TRANS-BORDER CRIMES AND THE CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS)
Isibor Uhunoma Mary
University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria (mary.isibor@uniben.edu)
&
Yemisi Olawale Isaac
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria (yemisiwaleisaac@gmail.com)
Abstract
The West African region is undeniablya strategic and important Sub-region in Africa. However, it has become one of the most volatile regions in Africa today. Amidst these challenges emerged the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975 with the laudable goal of economic integration. However, the economic integration efforts of ECOWAS have been challenged by new global dynamics and regional challenges. Since integration requires an organisation of socio-economic activities on a much larger scale, the study finds out that trans-border crimesremain a fundamental challenge to the regional multilateral economic paradigm. Trans-border crimes prevalent in the West Africa region include the smuggling of small arms and light weapons, armed robbery, money laundering, smuggling of contraband goods and commodities, human trafficking, trans-border terrorism and insurgencies, and drug trafficking. The study argues that the proliferation of trans-border crimes has posed a significant challenge to integration agendas such as Free Trade Area, Free movement, Customs Union, Monetary Union, and economic integration. The study, using historical methodology relies on content analysis of secondary data, sourced from peer-reviewed journals, books, and official publications of ECOWAS and other relevant multilateral institutions.The study finds out that trans-border crimes have contributed to the challenges facing the regional integration agenda in West Africa. Given the above findings, concludes the need for a joint collaborative multi-stakeholder approach to tackling these crimes which will help in deepening regional integration.
Keywords: West Africa, ECOWAS, Trans-Border Crimes, Regional Integration, Development
Introduction
It is an undeniable fact that West Africa is a strategic and important Sub-region in Africa and the globe, yet identified as ‘one of the world’s most sensitive and volatile regions[1] and as ‘being among one of the world’s most unstable sub-regions.[2] Despite the economic growth and development, it has experienced over decades, it has equally faced significant security challenges since the 1980s. Among these challenges includes insurgencies and terrorism, armed mercenaries and warlords, transnational health challenges and pandemics such as Ebola and Coronavirus, acute piracy and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, and functioning hub for transnational and organised crime particularly smuggling and trafficking (human and drug), the proliferation of small and light Arms and Weapons as a result of border porosity among others.
ECOWAS was established in 1975 with a laudable goal of economic integration. Economic integration encompasses robust economic growth and development of human and material resources among member states. The integration agenda focused on sectors such as transportation, telecommunication, industry, agriculture, natural resources, commerce and trade, monetary and financial sector,and humanitarian and human rights protection concerns across West Africa that protect, promote, sustain and strengthen economic relations.[3] However, ECOWAS’s objective of integration since 1975 has been anchored on good faith while the challenges abound.
Academics, policymakers, and regional integration analysts have discussed the barriers affecting the realisation of these goals. Among the barrier identified included the over-ambitious nature of the integration programme, poor leadership, inadequate funding, and lack of cooperation from among the countries of West Africa. Whilst these factors are important in explaining the integration dilemma and cannot be discounted, I would argue and support that such views are sophisticated. These factors, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, they are ultimately peculiar and interconnected with issues of state and regional (in) security. However, the present study interrogates the place of trans-border crimes and their implications for regional integration in West Africa.
The study relies on the content analysis of secondary data, sourced from scholarly peer-reviewed journals and books, and official publications of ECOWAS and other relevant multilateral institutions. There are four sections in the article, apart from the introduction and conclusion. The first is a brief conceptual explanation of Trans-border crimes. The next segment examines ECOWAS and its Integration Agenda, followed by a survey of various trans-border crimes in West Africa. The last segment examined the efforts of ECOWAS in border security and management and its implications for the integration agenda in West Africa.
ECOWAS and Integration Agenda in West Africa: Historical Perspective
The idea of integration is not peculiar to the West Africa sub-region alone.[4] It is a global political-economic concept found across boundaries and space. Olutayo et al contend that regional integration has become a unique and distinctive characteristic of the development efforts of nations.[5] The idea of integration in Africa was borne out of agitations against colonial and neo-colonial forces as well as the need to re-organise the continent’s socio-economic and political development path towards greater nation-building.[6]Regional integration encompasses a level of social, economic, and political cooperation. Kimunguyi identified the essential characteristics of integration namely;minimisation of cost of trade, facilitation of market access, and growth of region’s industries to the economic power of integrating states.[7] Similarly, Kabananiye identifies monetary, fiscal, and financial policy coordination and harmonisation as measures for successful integration.[8]
In Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) established in 1963 and changed in 2001 to establish a framework of a regional organisation serving as an agitation against the influence of colonial rule. This position was underscored by Diallo, who maintained that ‘integration in Africa is an idea which arises as a form of resistance and struggles against external aggression that the continent and its people have suffered throughout history.[9] However, the emergence of other regional organisations, especially sub-region organisations argued Abubakar to have emanated from the character of post-independent African leadership which abruptly dashed the hope of many in terms of all-encompassing independence and sustainable democracy. Abubakar contends further that ‘regional and sub-regional initiatives were developed to among other things improve the quality of leadership and by extension, enhance the quality of governance in Africa’.[10] Among these sub-region organisations included – the Economic Community of West African States (EOWAS); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community for the Central African States (ECCAS), and later, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and South Africa Development Commission (SADC).
ECOWAS constitutes fifteen West African member States[11] with a total population of 367 million. The organisation was established in 1975 through the idea of General YakubuGowon of Nigeria and the Francophone General GnassingbeEyadema of Togo. The goal of ECOWAS, at the early stage of its establishment, was purely economic oriented saddled with the responsibility of promoting trade and fostering integration among member states. The United Nation Economic Community Arrangement (UNECA) state that the fundamental objective of ECOWAS was to promote cooperation and integration in the economic, social, and cultural domain for the overall development of the sub-region.[12]Adetula also emphasized that the formation of ECOWAS was designed as a response and initiative (emerging states of West Africa from colonialism) to facilitate economic growth and development in West Africa.[13]AbdelfatauMusahsummarised the above discussion thus:
The Treaty establishing ECOWAS, therefore, came into being in May 1975 with a vision to create a single regional economic space as a prelude to the continental common market, through integration and collective self-reliance; an economic space with a single market and single currency capable of generating accelerated socio-economic development and competing more meaningfully in the global market of large trade blocs and uneven patterns of trade between the industrialised North and raw material-based economies of the South.[14]
The Regional Organisation Treaty states the essence of the formation of the organisation as contained in the 1975 treaty thus:
To promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, and in social and cultural matters to raise the standard of its people, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent[15]
ECOWAS trade liberalisation policy and regional integration agenda included Common Customs Union, Removal of tariff barriers to trade, Customs Duties, and Common External Tariff. Customs Union focused on trade liberalisation[16] towards the elimination of intra-trade barriers and the equalisation of tariffs on imports from non-member countries.[17]Similarly, the removal of tariff barriers to trade focused on institutionalising communal trade through the removal of the tariff on export and import for member states. Custom duties and Common Tariffs are designed to address the establishment of a common duties external tariff in line with importation as stated in Article 36, Article 38, and Article 40 of the organisation treaty.
Beyond the economic agenda of ECOWAS, in the 1990s West Africa redefined the organisation’s focus in terms of widespread insecurity. Insecurity led to a paradigm shift in the ECOWAS objective to matters of peace, security and development. For instance, the 1978 Protocol on non-aggression, was followed later in 1981 by the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense and the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990, and the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Management, Peacekeeping, and Security in 1999 which encompasses regional cooperation in the areas of ‘conflict prevention, early warning, peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and antipersonnel mines.[18] The mechanism also establishes Mediation and Security Council (MSC), the Executive Secretariat, ECOWAS Rapid Response Force, an Early Warning System (ECOWARN), and the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF).
Other security frameworks included the 2001 Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy, the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, and the 2013, ECOWASCounter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan as a reaction to growing insurgency and jihadist terrorism. Despite the deficiencies in the security arrangement of the organisation, the security protocols and the mechanism is an affirmative and assertive step toward security integration and arrangement. Golwa emphasised a similar position that ‘the intensity and devastating consequences of the situation (Insecurity) led to a major shift in the focus of ECOWAS from economic development to peace, security and stability. The intervention of ECOWAS in these countries opened a new vista for the organisation as a critical vehicle for achieving regional security.[19]
ECOWAS and Trans-Border Crimes in West African Sub-Region
Geographically, the West Africa region is 4.7 million square kilometres which stretches from the upper reaches of Angola in South-West Africa to the lower reaches of Western Sahara to the North and is washed by the Atlantic Ocean.[20] The region is also endowed with precious and strategic natural minerals, including gold, uranium, diamonds and titanium among others. One can dare say that West Africa is a major economic hub. Issues relating to border insecurity in West Africa can be traced to border disputes that characterised immediate independence years over arbitrary colonial-drawn boundaries.[21] Some identified factors such as the quest of securing economic interests (searching for vital economic resources), expansionist policies, political rivalry, and increasing populations as factors that aid border disputes in West Africa.[22] The implications of border dispute for economic integration is obvious. For instance, long-tussle and conflict interests over borders prolong disunity and the inability of the state to open their arms toward integration models of ECOWAS. Such disputes include Cameroon – Nigeria over Oil Rich Bakaasi Peninsula (1994 -2002); Mali – Burkina Faso over 18km Agacher Strip (1969 -1967); Mali – Mauritania over Hodh Region and Savannah Region of DjelMael to Queneibe (1960 – 1963) among several others.
Beyond the disputes attached to colonially drawn borders in West Africa, the porosity conundrum has also generated significant attention. In West Africa alone, there are a total of 35 international boundaries characterized by high levels of porosity. Porosity leads to vulnerability to trans-border threats such as trafficking of people, drugs, small arms, and light weapons as well as insurgency and terrorism. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that border security and management issues are not always integrated into the national security or economic strategies of states. Similarly, border agencies are usually ill-equipped, ill-trained, and poorly resourced.[23]
In the age of globalisation, regional integration schemes are considered an effective bargaining tool in the larger international economic order. Regional organisations place member states in a better position – collective to compete and participate in the world economy.[24] However, despite these laudable opportunities, policies on regional integration are faced with challenges in the new world order. Prominent among them are Trans-border crimes. In West Africa, drug trafficking accounts for a substantial quota of trans-border crime or organized illicit trade. West African states served as a point of origin, transit, and destination to other states in Africa. West Africa’s coastal states of Guinea- Bissau, Guinea, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, and Senegal have become major transit routes for drug traffickers from Latin America such that these states are now regarded as the ‘coke coast’ or ‘narco-states’ because of widespread drug trafficking activities.[25] West Africa’s seashores and harbours have become the hub of transatlantic cocaine trafficking.[26] Records of international bodies reveal that there is a huge financial flow emanating from drug trafficking in the region. Geographically, Cape Verde served as a point of entry for drug traffickers into West Africa.[27] In 2007 important cocaine seizures exceeding I5O kilograms have been reported in Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Senegal.[28]
The West Africa Sea, land, and air border are highly porous. UNDOC reported that between 2000, and 2004 reveals that about 1.4tons of cocaine has been seized en route to West Africa or from West Africa to Europe not including a usually large seizure of 2.29-7.4 tons.[29] Heroin is also transported to West Africa through Ethiopia, Kenya, and Egypt with Cote d’Ivoire forming the hub for the drug trade. The involvement of West African citizens especially Nigerians in drug trafficking within and beyond Nigeria has become worrisome.[30] More importantly, there is a growing linkage between insurgencies/terrorism and drug trafficking in West Africa. Terrorist elements in West Africa and the Sahel–Saharan belt reportedly have also forged an alliance with drug traffickers for financial gains.[31] It is alleged that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been supporting the drug trade in the trans-Sahel region by placing levies on drugs passing through its controlled territory and, in some cases, by actively engaging in the drug trafficking trade to generate revenue for its operations.[32]
Furthermore, human trafficking is another major trans-border crime prevalent in West Africa sub-region. Article 3(a) of the UNDOC protocol defines trafficking as ‘…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons, employing threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for exploitation.[33] In West Africa, Child trafficking is particularly prevalent. The United Nations’ Children Emergency Funds estimated that about 1.2 million children are trafficked each year.[34] The major source/destination countries for child labour are Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Togo, while the major countries of origin for prostitution are Nigeria and Togo.[35]The victims of trafficking (mostly women and children) are often either kidnapped or lured from their homes by traffickers under various guises like securing employment or pursuing educational advancement.[36]West Africa region served as a point of destination, transit, and origin in human trafficking crimes. In Sierra Leone, it is reported that members of the country’s influential Lebanese community have taken local girls to Lebanon, mostly under 18 years of age, ostensibly to work as maids. Equally, in Nigeria, many girls or young women have been trafficked to Europe -especially Italy and the Middle East.[37]
In West Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal have been identified as source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked women and children.[38] Indeed, the rate of women trafficked cannot be overemphasised in West Africa. Women are major transit from rural to urban centres, especially from Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Ghana to Côted’Ivoire’s to destination countries like Nigeria and Gabon.[39] In a similar vein, Adepoju noted that Ghana is a transit route for Nigerian women trafficked to Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands for commercial sex workers, forced labour, and prostitution.[40] He equally affirmed that Senegal is both a source and transit country for women trafficked to Europe, South Africa and the Gulf States for illicit work.[41] Human trafficking has led to intense movement restrictions which in turn hindered ECOWAS Provision on Free Movement of Persons and Goods.
The use and proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in West Africa have also hindered the ECOWAS integration agenda. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has contributed to conflicts, insurgencies, and terrorism. Darkwa identified three main sources of SALWin West Africa, namely: ‘extant stocks that are recycled; new imports, which may include brand-new weapons and ammunition as well as used weapons recycled from outside the sub-region; and local craft production in countries of the sub-region.[42] These weapons are a threat to national security and state sovereignty. West Africa has witnessed an increasing level of arms proliferation for decades and thus, it is responsible for the intense and precarious nature of insecurity in the region. The experiences of the West African Stateshave stressed the capability of lethal weapons to be a catalyst for crisis and armed conflict which destabilise the governments through the deadly operations of violent non-state actors.[43]Musa describes SALW in West Africa thus:
Small arms and light weapons have been called ‘weapons of mass destruction in West Africa for good reason. The availability of small arms and light weapons in West Africa has long-term and widespread pernicious effects. Even when conflicts have been officially terminated, small arms have remained, illicitly, in the post-conflict zones of Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, making it easy for fighting to recommence. Even when further combat is avoided, the easy availability of small arms means that they have become common tools of violence, used in criminal activities and ethnic and political rivalries. Armed ex-combatants may become affiliated with local gangs, warlords, or militias. This enduring climate of violence has often resulted in refugees and displaced persons fearing to return home after a conflict has ended.[44]
The trafficking of arms in West Africa is proliferated by supplies from current and past conflict zones and aided by corrupt law enforcement and military personnel and the growing domestic artisan production from Senegal, Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria, which passes down established trade routes.[45] Nigeria, Niger, and Chad are facing the menace of the Fulani herdsmen-farmers crisis, which has recorded violent phases. The Fulani herdsmen armed with Small and Light Weapons (SALW) have led to numerous cases of killings and destruction of farmlands. In all, the proliferation of SALW has fuelled the farmers-herders crisis. The increase in terrorism and insurgency acts in the West Africa sub-region has also facilitated the trafficking of SALW, while its presence has also prolonged them. Terrorists and insurgency networks have aided the supply of these weapons to the Boko-Haram terrorist groups that conduct trans-border terrorist acts between Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and the Benin Republic. The circulation of SALW has been factored on some structural issuessuch as governance, institutional corruption, porous borders and globalisation. This proliferation has also been aided by the rise of ethnic militarism, religious crises, inter-tribal conflicts, insurrection and terrorism, and political violence.[46] Moreover, small arms are ubiquitous in that they are cheap, easy to transport and conceal, simple to maintain, and easy to handle. SAWL has fuelled conflict between rebels and the National Government in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea. Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and Nigeria are also facing the implication of SALW proliferation.[47]
Trans-Border Armed Robbery (TAR) is another prevalent trans-border crime. Migrant and border town/village residents and traders are frequently robbed and attacked by armed robbers without any protection from law enforcement agents. Several Borders in the sub-region are either outright unpoliced or poorly policed, making them easy areas of operations for smugglers. This has hampered the ECOWAS agenda for integration since human security cannot be guaranteed under the ECOWAS free movement of goods and services. In addition, borders in West Africa securing vital natural resources are faced with the incessant robbery of natural resources thereby making these natural resources ungovernable. Cases of trans-border armed robbery also frequently occur at the Sorou-Belel and Konkol communities in Maiha Local Government Area of Adamawa State, Nigeria[48]. In addition, robbers move unhindered across the borders of Chad, Cameroun, and Niger[49] with arms and ammunition, to perpetrate their obnoxious acts. The porosity of borders provided the avenue for robbers to move in and out while weak or absence of security apparatus and corrupted security framework makes matter worse in West Africa sub-region.
Transnational terrorism and insurgencies have also been linked to the porosity of borders in West Africa and Africa. Notable terrorist groups in the sub-region include Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, Ansar Dine (or AnsarEddine), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), al-Mourabitoun, and Front de Libération du Macina (FLM), AQIM affiliates, all in Mali. The Boko haram insurgents group in Nigeria 2009 has posed serious insecurity along Northeastern state borders in Nigeria and Northern Cameroon. The transnational nature of the insurgents’ group operation accounts for their spillover to Chad and the Niger Republic. Besides the implication for the political economy of border security, the humanitarian costs attached to these insurgencies increase the nature of the catastrophe.
Between 2009 and 2019, the unprecedented level of violence and mayhem has been underscored as crimes against humanity considering the numbers of Internally Displaced Persons, Refugees, and third-country nationals affected by the crisis. Nonetheless, the region has been described as an ungoverned space. Mali, a West African state is also bedevilled by violent Islamic extremists. The 2012 crisis in Mali, and by extension, the Sahel, has brought several critical questions to the fore in terms of border management. The question of how economic integration would be sustained when borders of integrating states are controlled by insurgents and terrorist groups? The trans-border nature of terrorists and insurgents has contributed to a depletion of the fragile economic base of the affected states. Insurgencies across the West African sub-region, coupled with the porous borders and limited resources to control them, provide an opportunity for terrorist groups to expand their communications and training and invariably increased regional instability.
The implication of SALW, trans-border robbery, terrorism, and insurgency for ECOWAS integration was underscored by John DramaniMahama, in his acceptance speech as Chairman of the ECOWAS, when he asserts that:
The absence of peace and security in the sub-region has been the bane of the integration process. It has hindered development in the affected countries as well as sub-regional projects. While internal conflicts in member countries have been reduced, new and more complex forms of security threats are emerging. Islamist extremism, terrorism, piracy, worsening drug use, and trafficking are among these threats. Consolidating peace in Mali, halting Boko Haram’s atrocities on innocent civilians in Nigeria, and addressing the dire economic situation of Guinea Bissau (resulting from years of conflicts) will all have positive implications for security in the sub-region.[50]
ECOWAS Integration Agenda: Institutional Efforts, Challenges, and Contours
The ECOWAS has responded to trans-border crimes and insecurity in West Africa over time and space. For instance, ECOWAS member states initiated the Abuja Political Declaration and accompanying Action Plan on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in West Africa in 2009 and in addition, the Dakar Initiative in 2010.[51] The regional organisation has also enjoyed the support of the international organisation in its quest towards addressing trans-border crimes. The United Nations initiated and implemented the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) in four West African countries including Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; by the then United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, which complemented the ECOWAS effort by establishing the West African Drugs Commission (WACD).[52]
UNODC has also been supporting the ‘interdiction of containerized shipments’ and developed National Integrated Programmes (NIPs) for all the ECOWAS countries.[53] Other ECOWAS initiatives geared at combating drug trafficking include the formation of the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO), West African Joint Operations Initiatives(WAJO), ECOWAS Drug Control Unit and Drug Fund (EDCUDF), Airport Communication Project (AIRCOP), the Global Container Control Programme (GCCP),[54] among several other national drug enforcement agencies such as Nigeria’s National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Ghana’s Narcotics Control Board (NACOB).
In the sphereofSALW proliferation, ECOWAS adopted a Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials in June 2006 and launched a small arm initiative namedECOWAS Small Arms Programme(ECOSAP) based in Bamako, Mali, designed to provide professional assistance to members’ state in tackling the challenges emanating from the proliferation of SALW. ECOWAS efforts on human trafficking started in 2001 with the ECOWAS Declaration and Plan Action against Trafficking in Persons 2002-2003and 2008-2011 respectively. In addition, ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted a Joint Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons in 2006, and the launching of the ECOWASAnti-Trafficking Unit was designed for coordinating the efforts against human trafficking.
ECOWAS has been playing an indelible role in the process of countering terrorism. ECOWAS over time has initiated strategies and collaborated with continental and international state and non-state actors such as the United States of America, France, African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). In 2013, ECOWAS made a Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism encompassing ‘terrorist bombings, suicide attacks, kidnappings, hostage-taking, hijacking, mass murder, wanton assassinations, piracy and acts of sabotage of public and private properties, as well as the torching and desecration of religious and sacred places.[55] ECOWAS in a bid to address money laundering and the financial base of terrorist organisations rooted in money laundering revised Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and relevant international instruments on AML/CFT in 2006.[56]
ECOWAS also collaborated with the African Union on the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999; entered into a multi-year (2015–2019) security and development agreement with the US Government in 2015[57] UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), a committee created by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624; the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). Other ECOWAS counter-terrorism measures include ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Bureau (ECOCTB); ECOWAS Arrest Warrant (ECOWARRANT); ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks (ECOLIST); ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Training Centre; and Counter-Terrorism Technical Assistance Directory in 2013 in line with the 2013 ECOWAS Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism, which contained ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan.[58] The region organisation, in its counter-terrorism measures, established information and communication networks referred to as ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) and West Africa Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) on the assumption that a terrorist threat to one is a threat to all in the region.[59]
Despite these aforementioned efforts, Trans-border crimes in West Africa persist. However, this has not deterred high expectations of regional arrangement and the benefits accrued to regional economic and political integration. The challenges faced by the West African government in addressing the challenges posed by trans-border crimes are enmeshed in the poor enforcement of the law as a result of institutional challenges. West African government has decentralised national frameworks in line with the requirement of ECOWAS and other international organisations. The efforts of ECOWAS in addressing trans-border crimes have been forestalled by the inability of member states’ structures and institutions to contribute meaningfully to the process. West African state adopts the necessary legislative measure but is handicapped to contribute meaningfully to the regional security measures. However, Tran border crimes can be adjudged to have undermined the role of state structure and the inability to effectively curb the proliferation and respond to evolving dynamics has not only made the region a hub in the proliferation of trans-border crimes but also served as a major route to other regions and continents.[60]Omoluabi, et.al. argued that in the Benin Republic, the major hindrances to enhancing trade liberalisation is the lack of enforcement of national and regional laws at the border, which is evident in the non-tariff barriers imposed at the borders, therefore inhibiting the agenda of free trade.[61] Similarly, in Burkina Faso, goods with 30% value-added are still being charged tax, despite ECOWAS regulation that such goods should enter duty-free within the sub-region. Thus, until ECOWAS possessed an institutional framework to monitor member states’ compliance, integration effort remains futile.[62]
In addition, member states of ECOWAS lack coordination despite being members of the same regional arrangement. This has led to different strategies and contradictory measures in addressing trans-border crime. Since border signified the end of a state and the beginning of another, the responsibility of protection should be of both states. The lack of coordination has propelled the regional arrangement demands for support from several international organisations which face similar challenges. Sawadogo observed that intergovernmental organisations engaged by ECOWAS lack coordination which has led to a diversion of their strategies and led to contradictory demands on governments and societies involved which has hampered the efficacy of their actions.[63] By implication, ECOWAS needs to take responsibility for addressing trans-border crimes by coordinating states’ actions and not rely on international actors who may not more readily facilitate the speedy elimination of this trans-border crime.
The proliferation of Trans-border crimes has further complicated ECOWAS efforts on Protocol on freedom of movement. The ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of People and Goods ensures free mobility of goods and services through the abolishment of entry visas and usage of ECOWAS travel certificates. However, the protocol on freedom of movement has been confronted with trans-border challenges. The goal of the free movement protocol to enhance economic activities has turned out to be a security liability for West African states as Criminal networks have availed themselves of this initiative to perpetrate nefarious activities. Even though ECOWAS prides itself as the first region in Africa with the free movement initiative, the Protocol is poorly implemented constituting more security concerns than boosting regional trade and economic development. The Protocol rather than serving the purpose of integration is rather contributing to the insecurity prevalent in the sub-region as a result of institutional mechanisms to address proper monitoring of cross border movements and challenges emanating from the policies.
The essence of border security and management lies in the provision of an adequate environment which guarantee not only sustainable national economic and political development but also a successful regional economic integration programme. The challenges and predicaments confronting the West African state have threatened national security crucial to socio-economic and political growth and development. From observation, these crimes have also contributed to the overall challenges of state nation-building. It is on the above discourse that Anadi surmised that The present state of affairs in member states’ domestic socio-political and economic environment does not and cannot state provide the much required favourable condition for ECOWAS to successfully implement its regional economic integration programmes[64] The proliferation of Trans-border crimes in West Africa have also been traced to some structural regional causes such as poverty and inequality, hunger, unemployment and corruption, absence of good governance among others. Since there is hardly any region of the world that is spared from the phenomenon of trans-border crimes and these structural causes, ECOWAS must task member states on the essence of good governance for regional integration. Without a doubt, most of these structural indices of Trans-border crimes appeared internal but with a trans-border undertone. For instance, the porosity of state borders will aid insurgencies and criminal networks.
Conclusion
This article concluded that the ECOWAS charter goal of integration of the West African people may not be achievable, after all, due to incessant trans-border crimes and attendant insecurity. Trans-border crimes would continue to de-integrate the socio-economic and political development of the regional integration fabrics. While the idea and practice of integration are noble and huge investments are placed on it in the sub-region through ECOWAS, trans-border crimes pose a huge threat to security and integration in the sub-region. As laudable as it is, it is threatened by insecurity occasioned by trans-border crimes. The recent happenings in Mali, and Nigeria, human trafficking, drug trafficking, trans-border armed robbery, and smuggling of small arms and light weapons have presented debilitating security challenges and are hindrances to the integration of the people of West Africa.
[1]L.M.Antonio, Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: The Additional Challenge, International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 83, No.6, (2007): 1072
[2]A.Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 24
[3]A.O. Olutayo, M.A.O. Olutayo, and O. Akanle, The New Strategic Approaches to Integration and Development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region: towards securing the future, (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, DAKAR, 2012).
[4] Notes: In Africa alone, there are currently fourteen regional groupings in Africa, with eight recognized by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Union (AU) as the building blocks of the African Economic Community (AEC). These recognized groupings are collectively referred to as regional economic communities (RECs). They are: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the East African Community (EAC); the Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD); and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
[5]A.O.Olutayo, M.A.O.Olutayo, and O.Akanle, The New Strategic Approaches to Integration and Development in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region.
[6]H.Y.Bappah, Inter-regionalism as a Mechanism for the Harmonization of Africa’s Regional Integration Projects in O.O.Akinpelu, I.A.Adebusuyi, Regional Economic Communities Exploring the Process of Socio-economic Integration in Africa, (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, DAKAR, 2012).
[7]P.Kimunguyi, Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and Challenges for the European Union, (Contemporary Europe Research Centre: University of Melbourne, 2006)
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