MILITARY REGIMES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: AN EVALUATION OF GENERAL BUHARI’S ECONOMIC POLICIES, 1983-1985
Thaddeus T. Ityonzughul, PhD
Department of International Studies and Diplomacy
Benson Idahosa University, Benin City, Nigeria
&
Idahosa Osagie Ojo, PhD
Department of International Studies and Diplomacy
Benson Idahosa University, Benin City, Nigeria
&
Olusanya Faboyede, PhD
Department of International Studies and Diplomacy
Benson Idahosa University, Benin City, Nigeria
&
Samuel T. Ihom
Department of History
Benue State University, Makurdi, Nigeria
Abstract
Several articles and books have been written on the Buhari/Idiagbon’s military regime. However, these articles have not directly hinged on the economic policies of the administration. It is this missing link that prompted the intervention of this study. With the use of secondary data from diverse academic disciplines, the study traces the pedigrees of the two administrators emphasizing their career. It thereafter, assesses the administration’s economic policies. The study argues that those policies were solely aimed at protecting and growing the local economy of Nigeria. The paper evaluates those policies ranging from labour force, external reserves, fiscal discipline, River Basin Authorities (RBA), and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), among others. In evaluating the aforementioned policies, their strengths and weaknesses/criticisms are brought under consideration. The paper concludes that the Buhari/Idiagbon’s regime had attempted to revamp the Nation’s economy but failed; this in turn brought untold hardship to the Nigerian’s citizenry and it was later accused of corrupt practices and subsequently over thrown.
Keywords: Military Regimes; Economic Development; Nigeria; Buhari/Idiagbon; Economic Policies
Introduction
The end of the phenomenon of colonialism and the critical challenges that accompanied Nigeria’s independence has undoubtedly introduced another dimension of governance, the erstwhile military regimes in Africa, including Nigeria. In the African continent, whenever the name military is mentioned, it readily creates an atmosphere of terror. This is because of the experiences associated with military regimes and their activities whenever they truncated the Nation’s democracy. It is common knowledge that the constitutional responsibility of the military worldwide is purely to defend their states against external aggressions and quell down internal insurgrnces. But in Africa, the military has added the administration of the continent to their traditional role of defense. In the history of Nigeria, the military has intervened three times in Nigerian politics (1966, 1983, and 1993). In all these interventions, people criticized their actions. Some said they were incompetent, intolerant of criticism, undemocratic, and were political neophytes. Despite all these, the military has contributed meaningfully to the development of Nigeria.[1]
This article assesses the economic policies of the military administration of Major General Muhammadu Buhari/Tunde Idiagbon, between 1983 and 1985. This administration was named after two persons (and remained the only one in the history of military rule in Nigeria) because when Buhari was the Head of State of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN) because of the power of his second in command, Major General Tunde Idiagbon, the then Chief of Staff at the Supreme Headquarters, was believed to wield, many policy analysts and political commentators refer to the government as the Buhari/Idiagbon regime.[2] In evaluating the economic policies of this regime, this essay attempts to provides answers to the following questions: what is a policy and economic policy? What were the economic policies introduced by the Buhari/Idiagbon regime? What were the merits and defects of such policies? These and other variegated issues are the main thrust of this chapter. In examining the issues raised above, this chapter, therefore, clarifies the concepts of the military, economic development, and policy, it gives a pedigree of Buhari/Idiagbon and examines their economic policies emphasizing on the strengths and weaknesses. In doing this, the study examines the consequences/ implications of such policies for national economic development in Nigeria.
Conceptual Discourse of the Key Issues
The key issues in this chapter are military, economic development, policy, and economic policy. The concept of the military has been explained in this chapter from four different dimensions; military rule, military government, military regime, and military intervention in politics. The military rule refers to governance by the armed forces and the consequent reversal from civil to military super-ordinary, usually through an unconstitutional takeover of power in a coup d’état that ousted the legitimate civil authority, with the pretext of either restoring law and order, re-instituting legality within the system or eradicating any other social ills affecting the state. From another perspective, military rule can be defined as an act or process of administering a given polity by the Armed Forces which is often acquired via the seizure of state power through force.[3] That is to say that, military power to govern is acquired not through the ballot papers but the barrel of guns. Therefore, in the context of this chapter, military rule implies the act of governing a people without their consent and basically with the use of force through coup de tat. The military government, on the other hand, refers to the administrative agency managed by the Armed Forces and charged with the responsibility of exercising state power on behalf of the whole social classes in a given polity. It is therefore an institution of governance that is derived unconstitutionally.[4] This is simply a government that is imposed on people without being elected into office and is administered by decrees and order. Military government as used here implies governance by the armed forces of Nigeria rather than the civilian government. This kind of government does not use the constitution for its administration; it is rather based on decrees and edicts.
Furthermore, the term regime is used generally to mean a form of government or even a set of rules and the time or period a person rules.[5] Especially in politics, a regime is a framework of social organization based on rules designed to regulate the operation of government and its interactions with the rest of the society. Extrapolating from the above, this study conceptualized a military regime as a coercive framework of social organization that is based on strictly controlled rules designed to compel obedience from the rest of the civil societies via the promulgation of Decrees.[6] In a similar vein, military intervention in politics, as used in this chapter, signifies an unconstitutional takeover of political power from the civilian government by the armed forces with the use of brute force. These Armed forces for instance include the army, the navy, the air force, the police, and other law enforcement agencies.[7] Military intervention is regarded as unconstitutional because there are no defined rules of engagement stated anywhere as the established mechanisms on how the people can change their government through military intervention. This style of political takeover can be called coup d’état. It implies violent (or by whatever means) military overthrow of an elected civilian government or a constituted monarchy.[8]
Economic Development on one hand can be broadly regarded as the structural transformation of an economy by introducing more mechanized and updated technologies to boost labour productivity, employment, incomes, and standard of living of the citizens. Economic development usually works hand in hand with infrastructure improvements, as well as social, political, and institutional factors to facilitate the transformation of a particular economy.[9] Additionally, economic development includes progress in providing livelihood on a sustainable basis, access to education, and basic healthcare for the majority of the population.[10] However, the economic development of any country depends on the quantity and quality of its resources (renewable and non-renewable), the state of technology, and the efficient utilization of resources in both the production and consumption processes.[11] Economic development could include changes in social, political, and institutional structures in the economy, reflected in the character of the people and the attainment of a better life for the majority of the population in a society. Economic development could also involve development in different sectors of the economy. It involves efficient economic management, good governance, sustainable development, and poverty reduction; all of these are goals to which development stakeholders have to contribute.[12] Economic development is an important requisite for a country to reduce its poverty by providing more employment, higher incomes, improved goods and services, and the latest technologies of production.[13] However, the root of the problem lies in the fact that the framework for economic development; which is modern technology, industrial sector, and infrastructural facilities has not yet been established in many countries of the world including Nigeria, due to various historical and political reasons. That is why in the case of Nigeria, there were a series of military interventions shortly after political independence in 1960. These military regimes supposedly took over to bring economic development to the nation. Unfortunately, it became a game of tussle to amass wealth without eliminating the abnormalities.
To understand the concept of Economic Policy better, there is a need to, first of all, discuss the concept of policy. Policy as a concept has been faced with definitional problems; just like other concepts in social sciences. Several scholars have conceptualized policy based on their persuasion. According to Roger Scruton, cited by Newke in Anikeze, a policy is a general principle that guides the making of laws, administration, and executive acts of government in domestic and international affairs. This policy lays the processes and actions of government institutions or its agencies in responding to the needs of the citizens within and beyond domestic borders.[14] In a similar view, the policy is further explained as a definite course or method of action selected from alternatives, and in the light of given conditions to guide and usually determine present and future decisions.[15]
A policy is a proposed course of action on an individual, a group, an institution, or government, to realize a specific objective or purpose, within a given environment. To Terry, cited in Anikeze, a policy is a verbal, written, or implied basic guide to action that is adopted and followed by a manager.[16] However, Ugwu, conceives of policy as broad guidelines for thinking which lead to effective action. He added that policy is a plan of action, statement of intention, proposals, aims, and ideals usually made by government or state officials or private institutions.[17]
According to Dimock, policy is a consciously acknowledged rule of conduct that guides administrative decisions.[18] In a similar vein, David and Folley define policy as a statement of principles or group of principles, with their supporting rules of action and condition that governs the achievement of certain objectives to which a business is directed.[19] The policy is a set of decisions taken by a political role-playing group concerning the choice of goals and the means of attaining them. From the perspective of Ikelegle, a policy is seen as action taken or to be taken by a government or private organization. Thus policy is not restricted, to government and its agencies alone, private institutions and individuals are all involved in policymaking and this involves a series of actions and activities of government and private organizations aimed at solving perceived problems. This implies that a policy is goal-oriented and equally involves present inspirations.
Policy is the highest level of statecraft, embodying a set of objectives of the state and the means of attaining them and solving coordinated application of all the elements of national power interconnected variables of grand strategy including the administration of demographic, diplomatic, economic, geographical, ideological, military-strategic, political, psychological, scientific and technical as well as socio-cultural, amongst others to advance and protect the national interest.[20] To Anderson, cited in Anikeze, a policy is a relatively stable proper course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern.[21]
Characteristically, a good policy should be implemented according to the directives of its formulations and in conformity with the laid down guidelines, with the implementers obeying all rules and regulations. In line with this, Ugwu outlined the relevant elements of policies whether in the public or private sectors to include the following: choosing from available alternatives is very strategic. According to him, one is expected to make choice, which involves rationalization. Policies must be goal-oriented. This means that all policies must be geared towards realizing set objectives or goals. There should be a proposition of courses of actions or projected and organized set of decisions, these outlines, skills, and decisions about set actions must be properly laid down for people to see and identify. Solutions have to be found to particular problems that often arise in society.[22]
Obikeze, et al cited in Anikeze, Okonkwo, and Esiagu highlight the characteristics of policy to include; it must be based on the organization’s objectives. While trying to define policy, we did state that a policy is a guide to achieving the organisation’s objectives. Once the policy does not derive or deviate from the organisation’s objectives, it is faulty and will result in problems for the organization. It must be specific and clear. A policy that is a guide for action must specify what it expects from the workers. It therefore should be stated in clear terms, in a simple language for all to understand. Making a policy ambiguous is tantamount to if not worse than not having a policy. Contextually, the policy is a deliberate rational action or decision that a government and its agencies, private organization, individuals, and groups of people to solve an identified problem that is currently affecting the society or has a tendency to affect it in the future.[23]
The economic policy, however, could be seen as one of the key intentional decisions of any government to achieve prosperity and stability of the economy. It intends to achieve this by increasing the economy’s competitiveness, promoting long-term sustainable economic growth, and increasing employment. By way of defining economic policy, it is rather a general term that cannot be concisely defined. However, a policy itself has a very broad meaning; it could refer to strategies, rules, decisions, and coordinated actions. The adjective “economic” therefore specifies the target area of policy-making; it is about the economy.[24] The concept of economic policy as used in this chapter refers to the conscious decisions and strategies adopted by the Buhari/Idiagbon military regime to correct the abnormalities that were hampering the economy of Nigeria during the civilian government of the then president Alhaji Shehu Shagari. These economic policies were thought to be curative measures to heal the nation’s economic ills that were bothering the entire country.
Biographical Notes on Buhari
Pedigree of Major General Muhammadu Buhari
Muhammadu Buhari was born on December 17, 1942, in Daura, Katsina State. He is the twenty-third child of his father, Adamu. Buhari was raised by his mother, his father died when he was about three or four. He attended Primary School in Daura and Mai’adua from 1948 – to 1952, and proceeded to Katsina Middle School in 1953. He went to Katsina Provincial Secondary School (now Government College Katsina) from 1956-to 1961. Buhari was further enlisted into the Nigerian Military Training School, Kaduna in 1963 and later went to the officers’ Cadet School in Aldershot in the United Kingdom and was thereafter commissioned Second Lieutenant in 1963 and posted to the 2nd Infantry Battalion, Abeokuta as Platoon Commander in 1963. From 1963-to 1964 he was sent for further training on the Platoon Commanders’ Course at the Nigerian Military College, Kaduna. In 1965, he went for the Mechanical Transport Officers’ Course at the Army Mechanical Transport School in Borden, England. He went to the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, India in 1973 and to the United States Army War College from June 1979 to June 1980.[25]
Buhari’s first political appointment was in August 1975, after General Murtala Mohammed as Governor of the North-Eastern State, to oversee social, economic, and political improvements in the state. In March 1976, the then Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo appointed Buhari as the Federal Commissioner (a position now called Minister) for Petroleum and Natural Resources. When the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation was created in 1976, Buhari was also appointed as its Chairman, a position he held until 1978. By 1977 Buhari had become the military secretary at Supreme Military Headquarters, which was the seat of government. By September 1979 he had returned to regular army duties and commanded a division based in Kaduna. Although the civilian government had returned to Nigeria in 1979 with the election of Shehu Shagari, dissatisfaction with dismal economic conditions and what the military perceived as corrupt politicians led to another military coup on December 31, 1983, and Buhari was chosen unanimously to be the new head of state.[26]
Pedigree of Genral Tunde Idiagbon
Mr. Tunde Idiagbon was born on September 14, 1943, to the family of late Hassan and Aishat Dogo, a cattle merchant in the Oro-Ago axis of the present-day Ifelodun Local Government Area of Kwara State. Idiagbon started life as a boy-herder who assisted his father in tending cattle. He later attended the Ilorin United School, an institution founded by the Ilorin Emirate Descendants Progressive Union (IEDPU), for his primary education between 1950 and 1952. In 1953, he proceeded to the Okesuna Senior Primary School, Ilorin, from where he finished his primary education in 1957 and was enrolled in the Nigerian Military School, Zaria, between 1958 and 1962. He proceeded to the Nigerian Army and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1965 at the Pakistani Military Academy, Kakul, from where he also bagged a Bachelor of Arts degree in Economics. He became one of the first officers who obtained a university degree while in military service. In 1976, Idiagbon went back to Pakistan where he attended the country’s Command and Staff College. He also attended the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, in 1981. In 1982, he was at the Naval Post Graduate School, United States, from where he obtained an International Defence Management Diploma. He was also a distinguished member of the Nigerian Institute of Management. He became a captain in 1968 during the bloody Nigerian civil war. In 1971, he was promoted to the rank of major, and in 1974, he became a lieutenant colonel. He was decorated with the rank of a full Colonel in July 1978. In May 1980, he was elevated to the rank of a brigadier-general and eventually to the rank of major-general in 1984. He was the commander, of the 4th Battalion of the Nigerian Army from August 1965 to February 1966 and the sector commanding officer, of the 20 Battalion from October 1967 to February 1968. He also served in the same capacity at the 125 Battalion from 1968 to 1970. Idiagbon was appointed the General Staff Officer, Grade 1, and later Principal Staff Officer, Supreme Headquarters, from January 1973 to August 1975. He also served as a member of the governing council of the University of Jos, Plateau State.
Idiagbon’s political appointment was in August 1978 as the military administrator of the old Borno State. He was at the same time the commander, of the 33 Brigade of the Nigerian Army, Maiduguri, as well as a member of the National Council of States till October 1, 1979. From October 1979, General Idiagbon was the Director, Manpower and Planning, army headquarters, till February 1981. Between 1981 and 1983, he was the military secretary (army). He was in that position when he and his colleagues overthrew the government of Shehu Shagari, which they accused of mismanagement of the nation’s resources. Idiagbon was, no doubt, the engine room, the brain-box, and the star boy of the military regime of General Muhammadu Buhari.[27]
An Assessment of the Economic Policies of the Buhari’s Regime, 1983-1985
The economic policies of Major General Muhammadu Buhari’s military regime between 1983 and 1985 have been discussed in this chapter with the primary goal of evaluating the various achievements their military intervention recorded before its overthrow in 1985 by General Ibrahim Babangida. Also, some of the criticisms and negative impact of these economic policies have been equally analyzed. To fully understand the premise upon which Buhari/Idiagbon’s economic policies were made, it is essential to have a good understanding of the previous condition of the Nigerian economy under their predecessor, President Alhaji Shehu Shagari. This will establish a premise upon which the successor administrative policies of Buhari and Idiagbon would be assessed. As of December 1983, President Shehu Shagari was only three months into his second and final term of office, having been re-elected for another four-year term in an election that was marred by accusations of electoral malpractice. Shagari’s management of the nation’s finances started very well. By October 1980, a year after he assumed office, he increased Nigeria’s external reserves from 3 billion naira to 5.5 billion naira and also paid off an internal deficit of 1.4 billion naira, which was inherited from the Obasanjo’s government. In addition, the government also had a net surplus of 1.3 billion naira in its current account.[28]
Within two years, effective fiscal discipline floundered on the altar of politics and the nation tottered towards bankruptcy. Contractors, the majority of whom had financed the party’s elections and were therefore important stakeholders in government, got various multimillion-dollar contracts, the costs of which were overinflated and unexecuted despite mobilization fees of more than 70 percent of the contract sums paid. For instance, Bako Kontagora won 8 million naira worth of contracts both from state and federal governments, collected substantial sums as mobilization fees, but refused to execute the contracts. In Ogun State, politicians colluded with foreign firms to transfer two million naira, which was meant to supply power generating plants, abroad. Several millions were also paid by the regime to contractors, some of whom were either staffer of the Federal Ministry of Housing or their cronies. Two-thirds of these contracts were never executed.[29] The Federal Capital Territory; Abuja was the biggest conduit through which money was stolen by the regime. Multimillion naira contracts, all of which were inflated, were awarded and paid for by the Shagari regime, but the contractors failed to either deliver the jobs or execute them at all.[30] Politicians, with the active connivance of civil servants, also collected bribes from contractors. Allegations of bribery running into millions of naira were commonplace. For instance, Fougerole Nigeria Limited reportedly paid a 1.790 million naira bribe to some NPN officials for 746 million naira contracts; and one contractor, using several companies, most of which were fictitious, gave different civil servants working at the secretariat of the National Youth Service Corps bribes of 2.42 million naira.[31] All these corrupt practices negatively affected the economy of Nigeria because the money that was supposed to be used for development purposes was diverted to private individuals for their selfish interests leaving the country in a state of neglect.
Another source of corruption during the Shagari regime was import licensing. To cushion the effect of inflation, the federal government granted import licenses to states to import food items, especially rice. The states developed the culture of selling these licenses to the highest bidders, who imported these commodities into the country only to hoard them and sell them later at inflated prices. Mouthwatering gains accrued to members of the NPN through such deals and one of such members reportedly gained 100 million naira in one single deal. One NPN financier was reported to have also gained about 140 million naira profit, using thirteen fake companies. The Presidential Task Force on importation of essential commodities also indulged in the habit of using cronies. The Daily Times reported that Alhaji Inuwa, one of the many cronies, got a gift of 5.5 million naira for acting as a crony of one of the officials of the Task Force.[32] It is more appropriate to describe the government-run by Shagari as a syndicate of patrimonial swindlers for contractors and by contractors, and certainly not a democracy. Finally, Religious and political violence mixed with the economic crises paved the way for the overthrow of the Shagari led government by General Muhammadu Buhari, which was considered by many Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike as a welcome development.[33]
On December 31, 1983, General Sanni Abacha announced the return to military rule in a nationwide broadcast according to him among other things, a “great economic predicament,” an “inept and corrupt leadership” and a “hopelessly mismanaged” economy, which had reduced the nation to the status of “a debtor and beggar nation,” were principal reasons necessitating the intervention of the military into Nigerian politics. Abacha further states that “inadequacy of food at reasonable prices” in the face of increasing “importation of foodstuffs,” and parlous health services, which reduced “our hospitals…to mere consulting clinics without drugs, water and equipment,” were some of the reasons for the military take-over of the civilian government. Other reasons given by Abacha included collapsed “educational system,” “unemployment…of …embarrassing and unacceptable proportions,” “salary arrears” and impending “salary cuts” while the Shagari-led government “revels in “squandermania”, corruption, and indiscipline”. The military further condemned the continued proliferation of “public appointments in complete disregard of our stark economic realities”, which made it necessary for the armed forces, “in the discharge of our national role as promoters and protectors of our national interest” “to effect a change in the leadership of the government of Nigeria.”[34] Following the military take-over, Major General Muhammadu Buhari became the head of state.
Later that day, Buhari, as the new Head of State, recounted the grubby conditions under Shagari, noting that although a general economic recession was coursing through the world, Nigeria was inflicted by the NPN-led government which continued milking the resources of the nation for their gains, turned elections into a struggle “of life and death, and was determined to capture or retain power by all means.” He noted further through the “inability to cultivate financial discipline and prudent management” by the Shagari regime, the nation had become dependent on “internal and external borrowing,” with “soaring external debts,” which invariably created “the twin problem of heavy budget deficits and weak balance of payments position.” Among so many other things, Buhari announced that the economy would be given a new impetus and better sense of direction; corrupt officials and their agents would be brought to book; and given the drought that affected most parts of the country, the federal government would, with the available resources, import foodstuffs to supplement the shortfalls suffered in the last harvest. He warned that the new government would have zero-tolerance for “kick-backs, inflation of contracts and over-invoicing of imports, forgery, fraud, embezzlement, misuse, and abuse of office” as well as money laundering and smuggling.[35]
Proceeding with measured steps, Buhari and the Supreme Military Council (SMC) announced the suspension of the constitution, banned all political parties and associations, compulsorily retired 17 federal permanent secretaries, 34 senior police officials, and 13 naval officers, either dismissed or retired more than 3000 federal civil servants, and retired state officials across all levels.[36] Following these developments were investigations of the Federal Capital Development Authority, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company, ex-political officeholders, contractors, and traders, among others. Besides compulsory retirement, dismissal, and investigations, dramatic changes were made in the states. Newly posted military governors demonstrated their fervent support of the new direction of the nation in different ways. Samuel Atukum, then a Navy Captain and governor of Plateau State, sold off all Mercedes Benz and Peugeot 505’s in the state’s official vehicle pool and replaced them with less prestigious Peugeot 504 cars. He also banned the after-hours use of all government cars. David Mark, then a Lieutenant Colonel and Military governor of Niger State, disguised himself as an ordinary patient in a hospital and, after experiencing inadequate and disrespectful services, he revealed himself and dismissed staff members of the hospital. Furthermore, in Ogun State, taxes ranging from 25 naira to 200 naira were introduced on merrymaking, especially where celebrants close a street. Akin Otiko, then a Commodore and governor of Ondo State, dismissed 35 staff of NTS and the state broadcasting station for reporting late at their duty posts.[37]
Government at all levels either sacked or retired thousands of their employees, in a series of steps to revamp the nation’s economy. In the states, one form of tax or another was imposed on the people. Peasants, artisans, workers, and even the unemployed were forced to pay poll and cattle taxes, hospital fees, school fees, et cetera. The government saw no need to increase the personal taxation of the rich. The government also revised upward excise duties on many hitherto exempted local manufacturers, a situation that drove up the cost of local manufacturing entities. As a part of the government’s “war against indiscipline,” the Federal Government carried out thousands of army raids on warehouses where hoarded goods were stored. When confiscated, hoarded goods were either sold off to the public at low prices or were given away freely. Many of the hoarders, as the government claimed, were top officers in the defunct Shagari civilian government. A notorious case was that of Dr. Umaru Dikko, President Shagari’s brother-in-law and erstwhile transport minister who fled the country shortly after the military takeover. Huge, four-bay warehouses were found in Dikko’s possession packed to the rafters with about one million bags of Presidential Task Force rice.[38] Dikko defended himself saying the rice would go back to the people and that “a politician’s first aim is to obtain votes, and that is what I was concerned with. Besides, whatever money a politician makes goes back to the people, because he wants their votes.”[39] Also, in most states, street trading was outlawed and artisans and petty traders were encouraged to rent stalls. With neither resources nor sufficient goods to merit the renting of stalls, petty traders and hawkers were inadvertently forced into the underground where they survived through ‘black-market’ operations or hidden economy and have aggravated their poverty and sufferings.
However, Buhari-Idiagbon’s economic policies according to Sanusi Lamido Sanusi were simply “a progressive move away from a political economy dominated by the parasitic and subservient elite to one in which a nationalist and productive class gains ascendancy.”[40] In this way, it can be argued that Buhari/Idiagbon’s economic policies were both an internal and external struggle against global capitalism, as represented by the IMF, World Bank, multilateral trade organizations, and the internal (Nigerian) agents in the garbs of class contractors, commission agents, and public officers who became parasitic and unpatriotic agents and spokespersons of global capitalism. The success the government achieved was a result of being a military government that did not shy away from rolling out draconian decrees.
The economic policies of the Buhari/Idiagbon era were aimed solely at protecting and growing the local economy. As noted earlier, besides contracts, another source of corruption during the Shagari years was imported licensing, through which affected individuals created an artificial scarcity and earned triple gains. Therefore, when Buhari-Idiagbon stepped to the helm of affairs, several options were opened to the new government, chief amongst which was the Structural Adjustment Program orchestrated by the Bretton Wood institutions, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. As Lamido Sanusi rightly argued, the neoclassical theory holds that a country can, under certain conditions improve its balance of payments by devaluing its currency. Standard economic sense maintains that a country would gain from devaluing its currency if only the price of its export to other countries is denominated in its currency. For instance, if Nigeria’s exports to other countries are priced in naira and its imports from, for instance, the US, are priced in US dollars then devaluation of Nigeria’s currency would make imports to Nigeria from the US dearer and make export to the US from Nigeria cheaper; hence, Nigerian products and Nigerians would benefit. This simple economic analysis, which has always characterized Nigeria’s economic relations, underlies the Structural Adjustment Program. It was this same economic analysis that IMF/World Bank aficionados were presenting to the Buhari-Idiagbon government as a basis for Nigeria to adopt the IMF/World Bank-mediated Structural Adjustment Program. Dr. Onaolapo Soleye and his economic teams in the Buhari-Idiagbon government reasoned differently. Among other things, they argued that Nigeria’s situation did not warrant the adoption of the SAP, and the SAP would, if implemented, plunge the nation into further economic dilemma.[41]
Rather than taking the simplistic explanation of the IMF/World Bank neoclassical economists, Soleye and his team argued that for devaluation to make a positive change in a nation’s balance of payments, the nation’s exports to other countries must be substantial enough to outweigh imports and the revenue lost through a price reduction. Buhari-Idiagbon’s economic policies refused to devalue the naira because the number of Nigeria’s exports cannot offset what the nation stood to lose by devaluation. Given the situation of the economy at the time, the hope of the nation’s exports increasing at a pace to offset the price decrease was zero. On the flip side, they argued that for Nigeria to benefit from devaluation, the importation of goods must decrease as the price of such goods increases. The deflationary, stabilization program of economic austerity succeeded in creatively raising foreign exchange earnings, refinancing Nigeria’s accumulated debts, and in the second period of austerity, bringing inflation down to a relatively low level of 5 percent in 1985. In addition, the accumulation of debt was curtailed as some categories of imports were cut to eliminate further external payment arrears.[42]
The need to trim down the country’s labor force; arrest, imprison, and try economic saboteurs; initiate countertrade in petroleum products; and obtain major concessions from the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which increased the oil production quota from 1.3 million barrels per day to 1.45 million, which was followed by the adoption of stricter austerity. In addition to these, the Buhari-Idiagbon government also ensured that wastage and opportunities for corruption were blocked in the oil sector. For instance, an expert assessment of the nation’s oil sector showed an estimated 1 million naira was lost daily due to smuggling under the Shagari regime. To stop this, a total overhaul of the sector was done and the nation’s borders were closed to forestall smuggling not just of crude oil, but also of other goods. To curb waste in government, the government slashed basic traveling allowances for its officials from 500 naira to 100 naira annually and introduced a special airport levy of 100 naira for travelers going outside Africa. From 1984, foreigners living and working in Nigeria were prohibited from remitting home more than 25 percent of their earnings. To stimulate foreign investment, import duties on some products were reduced from between 5 and 500 percent to between 0 percent and 200 percent. In addition, the government also granted an import duty waiver on agricultural implements, aircraft, fuels, lubricants, educational films, technical assistance materials, etc.[43]
Agriculturally, the regime of Buhari did not introduce many agricultural policies/programmes. The major agricultural economic policy achievement during the Buhari/Idiagbon regime was the increase of River Basin Authorities from eleven to eighteen in 1984. Although the increase was aimed at decentralizing the authorities and bringing their functions and activities close to the rural populace, the number was returned to the former 11 with the coming of another regime.[44] The table below provides more information about agricultural policies during military regimes including that of the Buhari-Idiagbon. The table covers the entire military regimes from January 1966 to May 1999.
Table 1: Agricultural Policies/Programmes in Nigeria during Military Regimes, 1966- 1999
| S/N | Period | Duration (years) | Head of State | Policies/program |
| 1. | Jan. 1966-July 1966 | ½ | Aguyi Ironsi | Nil |
| 2. | July 1966-July 1975 | 9 | Yakubu Gowon | Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria DecreeAgricultural Research Institute Decree National Accelerated Food Production Project (NAFPP) Integrated Agricultural Development Projects Nigerian Agriculture and Cooperative Bank Specialized Marketing Boards National Grains and Roots Cultivation Programme |
| 3. | July 1975-Feb. 1976 | ½ | Murtala Muhammed | Nil |
| 4. | Feb. 1976-Oct. 1979 | 3 | Olusegun Obasanjo | Operation Feed the Nation River Basin Development Authorities Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Rural Banking Scheme Land Use Act |
| 5. | Dec. 1983-Aug. 1985 | 1 | Buhari | Increase in the number of River Basin Authorities from 11 to 18 |
| 6. | Aug. 1985-Aug. 1993 | 8 | Ibrahim Babangida | Directorate for Foods, Roads, and Rural Infrastructure. Reorganization of the River Basin Authorities Abolition of the Marketing Board Trade Liberalization Policy National Directorate for EmploymentNational Agricultural Insurance Scheme National Land Development Authority |
| 7. | Nov. 1993-June 1998 | 4 ¾ | Sani Abacha | Continuation of Babangida’s programmes |
| 8. | June 1998-May 1999 | Abdulsalami Abubakar | Nill |
Source: Agricultural Policies in Federal Government Budgets: (1) Federal Ministry of Agriculture (2) National Planning Commission, as cued from O.I Akinboyo, 2008.[45]
The table 1 above shows that, between 1966 and 1999, Nigeria experienced eight (8) military interventions on both civilian and military governments. These military interventions were a result of one mal-administration and the other; primarily due to corruption that kept eating deep into the nation’s economy. Unfortunately, the military regimes which have intervened and claimed to provide curative measures could not fix the nation’s economic challenges and were also accused of corruption, despite their various efforts. Some of these major economic policies/efforts as indicated in the table above include the introduction of agricultural policies/programmes to improve the sector, however; their policies were also characterized by some distinctive weaknesses as stated severally in this chapter.
The preceding table 1 shows that during military regimes, Murtala Muhammed who took over and ruled between July 1975 and February 1976 did not initiate any agricultural policy. However, Olusegun Obasanjo who ruled from February 1976 to October 1979 initiated the following policies/programmes; Operation Feed the Nation (OFN), River Basin Development Authorities (RBDA) Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS), Rural Banking Scheme (RBS), and Land Use Act of 1978. During the Buhari-Idiagbon regime that lasted between December 1983 and August 1985, the administration did only increase the number of River Basin Authorities earlier initiated during Obasanjo’s regime from 11 to 18.
From August 1985 to August 1993, Ibrahim Babangida’s regime recorded about seven (7) agricultural policies/programmes. They are; the Directorate for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure, Reorganization of the River Basin Authorities, Abolition of the Marketing Board, Trade Liberalization Policy, National Directorate for Employment, National Agricultural Insurance Scheme, and national Land Development Authority. Sani Abacha’s regime which lasted from November 1993 to June 1998 continued with the policies and programmes of Babangida’s administration. And finally, Abdulsalami Abubakar took over and ruled from June 1998 to May 1999 with no single agricultural policy/programme.
Moving forward, it is pertinent to note that another significant economic feat during Buhari/Idiagbon’s military regime has to do with Foreign Direct Investment. There are many reasons for investments. These include escape investments, support investments, and passive investments. Passive investments are based on speculation that these investments may turn out to be profitable in the future. Escape investments are done to escape restrictive laws or macroeconomic policies by host governments. To buttress the above explanations, the establishment of farms by the United African Company (UAC) in Nigeria in the 1980s is a very good example of escape investment of the Buhari/Idiagbon Administration.[46] This could be added to the list of their economic policies as one of the significant achievements during the regime among other policies. During this period, Nigeria recorded a shift in the Gross Domestic Product as a result of the nation’s Foreign Direct Investment as shown in the table 2 below:
Table 2: Annual Gross Domestic Product and Foreign Direct Investment during Buhari-Idiagbon’s Regime, 1983-1985
| S/N | Year | GDP | FDI |
| 1. | 1983 | 185598.1 | 264.3 |
| 2. | 1984 | 183563 | 360.4 |
| 3. | 1985 | 201036.3 | 434.1 |
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2010, cited in G. Otto & W.I. Ukpere, 2014.
Table depicts that, in 1983, the Gross Domestic Product of Nigeria was N185, 598.1 million; however, the Foreign Direct Invest during the same year was N264.3 million. Similarly, in 1984, the Gross Domestic Product of the state dropped down to N183,563 million and the Foreign Direct Investment increased to N360.4 million. Finally, in 1985, Gross Domestic Product increased to N201, 036.3 million, meanwhile, the Foreign Direct Investment for that year also increased to N434.1 million.47 This shows a positive shift in the FDI of the nation as compared to previous records.
Despite the positive achievements recorded by Buhari/Idiagbon’s regime, there were some dissatisfactions and criticisms leveled against their regime. For instance, some argued that, whatever the gains of Buhari/Idiagbon’s government, its view of indiscipline was too simplistic and distorted. For example, they considered a dirty person a thief, a rapist, and a swindler. Not only that, Buhari/Idiagbon successfully ordered Nigerians to queue, dance, and hop around in the name of discipline, they soon found out that the economy could not be ordered around by force. To their disappointment, a cleaner environment could not guarantee a thriving economy.[47]
Although many Nigerian citizens had initially welcomed Buhari/Idiagbon’s efforts to root out corruption and improve societal values, the repressive measures employed by his regime, against a backdrop of continuing economic troubles, led to discontent. As part of his “War against Indiscipline (WAI)”, he ordered Nigerians to form neat queues at bus stops, under the sharp eyes of whip-wielding soldiers. Civil servants who were late for work were publicly humiliated by being forced to do frog jumps, yet, unemployment was on the rise as the recession worsened so speeches about working hard seemed out of place. The appeal to Nigerian nationalism had the negative effect of restricting the flexibility of the government in international negotiations over the debt. The campaign was enforced haphazardly; some people were executed or given long jail terms while others were allowed off if they were well connected.
Nevertheless, Buhari/Idiagbon’s economic policies caused over a 500 percent increase (in one year) in the prices of staple foods and essential commodities. His policies also led to a scarcity of cooking oil, soap, milk, rice, sugar, salt, and meat. During Buhari/Idiagbon’s regime, milk and sugar were called essential commodities; consequently, shops were not allowed to sell them. He introduced tuition fees in higher institutions which were earlier abolished in 1972. He canceled the Lagos metro rail line being constructed by Jakande then with the excuse of cutting down the nation’s debt. However, three decades after, the Lagos state government began to build the same rail line with a loan from World Bank, approved by Goodluck Ebele John (GEJ), thereby incurring that same debt.[48]
In August 1985, Buhari was himself overthrown in a coup led by General Ibrahim Babangida on August 27th, and other members of the ruling Supreme Military Council (SMC) ostensibly, because he insisted on investigating allegations of fraudulent award of contracts in the Ministry of Defense. Buhari was detained in Benin City but was released at the end of 1988. Nevertheless, Buhari/Idiagbon’s regime is remembered for a strict campaign against indiscipline and corruption, and its human rights abuses.[49]
Conclusion
This article examined evidentially the economic policies of Buhari/Idiagbon’s military regime (administration) that lasted between December 1983 and August 1985. In the process of doing this it presented contextual and textual definitions of key concepts such as military, economic development, and economic policy. This was done to avoid the ambiguity that may arise. It went further to give a biographical pedigree of the key military actors that led the administration under consideration which is Major General Muhammadu Buhari and General Tunde Idiagbon. It is done basically to provide valid information on both, especially about their birth, education, military career, and their involvement in the military politics of the nation. The study has assessed the Buhari/Idiagbon’s economic policies and found that their regime at all levels either sacked or retired thousands of their employees, in a series of steps to revamp the nation’s economy. The economic policies of the Buhari/Idiagbon regime were aimed solely at protecting and growing the local economy. Besides, the regime was so much concerned with ensuring that wastage and opportunities for corruption were blocked in the oil sector. In the agricultural sector, the major achievement accredited to Buhari/Idiagbon’s era was the increase of River Basin Authorities from eleven to eighteen in 1984. The administration also established some farms under the auspices of the United African Company (UAC) in Nigeria in the 1980s and was considered an escape investment that is seen as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) during the Buhari/Idiagbon. Generally, the regime/administration tried to restore public accountability and reestablished a dynamic economy without altering the basic power structure of the country. This was done in some ways namely; it attempted to secure public support by reducing the level of corruption. Besides, the regime demonstrated its commitment to austerity by trimming the federal budget, among other curative measures to revamp the economy. Despite all these achievements, the economic policies of Buhari/Idiagbon brought untold hardship to the citizens and failed to sanitize the economy of the nation as it decreed from its inception. The government was subsequently accused of corruption and later overthrown in August 1985.
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[37] See among others: West Africa, January 30, 1984: 244; Africa Confidential, 25, 5:5, West Africa, February 20, 1984: 414; West Africa, April 2, 1984: 748.
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[39] The Observer, January 22, 1984.
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[45] O.I. Akinboyo, “Five Decades of Agricultural Policies in Nigeria: What Roles Has Statistics Played, 37-39.
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[47] B. Oyeniyi, “General Muhammadu Buhari And Nigerian Politics,
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[49] B. Oyeniyi, “General Muhammadu Buhari And Nigerian Politics”…