AU (Gelot, 2012: 43-44). Even global and regional institutions such as the UN and AU, derive their international legitimacy from their ability to deliver on the principles on which they stand (Gelot, 2012: 80). Though overriding sovereignty and acting on the maxim of common morality to save lives gives the international community a human face, there are other reasons, scholars argue, why peace operations is favoured by the international community.
Maintaining International Order
There is a consensus among peace authors that through peace operations, global institutions strive to maintain order in the international arena (Richmond, 2004; Zanotti, 2006:152; Macqueen 2006). Macqueen (2006) offers possibilities for this consensus. First is the UN’s claim to supreme legal authority in matters of world peace and security as laid out in chapter VII of the UN Charter. Next is the UN’s monopoly of multilateral military action which has persisted and was given impetus by the development of peace operations in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite this monopoly, intervention in conflict through peace operations by regional IGO’s, increased towards the end of the 20th century.
The maintenance of order and normalcy in the international arena has been adduced as one of the reasons for the use of peace operations by the international community (Zanotti, 2006). While the concept of order need not be expatiated, normalcy in this sense, refers to liberal democratic norms. This is made evident in the argument which ties securing peace to universalising democracy (Chandler, 2004: 59-60; Laffey and Weldes, 2005:61). International interventions are perceived as part of an international disciplinary security regime used in normalising states that are unstable, and of which risking a collapse would upset regional dynamics or destabilise the international system (Zanotti, 2006:152). Attempting to normalise states through peace operations that have the institution of democratic processes as their grand objective is hinged onthe argument of mutual democratic pacifism that peace is better sustained between democracies (Friedman, 1999; Nielsen, 2012). In essence, peace operations, while being used by the international community to maintain order, is also used as a means to ensure states are transformed into democracies (Barnett and Finnemore, 2005). The posture of the international community that democracy and the free market are panaceas for all post conflict states, irrespective of the institutional and cultural ripeness of the societies to cope with the inherent competitiveness of democracy and the markets (see Doe, 2009; 1), has been detrimental to states coming out of conflict.
The international community, irrespective of the disadvantages of this approach, still adopts it. This according to Finnemore (2003:8) is because peace operations serve specific goals of powerful states that compels their continued use with the intention of preserving the status quo in the international system. Scholars who hold this view maintain that these powerful states act on the maxim that the onus lies on them to preserve international peace and security in an international system where they occupy privileged positions (Pugh, 2004; Bellamy and Williams et al, 2010). Changes in the interests of these powerful states, determines the path peace operations take, and Alan James (1996) contend that this is the political character of all peace operations. In order to achieve these changes and enforce their will, there has been a tendency among the wealthy and powerful states to act multilaterally, rather than unilaterally if and when they have to intervene in conflict (Corbetta and Dixon, 2004). Such multilateral action gives legitimacy to intervention on foreign territory (Gowan and Sherman, 2012; Nardin, 2003; Finnemore, 2003).
Promoting State(s) Interests
There are different reasons why states participate in peace operations. For cosmopolitans, the reason hinges on the prevention of regional instability (Howe, 2005; Bullion, 2005). Neorealists contend that the expansion of certain state interests is a motivating force to contribute to peace operations (Smith, 2005; Watson, 2005). This position conversely implies that when these interests cannot be promoted, states become lethargic to their commitments. Experience has shown that due to the multiplicity of interests of the major powers, they are often propelled into intervening in conflicts abroad in order to protect these interests or extend them. While France’s presences in Mali stands as a good example of the protection of interest and extension of influence, the US, UN and handling of the Darfur crisis, provides a good example of the lack of commitment that takes over when there are no interests to protect (Lynch, 2014).
However, state involvement in peace operations is not all about interests. Kathleen Newland and Deborah Meyers (1998) and Mary Hampton (2005) see defending humanitarian values as the reason certain states get involved in peace operations. Finnemore (2003) accedes to this when she contends that it would be hard to assess state benefit or charge them with benefiting when their actions are clearly responsible for the reduction of human suffering. She contends that ‘humanitarian intervention looks odd from the conventional perspectives on international politics because it does not conform to the conceptions of interest that they specify’ (Finnemore, 2003:55). Using the intervention of the U.S. in Somalia as an example, she asserts that it was a clear case of intervention without obvious interests. In examining both sides of the debate, Dannreuther (2008) concludes that ‘neither the excessive optimism nor the extreme pessimism which have tended to characterise the general debate over intervention is justified’ (Dannreuther, 2008:143).
Contradictions of Peace Operations
While peace operations seem a laudable venture in many quarters, not all authors share the same view. Authors sceptical of it argue that history has shown a tendency for an elite group of states to opt for militarized solutions to conflicts, both because they have an interest in solving the issues at stake to suit their preferences and because they have the capabilities to affect these conflicts. The United States led military operation in Afghanistan, though not really a peace operation, is a good example (United States Institute for Peace, 2021; Warner, 2021). Peace operations as a multilateral initiative provide legitimacy for the pursuit of the interests of these states.This contradicts the notion that peace operationshave at their base a metaphor that promises the creation of a just and peaceful world. Developments in the way they have been used have seen a sliding toward earlier practices of imperial policing where the interests of the powerful states are placed above those of the communities in mission areas (Rubinstein, 2010; Pupavac, 2006)
Duffield (2001), Aksu (2003), Finnemore (2003), Pugh (2004) and Rubinstein (2010), all agree that peace operations are put at the service of interests – in this case, liberal imperialism. This consequently widens the gulf between wealthy donor nations and poor conflict areas. Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (2005) contend that when the capacity of peace operations to deal with security threats improves without corresponding development of a global culture based on equity, peace missions would be seen as serving the aspirations of certain blocs. Such an arrangement would be deemed an aberration as states would increasingly become wary of actions and decisions taken prior to and during peace operations. This argument runs in tandem with the neorealist position of scholars such as Finnemore (2003:85) and Dannreuther (2008:141-142) that powerful states have always intervened to promote an order or to protect a status quo that suits them. Pugh (2004:39) concurs with this view when he notes that peace support operations serve a narrow problem solving purpose of doctoring the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism. The perceived overarching aim of peace operations creates suspicions about whose interests exactly peace operations serve, creates apathy against global powers and works against the fermenting of global causes. The rise of extremist groups such as ISIS in Iraq and Al-Shabaab in Somalia are vivid examples.
Laura Neack (2004) points out that these contradictions in peace operations endanger the lives of peace operatives in the present and creates bigger problems for the communities in the future. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the peace building efforts that followed, and the peace enforcement mission in Somalia in 2006, gave rise to ISIS and Al-Shabaab respectively in these areas. Over a decade later, these groups are a severe threat to the peace and promote an ideology of hatred for the west and its values.
Thomas Jacobson (2012) sees peace operations as an aberration because it demands the un-natural inclination where men (no matter how well trained) would lay down their lives for people they do not know. This aberration is responsible for the many failures of peace operations and the reason why he claims ‘peacekeepers often cower in the face of armed opposition and do not protect women and children’ (Jacobson, 2012: 4). While Colum Lynch (2014) presents accounts in Darfur that corroborate this position, similar observation is made of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO):
The UN’s blue-helmeted troops are supposed to be working with the Congolese army to stop the bloodshed. MONUSCO … is the longest and most expensive peace operation in the organisation’s history. Almost 19,000 soldiers and 800 civilians have a mandate to protect the population, neutralise armed groups and stabilise the state. The aim is to help Congo recover from a war that killed anywhere from 500,000 to 5m people …In April 2012 a group of defectors, most of them Tutsi, formed an armed group, M23. This seized Goma, a city of 1m on the Rwandan border that is home to most of the UN’s operations in Congo. Without firing a shot … “the M23” raped and pillaged while UN soldiers stood by (The Economist, 2016).
The fact of the matter is, armed groups roam freely attacking villages and raping women, a phenomenon that has earned the D.R.C. the title “rape centre of the world.” Jacobson contends that it is difficult to justify peace operations as wise or in the safety and best interests of the people it is purportedly meant to protect. As such, the peace and safety attributed to peace operations is an illusion. Mark Paterson and Chris Saunders (2012:2) also note the lack of concern exhibited by peacekeepers in the eastern Congo as they were accused of looting, raping and the murder of local people. Beyond these huge lapses in the field, the benefits of peace operations are questioned in other areas as they often have ripple effects.
Impact and Consequences of Peace Operations
This section examines the impact of peace missions on host communities. Studies that have focused on understanding the role of peace operations generally hold that the impact they have on the host system is related to the degree of poverty in that society at the time of the intervention and the extent of the devastation caused by the conflict (De Coning et al, 2007). Jeffery Pickering and Emizet Kisangani (2006) and Cocodia (2018) hold that, how well a state fares after the peace operation depends on the form of government, the mandate of the mission, the size of the intervention force and its purposes. Peace operations are likely to be shorter and more productive when in favour of the incumbent government than when in favour of the opposition (Regan, 2002). Interventions in non-democratic states have tended to meet mandate targets better than in developing democracies where peace operations widens fractures in the state’s already weak institutions. Drawing on Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Flores (2009) notes that outright military victory sets the stage for longer stability in mission states than negotiated settlements.
Some scholars advocate large troop contingents for each peace mission on the basis that ‘such an approach conveys resolve, discourages resistance and improves the odds of success – especially in the most difficult conflicts (O’Hanlon, 2003: 10-11). It also offers the greatest hope of ending a conflict with minimum loss of life to intervening soldiers as well as local populations’. Romeo Dallaire’s (2005) account of the light UN contingent in Rwanda prior to and during the genocide lends credence to this argument.
Some authors disagree and state that the effectiveness of a peace operations contingent is not completely dependent on its size. A large army of undisciplined soldiers is as good a threat to the success of the mission. Aning and Edu-Afful (2013:20) make the following observation of ECOMOG’s 16,000 troop force:
The prospect of economic gains pushed individual peacekeepers to engage in economic activities (such as running taxi businesses, operating corner shops, establishing illegal lumber companies and retailing cellular phones) that undermined both the neutrality of the peacekeepers and the speedy resolution of the conflict and thus contributed to the prolonged stay in Liberia. It is also possible that the conflict environment … combined with the weak missions prompted peacekeepers to take economic survival into their own hands
In fairness to these peacekeepers, their actions could be linked to their supposed poor remuneration under ECOMOG command when compared to the better resourced UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). In other words, while a large contingent is desired to make brief work of keeping the peace, the need for diligence and focus on the part of the troops should not be taken for granted else their impact becomes negative rather than positive.
Problem of Large Contingents
Like most options, the use of robust operations comes with its drawbacks. De Coning et al (2007) warn of aftershocks on the mission state. They contend that the larger and longer the peace operation, the more widespread its unplanned effects. Peksen (2012) contends that robust foreign military intervention increases the state’s likelihood to be more repressive, a phenomenon he measures through the rate of extrajudicial killing, imprisonment and torture. Mali, Burundi and the post 2003 invasion Shiite regime in Iraq are good examples (Jansen, 2014; Dufka, 2017; Human Rights Watch 2018).
De Coning, et al (2007) and Carnahan et al (2006) warn about the creation of a dual economy where one serves the needs of the peace operations contingent and the other serves the needs of the local people. This places pressure on the public sector of the host community through brain-drain, under employment and local wages to create an even playing field for workers (Carnahan, et al, 2006). Agathangelou and Ling (2003) and Jennings (2008) discuss the scourge of sexual exploitation of local women associated with peace operations. The larger the peace mission, the wider the sex racket thereby increasing the risks of sexually transmitted infections and disrupted family ties. De Carvalho and Ettang (2011) and Holshek (2011) point to the danger of over dependence on peacekeepers in providing security in post war climates. With the corruption in security institutions in developing countries (see Zanotti 2006:161), and the free flow of Small and Light Weapons occasioned by the war, state security forces either become nonchalant or get overwhelmed by security challenges when peacekeepers live. This brings about the resurgence of violence as spaces are explored by spoilers. De Coning, et al. (2007) and Cocodia (2018) observe that peace operations have had a fair amount of unintended consequences. Despite these consequences that sometimes severely undermine the reputation of peace missions and the IGOs that support them, they agree that peace operations are vital and viable means of managing conflict.
Local Peace Support Strategies
Peace operations, some authors argue, are a poor choice for the task of building local capacity and making target states self-sufficient. Burundi, Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan make good examples. Despite the multiple peace operations conducted in these states, they are seldom safer than when the peace operations began (Cocodia, 2018 and 2021; Romo et al, 2019; Hussein and Cocodia, 2021). Hazen (2007) contends that there are factors that hinder peace operations such as limited mandates, resources and duration. There is also the problem of local resistance to what could be perceived as externally imposed norms. Sotroops attached to peace operations should focus on security while peace building should be left to local institutions (national governments and their populations). While there is the tendency to flaw this position on the grounds that it is extremely difficult for a state that had been at war with itself (most especially if the conflict had been one of attempted genocide), to rebuild itself after the likely destruction of social and public services, the success of Rwanda and more recently Darfur, challenge this critique. These cases strengthen the consensus among authors that post conflict rebuilding should largely be the responsibility of the local people (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2006, Doe, 2009; Autesserre, 2014; Cocodia, 2018). This consensus also goes with the conviction that the military and civilian peace operations staff should be part of the peace building process, at least minimally, to jump-start local participation and post conflict rebuilding. A good starting point for local population involvement is the process to enable them come to grips with the horrors of the conflict and chart a course of reconciliation in what is termed transitional justice.
Transitional justice as a local adjustment strategy often takes the form of nationally organised peace and reconciliations meetings between groups of the aggrieved and aggressors or judicial hearings to adjudicate on crimes against humanity (as in Liberia and Rwanda). It is a process intervening in a period of political change, characterized by a juridical answer to wrongs of the past (Teitel, 2003:69). This process has both forward and backward looking aspects, prompts successor governments to build institutions that will seek justice for past transgressions, while showing their commitment to good governance in the future.
This strategy of local adjustment attempts to place civil society as the primary object of peace efforts rather than the sustenance of liberal democratic institutions. As such, this form of social engineering is better done at the grassroots, rather than the adoption a neo-imperial top-down model which could be counter-productive to the peace process (Doe, 2009; Andrieu, 2010; Autesserre, 2014). A good example were the Gacaca courts of Rwanda where prisoners who were prepared to confess to their roles in the genocide and engage community adjudication were tried (Mutisi, 2009). This indigenous approach, though having its deficits, was successful in promoting peace, justice and accountability in the various communities. The essence of this approach, in line with Putnam’s trust as social capital thesis, is to develop positive social capital where trust goes beyond ones ethnic or social grouping (Putnam, 1995). This creates firm grounds for cordial existence and reduces the risk of conflict in the community. With this as its aim, it has become an essential component of any post conflict peace building operation (Andrieu, 2010).
Increase in civil society engagement is another strategy peace scholars have focused on for effective peace operations (Cocodia, 2018). Local support is the cooperation between governments, secular or faith based non-governmental organisations and other grassroots groups. Cooperating with peace missions should become routine for these groups as they explore their strengths and comparative advantages. The influence of religion in the post conflict peace process should be taken advantage of. If religion is strong enough to make men fight, when properly harnessed, it could be a strong adhesive. The visit of Pope Francis to the Central African Republic in November 2015 and the marked reduction in violence up until May 2017 shows the power or religion if properly manipulated. Breidlid and Stensland (2011) contend that the Church in South Sudan can be a major effective player in the peace process if its strengths are harnessed in this direction.
While the local initiatives above have been lauded by scholars, they also indicate that there are dangers that lurk. Among these are, the commercialisation of peace work arising from the increased involvement and mushrooming of local peace support groups. Local initiatives are often too resource limited to create domestic social capital which leaves them in a subordinate position to international donor groups who take credit for schemes and undermine local content. Despite these drawbacks, Paffenholz and Spurk (2006:34) note that ‘the most striking result in civil society peace building research shows a direct correlation between civil society involvement in peace negotiations and the sustainability of the agreement – the greater the involvement of civil society, the more likely the peace agreement will be sustained’. Cordell (2011) agrees with this, but from a gender perspective.
Redefining Societal Norms
One of the consequences of conflict and peace operations is the shift in gender roles. Cordell (2011) is of the view that women are continually plagued by exclusion, economic marginalisation and sexual violence among others in post conflict societies. This is in addition to the issue of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers. There are dissenting views to this. Aning and Edu-Afful (2013), Angom (2011), De Coning, et al (2007) and Carnahan et al (2006) contend that women are seemingly more active in the rehabilitation of society, and as a result, special attention is provided both internationally (see UNSCR 1509[1]), and locally to promote their interest. Aning and Edu-Afful, (2013:24) avowed that:
Because many women became heads of households and own properties as a consequence of displacement and bereavement of their partners, they now earned income accruing from the rents paid by peacekeepers. In addition the presence of peacekeepers contributes innovative ideas that build the capacity of the people living in the mission area. Joint programmes for agriculture, micro-financing and skills training are specifically geared towards women’s economic empowerment
De Coning et al. (2007:171) make the argument that over the last decade, women in post conflict societies have tended to be the focus of empowerment programmes by international and national organisations and sometimes have the luxury of certain career opportunities and training preserved for them. This emphasis may not be divorced from the belief that emphasis in gender equality and women’s inclusion early in peace operations is likely to improve the outcomes of state stability, unlike societies which remained stratified by gender that showed a continued proclivity towards violence and oppression in the long term (Cordell, 2011). The contention here is, since there is a positive correlation between domestic gender inequality and external aggression, it is necessary for the development of society to get women actively involved in its rehabilitation.
Conclusion
The crux of this paper has been to examine some of the major issues of peace operations and the debates that have emanated thereof. These debates revolve around peace operations aims, impact and local support. Discussing the aim of peace operations was deemed necessary since effectiveness is measured by how well performance satisfies set goals. The major aim of peace operations has been in dispute among authors. For some, the goal is humanitarian, the provision of human security. For others, it is the management and resolution of conflict, while some others still, contend that peace operations have been placed at the service of the liberal tenets of democracy. This latter group of scholars contend that the fundamental role of peace operations is as regulator of the state-based international system. This study brings these issues to the fore, the problems associated therein and the contradictions that arise thereof
To make peace operations effective, scholars have advocated various strategies such as the use of large intimidating peace operations contingents, the need for bias likely in favour of the incumbent and to securing outright victory over insurgents as opposed to negotiated settlements. But there is a down side to deploying large contingents and this includes the creation of a peace operation economy, a thriving sex industry and the possibility of leaving behind a complacent local security force. Another major contradiction is encountered when the state is the aggressor and rebels fight for their right to survive as we have seen in Darfur, Sudan under Al-Bashir, and the state sponsored genocide in Rwanda. To assume therefore that the state is a benevolent arbiter of rights has been detrimental to effective peacekeeping that is dependent on state consent.
Drawing from the unintended consequences of peace operations, some authors are sceptical of its benefits. They contend that it endangers the lives of personnel meant to keep the peace and it is contradictory to the inclination of laying down one’s life for one’s kin by demanding peacekeepers do same for strangers. Peace operations have also been accused of striving to strengthen democracy in societies that do not have the structures to support this system of government and consequently does more harm than good. In other debates, it is conceived as a tool used by the powerful states in the international system to maintain the status quo. Whichever point is advocated, the international outlook of peacekeeping is one of its flaws in that it always takes the top-bottom approach. Peace plans conceived from the UN or any other international IGO in charge may be at odds with local realities and so aggravate issues on the ground. Peace operations planners, should therefore take as a major step, getting CSO’s involved right from the start of operations. Through working with CSO’s, local participation and ownership of the peace (sought) is enhanced.
The dilemma of peace operations does not lie with interveners only. The local populace bears its own part of this confusion. Consequently, effort should be directed at getting the local populace to put their lives back together through their own initiatives. This paper highlighted some of the strategies that aid society’s rehabilitation and contribute to the overall effectives of peace operations. Strategies discussed include local transitional justice, the role of NGO’s and the utilisation of established institutions such as the church in improving and enhancing the reaches of peace missions.
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