PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: EVOLUTION, CONTRADICTIONS AND DIVIDENDS
Roseline Oshewolo, Ph.D.
Department of History and International Studies,
Federal University Lokoja, Lokoja, Nigeria.
E-mail: roselineoshewolo@yahoo.com
Abstract
This article is intended to generate arguments to legitimise and rationalise international peace operations. Although some writers have discounted the usefulness of peace operations in mitigating international conflicts and the accompanying complex emergencies, the paper argues that ‘international intervention’ still represents a core instrument in the resolution of international conflicts. The justification for international peace operations is built on a number of compelling grounds, which include military cum strategic, political, humanitarian and economic. In conclusion, the paper points out that the values or benefits of international peace operations overbalance the possible objections or contradictions about them; without discounting the need to erect structures and regimes that will enhance peace operations and address the misgivings surrounding them. The paper relied principally on the secondary sources of data and thematic analysis.
Keywords: Peace support operations, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, Peace building, United Nations.
Introduction
The post-cold war complex conflicts and emergencies have reinforced the need forinternational intervention forces to mitigate their effects on nations and guarantee the survival of our world. International peace operations at all levels – global, regional andbilateral – have become apposite now than ever. The reason is that the world currently faces multiple security threats from diverse sources and previous threats are assuming new complex dimensions with increased levels offatalities and casualties. The usefulness of peace support operations in this regardnotwithstanding, some authors have expressed some reservations about the capacity ofintervention forces to halt or trim back the world’s increasing complex emergencies (Gowan, 2011; McGreal, 2015; Pugh, 2014).While this article reckons that the arguments of the critics are not mislaid, it explains thatpeace intervention still represents a core instrument in resolving international conflicts.
The article is divided into five sections. While this section represents the introductorypiece, section two attempts a conceptualisation of peace support operations. The thirdsection focuses on the evolution of international peace operations. Sections four andfive, in turn, examine the contradictions inherent in international peace operations andthe legitimising and supporting arguments for such operations. The study utilises thesecondary sources for the purpose of data collection and the thematic method for thepurpose of data analysis.
Understanding Peace Support Operations (PSO)
The idea of PSOs is sometimes subjected to confusing interpretations in the literature, thus calling for the explanation of its usage in any given context (Olonisakin, 2008). Asaptly explained by Ogomudia (2007, 3), PSO is a construction employed to describe ‘the totalgamut of plans, policies, and actions geared towards preventing, managing, andresolving conflict as well as restoring and maintaining peace in a conflict environment’. Olonisakin (2008, 6) describes it ‘as the process whereby diplomatic, civil and military activities areemployed to re-establish peace in conflict-affected environments, and thus create anenvironment whereby civilian elements of the mission can operate to ensure theestablishment of self-sustaining peace’. Pogoson (2007, 254) observes that PSOs are normally‘undertaken to assist in creating a tranquil environment devoid of strife and disorder byestablishing and maintaining peace between disputants…safeguard human existence,rights, security and stability’.
From the broad definitions of the concept, one could identify two implicitinterpretations. First, in terms of the operations involved, the concept is complex andmultidimensional. It has many ramifications including peacemaking, peacekeeping,peace-enforcement, peace-building, delivery of humanitarian assistance, peace educationand confidence building, election monitoring, supervision and organisation, enactmentof police and judicial reforms, post-conflict economic reconstruction, protection and promotion of human rights, among others (Musa, 2010). PSOs connote all dimensions of peaceoperations such as ‘the ones directly operated by the United Nations (UN) and thosecarried out by states or other international organisations authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter’ (Direk, 2014, 2). In terms of stakeholders’ participation, PSOs involve diverse actors/stakeholders such as military personnel, police officers,peace envoys, civilian observers, and humanitarian workers from member countries ofinternational or regional organisations under whose authority the operations are beingplanned and executed (Pogoson, 2007). The second interpretation is that ‘PSO is expected to beprevalent in places where the central government is either non-existent, or is completelyweak to actualise its exclusive control over the means of violence (Olonisakin, 2008, 6).
Furthermore, a thorough explanation of the diverse components of the concept requiresa focus on the different generations of PSOs (Kenkel, 2013). The first generation of PSOs has becomeknown as traditional peacekeeping. The tasks of a typical UN peacekeeping includecreating an atmosphere that facilitates peaceful conflict resolution and sustainable peacewhere a ceasefire is in place, creating buffer zones to reduce contact betweenbelligerents, diminishing the chances of conflict escalation, monitoring peace processesand the implementation of peace agreements, as well as supervising the withdrawal oftroops (DPKO and DFS, 2012). Peacekeeping is defined by three cardinal principles. These include the consentof the conflicting parties, impartiality of the peacekeeping force (implementing themandate without favour or prejudice to any of the warring parties), and non-use of forceexcept in self defence and defence of the mandate. These principles are considered important to promote the effective implementation of the mandate as well asthe credibility and legitimacy of the operation (DPKO and DFS, 2012).
The second generation of PSOs is ‘characterised by the addition of civilian tasks relatedto political transition from conflict, without an accompanying increase in the permissionto use military force’ (Kenkel, 2013, 128). These civilian tasks added to the first generation PSOs includehumanitarian and refugee assistance, protection of human rights, organisation ofelections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and governmentcapacity building (Kenkel, 2013). The third generation known as peace-enforcement ischaracterised by increased deployment of force. Peace-enforcement includes complexsecurity tasks to ‘guarantee security to populations at risk and provide them withhumanitarian aid under difficult conditions, forcibly disarm belligerents and disruptiveelements, conduct sanctions and embargo operations, arrest war criminals…’ (Guldimann, 2010, 5). Thefourth generation of PSOs promotes peace-building efforts that reduce or forestallregression into conflict by enhancing domestic capacity for conflict management andachieving sustainable peace (Guldimann, 2010). Peace-building ‘is a more ambitious enterprise thanadministering an extant peace’ and in its extreme form, relates to the ‘transitionaladministration, where in the exercise of sovereignty over a given territory is effectivelytransferred to a UN peace operation and all executive, legislative, and judicial authorities temporarily rest with the head of the UN mission’ (Kenkel, 2013, 133). As explained by Gbor (2007, 60), the differentcomponents or generations of PSOs can transform from one form to another. Forexample,
The introduction of military personnel into a conflict theatre may commencewith observer mission, or ceasefire monitoring group, and metamorphoseinto peacekeeping or peace enforcement later. Even while peacekeeping isgoing on, the processes of peace education, peace-making, peace-building, as well as confidence building may also be going on; although peace building ismore of post-conflict activity.
Moreover, efforts at explaining PSOs could also be predicated on the scope of theoperation. In terms of scope of international intervention, there are normally threeclassifications of PSOs. These take place at the world level, regional level and bilaterallevel. At the world level, PSOs are mounted by the UN which mobilises members tocontribute military troops, police and civilian personnel. The UN provides the fund forsuch operations. At the regional level, PSOs are mounted by regional organisations asallowed by Article 32(1) of the UN Charter. Such regional organisations include theAfrican Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),Organisation of American States (OAS), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), among others. Although regional PSOs operate strictly within the region of the mountingorganisation, financial and logistical assistance may be sourced externally. At the bilaterallevel, two states may enter into permanent or ad hoc mutual defence agreements forone to assist the other in maintaining peace and security within its borders (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). However, itshould be noted that the boundaries of these categories of PSOs have become blurry.Simbine-Okoosi (2007, 33) explains that ‘a water-tight divide cannot be drawn between the threelevels as one can reinforce the other’.
Evolution of International Peace Operations
Ogomudia (2007, 1) contends that ‘peace is a great value which the world needs dearly, butwhich it has not yet found a formula to achieve on a permanent basis’. This challengenotwithstanding, PSOs have emerged as an important tool in maintaining internationalpeace and security (Direk, 2014). The history of PSOs is connected with the development of theUN as a platform for promoting global peace and security. Before theemergence of the UN, there were no previous practices of PSOs. Although there were afew multilateral arrangements designed to maintain international peace and security, these arrangements were ad hoc, localised to specific regions and carried out by a fewpowerful nations. The ineffectiveness of these mechanisms was laid bare by theoutbreak of the First World War. At the end of the War in 1918, the League of Nationswas established as the first major attempt to internationalise the promotion and defenseof world peace and security. While the operation of the League was guided by theprinciple of unanimity against aggressors, the principle was however crippled by theaggressive tendencies of its ambitious members, particularly Germany. The failure of theorganisation to tame these aggressors inevitably led to the outbreak of the SecondWorld War (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007).
Statesmen’s unending quest for global peace and security was somewhat consummatedat the end of the Second World War with the establishment of the UN in1945 (DPKO and DFS, 2012). However, the earlier mechanisms – within the framework of the UN – designed toserve this purpose were limited in many respects. Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charterprovide for the strategy of collective security. In this regard, the UN Security Council isempowered to assess threats to international peace and security and then initiate theprocesses of intervention (Articles 39 and 40). But, the ideological war between the Westand East made the enforcement of the principle of collective security problematic. TheUnited States and the Soviet Union – leaders of the capitalist West and Communist Eastrespectively – were in the habit of blackballing/vetoing collective security measuresagainst an aggressor country considered an ally or within their respective blocs ofinfluence (DPKO and DFS, 2012; Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). The difficulties in entrenching a collective security system as envisioned bythe framers of the UN Charter had therefore led ‘to an overly pessimistic conclusion regarding theorganisation’s contribution to peace (Kaarbo and Ray, 2011, 312). Given the failure of the strategy of collective security and the need to rescue succeeding generations from the scourge of war, the UNcame up with a number of alternative measures collectively regarded as PSOs (Ogomudia, 2007; Simbine-Okoosi, 2007).
Although the UN Charter says nothing about peacekeeping in particular (Agbu, 2007), the legal basisfor it ‘can be found between the traditional methods for the “pacific settlement ofdisputes” under Chapter VI and the more forceful action mandated under Chapter VII’ (DPKO and DFS, 2012, 11). While Chapter VI recognises negotiation, mediation, arbitration, among other peacefulmeasures, Chapter VII is a coercive provision that addresses threats to peace and otheracts of aggression (Sule, 2013). Arising from this legal foundation, international peace operationswere embarked upon repeatedly ‘to deal with conflicts during the Cold War era thatmight otherwise have led to dangerous confrontations between the superpowers’ (Kaarbo and Ray, 2011, 312). Furthermore, Musa (2010) observes that since all international disputes could not be resolvedby peaceful means, some measures would have to be taken to contain those deep-rootedand escalating armed conflicts. The UN peace operations therefore evolvedessentially as a ‘holding action’ against aggressive military confrontations betweenwarring parties. However, because of the obvious constraints on the deployment of a UNpeacekeeping force during the Cold War period, ‘only on rare occasions did the SecurityCouncil authorise full deployment of UN forces’ (Mackinlay, 1996, 9).
The UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War period have been described in theliterature as first-generation peace operations (Kenkel, 2013). First-generation intervention forces ‘arelightly armed and operate under strictly limiting rules of engagement. The interpretationof state sovereignty prevalent during the Cold War era placed tight restrictions on thenature of peace operations’ (Kenkel, 2013, 126). The UN embarked on its first peace operation in 1948 withthe establishment of UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). The UNTSO mainly comprised unarmed military observers deployed to supervise the truceduring the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). There was also ‘the UN Monitoringand Observation Group in India and Pakistan, active in Kashmir since 1949’ (Kenkel, 2013, 126). In 1956, theUN deployed its first major armed peacekeeping force in response to the crisis in the Middle East. Egyptian leader, Gamal Nasser, nationalised the Suez Canal in 1956 and thisled to an attack on Egypt by Israel, Britain and France. With the influence of the UnitedStates and Soviet Union, the UN General Assembly passed resolutions calling for an endto hostilities. This led to the creation of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), which wasstationed on the Egyptian-Israeli border until 1967. UNEF was made up of purely militaryforces, none of which came from the five permanent members of the Security Council (Kaarbo and Ray, 2011).
As the Cold War receded, significantly reducing the clash of interest between the UnitedStates and former Soviet Union in the Security Council, the number of UN multinationalforces involved in peace operations increased. The end of the Cold War in 1991 allowed the UN to become more responsive to international conflicts (Mackinlay, 1996). After the end of the Cold War, ‘international conflicts shifted from interstate conflicts to predominantly intrastate. These conflicts are often referred to as complex emergencies’. They are large scale and complex civil wars and inter-communalviolence within states, and are normally ‘characterised as a humanitarian disaster’. These conflicts are as a result of political or ethnic conflict and they lead to massive population movements, ashortage of food and healthcare and in which political authority and public services havedeteriorated or completely collapsed’ (Rietjens, De Boer, and Voordijk, 2004, 99). As the end of the East-West rivalry signaled thewithdrawal of Cold War forces, intrastate complex emergencies were ‘fueled by theabundance of weapons in the former war zones. In some cases, weapons were left bydemobilised armies or supplied to client states that had become the proxy front lines in the superpower struggle beyond Europe’ (Mackinlay, 1996, 12). The post-Cold War complex civil conflicts –which require larger and more capable intervention forces – profoundly changed thenature of peace operations by giving birth to the second, third and fourth generations ofpeace operations respectively (civilian and humanitarian work, peace-enforcement andpeace-building (Dalla Costa, 2015).
A notable – though incipient – innovation in the field of peace operations is the conceptof hybrid missions. This is becoming recognised in the literature as the fifth generation ofpeace operations (Kenkel, 2013). These hybrid missions ‘deploy troops and police personnel undermixed command, with both the UN and various regional organisations deploying troopsto the same missions under separate chains of command and distinct forms of mandate’ (Kenkel, 2013, 135). In Europe for instance, NATO’s mounted Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR)was responsible for the security aspect of the hybrid mission in Kosovo under a separatechain of command, while the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was charged with the institution-building aspect.There is also the UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Thisarrangement promotes division of labour in the global system of peace operations andprovides the opportunity to engage regional organisations (Guldimann, 2010). Following the formalestablishment of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992, it hasover 120,000 personnel, with almost 120 countries contributing military, police andcivilian elements to maintain peace and security particularly in war-torn countries andcreate environments favourable to the consolidation of peace (DPKO and DFS, 2012).
Peace Operations and the Inherent Contradictions
As important as international peace operations are, they have always been confrontedwith a number of contradictions. These contradictions tend to undermine the usefulnessand legitimacy of international intervention forces. These contradictions are examined in this section of the paper.
A major problem relates to human fatalities. International peace operations have alwaysproduced human casualties such as combat-related deaths and physical injuries (Musa, 2010). A largenumber of troops as well as civilian personnel have lost their lives while participating inpeace operations. Several others have also been injured or permanently maimed. A lot ofchildren have been orphaned as a result (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). Explaining the determinants of PSO fatalities, Van der Lijn et al (2014) note that missions involving higher combat operations (a definingattribute of some post-cold war peace operations) and missions not well supported by thelocal population and conflicting parties (hostile security environment) are all likely to record high humanfatalities. Again, mission areas where qualified support forces are in short supply and lackthe required equipment, where peacekeepers have limited understanding of localconditions, and where domestic political constraints exist have always increased troopcasualties during peace operations (Dorussen, 2014). Again, because more troops are usually deployedfrom the poor countries of the world, it could be interpreted that the rich and powerfulcountries on the UNSC are commissioning the poor to fight and die (McGreal, 2015). While trying tostem the horror of war in conflict theatres, troop casualties produce irreparable lossesand extreme mental distress to the families of victims back home.
Furthermore, international peace operations are capable of hampering development –particularly in the participating countries – because the economic cost of mounting suchoperations is monumental (Sule, 2013). The resources expended on PSOs ‘in foreign lands placetremendous financial burden on the donor nations, especially if the donor nations are also facing serious economic recession and crisis of legitimacy back home’ (Atoyebi, 2007, 191). There is the‘diversion of developmental resources by governments to PSOs, especially non-UNsponsored PSOs. Thus, such PSOs have constituted a drainpipe in the economy ofnations’ (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007, 35). For instance, Nigeria was the main funder of ECOMOG operations in Liberiaand Sierra Leone (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). These operations were considered a drain on Nigeria’s economicresources. Because the resources committed to PSOs could be utilised for otherdevelopmental purposes, participation in such operations ‘is generally perceived as anunnecessary diversion’ especially if the massive amounts involved do not translate intodirect benefits to the participating nations (Sule, 2013, 16). As further explained by Nwolise (2007, 202),
defense economics teaches us that resources are not only scarce but alsohave alternative uses; and that money spent on armoured cars can no longerbe available for building schools or generating employment. When a warshipis destroyed in action, not only is the money invested in its acquisition wasted, but another money will be required to replace it. When a military officer is killed, not only does his family lose his contributions and services, the nation alsoloses his services and the money spent to train him as a professional. Anothermoney will also be spent to train someone else to replace him.
Again, the spectacular failure of international intervention forces to restore peace indesperate and complex situations may cast doubt on the usefulness of peace operations.McGreal (2015) observes that the failure of UN intervention forces to restore peace in severalareas characterised by complex emergencies have raised questions about the necessityfor, and effectiveness of, such interventions. The author points to the underperformanceof UN forces in Rwanda (despite the escalating massacre of 1994), failure ofpeacekeepers to stop the ethnic cleansing massacre of 8,000 Muslims by the Serbs inSrebrenica – a town in the east of Bosnia, and the combustion in Angola after thecollapse of the UN force in the country, and in several other places. In Bosnia for instance, the UN peacekeeping force was not only ineffective, it ‘lost its credibility when“UN Protection Zones” could not be protected’ (Guldimann, 2010, 4). In the words of McGreal (2015), onetherefore wonders if several UN PSOs had not claimed as many lives as they weremandated to protect by offering an illusion of security.
Scholars have attempted to explain the failure of peacekeepers to keep peace in conflictzones. Guldimann (2010, 1) maintains that the underperformance of UN peacekeepers is closelylinked to the problem of unclear mandates. This has ‘resulted in compromises on howand where to engage, which inevitably lead to discrepancies between the objectives andthe impact of certain operations’. As a result of the ‘gap in expectations between what ishoped for in New York and what is actually delivered on ground’, peacekeepingoperations may be seen as dysfunctional (Dorussen, 2014, 529). This gap could be attributable to the qualityof peacekeepers deployed, unwillingness of countries contributing troops to acceptcasualties, and the imperfect communication with New York which often fails to deliverthe needed support on ground (Dorussen, 2014). Explaining why PSOs have grown in scale, yet lostoperational impact, Gowan (2011, 2) mentions that troops often ‘lack the equipment, training andskills necessary to operate efficiently in challenging terrain or tackle well-armed spoilers.Force contributors put in place major caveats on the use of their contingents’. Zenko andFriedman (2011) are of the view that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)often lacks the capacity to effectively implement complex mandates, andsynergise with other UN agencies and regional partners. More so, there could be a clashbetween the UN and some national governments over who controls troops, resultinginto conflicting orders (McGreal, 2015).
What is more, peace operations may be seen as serving the strategic interest of the Westin the global system. Pugh (2014, 39) argues that a ‘deconstruction of the role of PSOs suggeststhat they sustain a particular order of world politics that privileges the rich and powerfulstates in their efforts to control or isolate unruly parts of the world’. Pugh (2014, 39) explainsfurther that ‘PSOs serve a narrow, problem-solving purpose – to doctor the dysfunctionsof the global political economy within a framework of liberal imperialism’. Gowan (2011, 3) observes that the UN in particular ‘has been accused of pursuing a Western agenda inpost-conflict countries, with a strong emphasis on democracy, human rights andinternational justice rather than adapting to local power dynamics’. In addition, troopsparticipating in PSOs abroad may fuel mutinies at home. Participation in PSOs ‘can leadto new grievances and exacerbate existing tensions within the contributing country’smilitary. Thus peacekeeping abroad may contribute to new problems at home bases’ (Dwyer, 2015, 207). West Africa alone has witnessed close to ten mutinies by soldiers involved inpeacekeeping abroad in relation to grievances such as ‘unfair treatment andirresponsible behaviour of superiors within the military context’. Grievances may alsosurround equipment, training, deployment lengths and pay problems (Dwyer, 2015, 207).
In Defense of International Peace Operations
The concerns of scholars about the usefulness and legitimacy of PSOs have been well documented (Gowan, 2011; Dwyer, 2015; Pugh, 2014; McGreal, 2015). These concerns have influenced international public opinion against PSOs (Guldimann, 2010). While we recognise that the contradictions about PSOs are real andacknowledge the need to innovate and reform PSO architecture at all levels of operations, particularly at the level of the UN to mitigate these contradictions, it must beobserved that ‘reporting on peacekeeping tends to be critical (if not outright hostile)and public opinion about intervention in faraway places…is at best uninterested or evennegative when costs become more apparent’ (Dorussen, 2014, 527). Leveraging on the abundant literature in this subject area, this work argues that the values or benefits of international peaceoperations overbalance the possible objections or contradictions about them; withoutdiscounting the need to erect structures and regimes that will enhance peace operationsand mitigate the misgivings surrounding them. The arguments that legitimise andrationalise the continuous deployment of troops for the purpose of PSOs are articulatedbelow.
Military cum Strategic Relevance
The military cum strategic relevance of PSOs has received attention in the literature. Themilitary component of PSOs usually involves the armed forces – the land, naval, and airforces. As explained by Gregorian (1996, 139), these forces are ‘capable of self-sustainedoperations in hostile and remote environments… they can perform a variety of tasksthat, though often ancillary to their raison d’être of combat, augment the responsegroup capabilities’. The deployment of military troops for the purpose of maintaininginternational peace and security has helped to de-escalate conflicts where there havebeen serious political convulsions. Peace operations have succeeded in creating afavourable environment for belligerents to put an end to hostilities and talk peace inseveral places. PSOs have contributed to ensuring a peaceful and secure world by providing stability in many nations of the world once described as theatres of war. Thesecountries include Congo, Liberia, Yugoslavia, among others (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007).
Although the expansion of military operations does not imply the military option isgrowing more effective (Gowan, 2011), the strategic tasks carried out by military personnel duringPSOs imply that they represent the core in contemporary peace operations. The militarycomponent of PSOs performs diverse functions. Apart from their critical functions ofpeacekeeping and enforcement, military troops also serve as strategic advisers ongeneral military issues such as security sector reforms, training and recruitment, amongothers. They also serve as unarmed military observers (MILOB) responsible formonitoring ceasefire agreements, preservation of buffer zones, and reporting on theextent of commitment to ceasefire agreements by conflicting parties (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003). Other critical andstrategic responsibilities of military personnel during PSOs include preventivedeployment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants,enforcement of sanctions, military liaison, human rights monitoring, protection ofcivilians and support for humanitarian activities (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003).
PSOs also create opportunities for key stakeholders. For countries benefitting frompeace operations, there are opportunities for military restructuring and retraining. Fortroops and other personnel involved in PSOs, there are opportunities to demonstratetheir capabilities and gain more professional experience/skills. PSOs facilitate foreignexposure and specialised training of military, police and civilian personnel of participating countries (Pogoson, 2007: Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). PSOs guarantee the combat readiness of participating troops and enablethem to test and apply new technologies and techniques (Musa, 2010).
Political Dividends
PSOs deliver some political dividends both to the benefitting and participating countries.These political dividends further underscore the importance of international peaceoperations. PSOs help to protect popular, constitutionally constituted and internationally recognised regimes/governments. Where those regimes have been illegally overthrown, they may berestored through international peace operations. This was the case in Sierra Leone wherethe elected government of President Tejan Kabbah was restored by the ECOWASMonitoring Group (ECOMOG) after it had been overthrown by the military forces (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). Through the instrumentality of PSOs therefore, the mounting organisation orparticipating countries ‘engage and assist local civilian authorities and communities inefforts to consolidate peace by restoring the political, legal, economic and socialinfrastructures that support democratic governance’ (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, 35). Other political values of PSOsinclude protection and promotion of human rights, free and fair elections throughmonitoring and supervision (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007).
While PSOs are believed to promote democracy and human rights, there have beeninstances where their activities have been observed to undermine democracy and humanrights. Among other instances, Gowan (2011, 3) identifies Sudan as the most obvious example,‘where the UN has had to cooperate with President Bashir even though the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) has indicted him for genocide in Darfur’. Apart from these isolatedcases, PSOs have generally aided democracy, particularly the organisation and actualconduct of elections in places where there have been very little incentives for such. Asargued by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2003, 147-148),
the role of elections in a post-conflict situation is to replace a violent contestfor political power with a non-violent one. An election is only effective,however, when the electoral process is widely accepted by the participatingpopulation as legitimate and binding…In many peacekeeping operations, afree and fair election is a critical milestone in achieving a mission’s objectives.Whether the purpose is to create the foundation of a newly democratic state or rehabilitate an existing democracy, a credible election will stronglyinfluence the course of the mission and its relationship with the hostgovernment.
Although not all PSOs have an electoral dimension, ‘where there is an electoraldimension, it is likely to be one of the most important aspects of the mission’ (Maley, 1996, 79). The electoral dimension of PSOs generally involve the organisation and conduct of elections, election observation and monitoring, logistics and military supports to internationalobservers, technical assistance such as the training of election administrators and pollingstaff, among others (Maley, 1996). Again, participation in international peace operations represents‘an instrument of foreign policy execution and pursuit and the promotion of a state’s national interest’ (Pogoson, 2007, 256). PSOs enable participating countries to gain legitimacy and credibilitywithin the relevant international and regional organisations spearheading them (Pogoson, 2007). Otherforeign policy dividends to the participating countries include international recognition, prestige and honour. For instance, Nigeria attained global reckoning through the Congopeace mission and Tanganyika operations from 1960-1964 (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007).
Humanitarian Gains
International peace operations have a humanitarian angle. Wars and other forms ofcomplex emergencies produce refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).Refugees and IDPs are persons displaced and exposed to security threats – particularlythreats to life. While refugees are outside of their countries of origin, IDPs remain withinthe boundaries of their countries (Whitcomb, 1996). These persons require international protection ‘toensure that their rights, security and welfare are recognised and safeguarded inaccordance with international standards’ (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003, 169-170). International humanitarian interventions‘enable populations to stay where they are; second, if they do move, ensure that theparticular needs caused by displacement are addressed; and third, assist refugees and displaced persons to return to and live in their places of origin under acceptablecircumstances’ (Whitcomb, 1996, 48). International peace operations create the required environment forhumanitarian organisations to operate. PSOs allow ‘humanitarian workers and reliefagencies to reach and service people affected by war. For example in Bosnia, if not forNATO operations, relief would not have reached war-trapped people early enough andmany would have died’ (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007, 33-34). PSOs therefore have the capacity to reduce human sufferingsand salvage several millions of lives in conflict zones (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007).
The term commonly used to describe the synergy between civilian and militaryorganisations when delivering humanitarian assistance is known as ‘civil-militarycooperation (CIMIC)’ (Rietjens, De Boer, Voordijk, 2004, 100). It should be noted however that the relationship betweenpeacekeepers and humanitarian civilian workers is somewhat fragile. While‘peacekeepers look with dismay at the loose-knit and apparently “shambolic” civilianstructures that are intended to provide humanitarian assistance, the civilians view thepeacekeepers as inflexible and culturally insensitive’ (Kent, 1996, 36). Again, ‘humanitarianorganisations fear competition and are afraid that their neutral status will be harmed’ (Rietjens, De Boer, Voordijk, 2004, 100). This fragile relationship notwithstanding, humanitarian agencies depend on militarytroops for protection of relief convoys and materials, mine awareness and demining, aswell as general security. The military force or peacekeepers on the other hand recognisethat humanitarian workers are critical stakeholders in promoting stability. These civilianworkers usually have a better understanding of the environment where peacekeepersoperate, as well as the people in conflict zones (Kent, 1996).
Normally, there are legal bases for international humanitarian protection. A major legalfoundation is what is universally known as human rights law. This law applies to refugees, IDPs and all people. This legal structure has the 1948 Universal Declaration of HumanRights as its cornerstone (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2003). The notable humanitarian organisations include theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations agencies such as theUnited Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs), local NGOs, relief agenciesoperated by national governments, among others. These humanitarian agencies involvedin PSOs serve as a check on the behaviour and actions of participating troops andcombatants in conflict theatres, takes care of prisoners of war, render medical and otherpsycho-social assistance, reunite family members separated by war, fight starvation andmalnutrition, engage in peace mediation/making, supply intelligence on movement oftroops and on atrocities committed in conflict theatres and by whom, among others (Nwolise and Ogomudia, 2007: Rietjens, De Boer, Voordijk, 2004). Although the activities of humanitarian workers naturally contribute to the peaceprocess, ‘the principal objective of humanitarian assistance is to save and protect humanlife’ (Kent, 1996, 31).
Economic Dividends
PSOs deliver economic dividends through some notable channels. First, internationalpeace operations make it possible for military, police and civilian personnel involved toearn additional economic benefits/allowances. The extra allowances earned are usually inforeign currencies (Musa, 2010). Second, as a result of the reimbursements received through UN-financedoperations, PSOs ‘may also help weak states generate wealth and thus reducetheir reliance on external aid’ (Gowan, 2011, 2). The funds provided to the countries contributing troopsto UN missions, particularly for equipment, contribute to foreign exchange earnings.Third, the benefitting countries strategically leverage on the economic and militaryresources provided by the participating organisations and countries. The implication isthat funds budgeted for defense by nations in conflict are reduced, thereby increasing the funds for social and economic development (Simbine-Okoosi, 2007). Fourth, a situation allowed todegenerate into civil war is likely to precipitate economic hardship, and PSOs can mitigate this challenge (Gowan, 2011).
Concluding Reflections
This article has covered some important issues such as the conceptual articulation of PSOs (meaning, different generations, and scope), the evolution of international peace operations, as well as the contradictions and challenges confronting PSOs. The contradictions identified here include human fatalities, diversion of developmental resources, failure to restore peace in desperate and complex situations, problem of unclear mandates and the quality of personnel deployed, and the sustenance of a particular world order that serves the strategic interest of the West. The core stakeholders involved in international peace operations at all levels will need to undertake reforms that will address these contradictions and impact positively on international public opinion about PSOs. More importantly, this work has leveraged on the existing literature to develop arguments in support of international peace operations. The contradictions notwithstanding, international peace operations confer major benefits and advantages. They include military and strategic, political, humanitarian, and economic dividends.
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