NIGERIA AND ITS CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBOURS: RELATIONSHIP AND CHANGE OF STRATEGIES
Adeleke, Adewole Ayodeji
Department of History and International Studies,
Osun State University, Osogbo, Ikire Campus, Nigeria
Abstract
The principal aim of this article is to examine Nigeria’s relations with its contiguous neighbours. A critical look at Nigeria’s relations with its immediate neighbours would give one a better understanding of the country’s foreign policy behaviour in relation with these six countries: Republic of Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe; starting from the end of the civil war. Substantial changes started to occur in Nigeria’s foreign policy during the regime of General Yakubu Gowon when it adopted an assertive method that emphasised the importance of national interests, personal diplomacy and good neighbourliness. This action proved to be a defining thrust of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy with its contiguous neighbours immediately after the civil war. Thus, it is pertinent to study Nigeria’s reviewed relations with those countries once perceived as too limited militarily and economically to have required any urgent attention. Since these states were all weak, they did not possess any capability to threaten Nigeria in any serious manner, which was the reason why Nigeria thought it did not need to develop a geographic or strategic foreign policy with them.The article draws upon extant literature and the use of historical analysis as its methodology. By adopting an emphatic posture, the article discovers that Nigeria’s Foreign Policy was not only placed on a solid footing with its immediate neighbours as an aftermath of the civil war, but also helped to fully strengthen the country’s leadership role in the sub-region.
Keywords: Nigeria, Foreign Policy, contiguous neighbours, national interests, leadership.
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to shed more light on actors, contexts, and outcomes of Nigeria’s international relations from independence in 1960. Since independence, Nigeria’s relationship strategies and its inherited identity have taken the form of a creature with four legs with the all-four driving its foreign policy process. The four aspects which have been extensively debated by scholars include; the official facet, the nationhood and national interests, the country’s global identity[1] and the head of government or the president of the country. The Prime Minister, Head of State or President being the arrowhead of foreign policy decision-making in the country is an important facet[2] since the foreign policy of a country swings around the mood of the country’s head of government.[3] In international relations, the foreign policy of a nation is an extension of domestic politics[4] and is meant to apply to a policy outside the state’s territorial borders.[5] It is the total of official external relations conducted by an independent state in international relations.[6] It covers not just a state’s relations with others, but also the domestic environment from which the policy emanated in the first instance,[7] the dynamic process of interactions between the changing domestic demands and supports, and the changing external circumstances.[8] Thus foreign policy is “an interplay between the outside and the inside,”[9] and it is the same in all nations, either great or small.[10]
The foreign policy of Nigeria, like that of any other country in the world, consists of several different policies for different external issues and problems within a larger foreign policy strategy.[11]Some scholars have explained Nigeria’s foreign policy in terms of the theory of four “concentric circles” principles of national interest with its foreign policy running on a fulcrum of these four “concentric circles.”[12] The first and the innermost “circle” represents Nigeria’s security, independence and prosperity, and it is centred on its immediate neighbours- Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and by extension, Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe. The second “circle” revolves around Nigeria’s relations with other West African neighbours while the third “circle” dwells on the continental African issues of peace, development and democratization. The fourth “circle” involves Nigeria’s relations with the rest of the world and international organisations.[13] Not only has the concentric circle theory reinforced the centrality of Africa in Nigeria’s foreign policy and governed its principles[14] it has also influenced its overall determinants. This article dwells majorly on Nigeria’s relationships within the first and the innermost circle of the “four concentric circles.”
Conceptual Clarification
To James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff,[15]theories ‘serve as the mental causes through which researchers view and interpret the world.’ Therefore, scholars can bring “a measure of order out of the inordinate complexities,” that sustain world politics.[16] Based on these arguments, a preferred theoretical approach to understanding Nigeria’s relations with its immediate neighbours is therefore premised on interdependence. The theory of interdependence, according to Keohane and Nye,[17] characterizes relationships in a global international system. The greater the level of interdependence among states, they argued, the greater the loss of control that they experience overall or in part of their decision-making While interdependence always carries costs with it because it restricts autonomy, according to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, there are two dimensions to interdependence: sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity in interdependence involves degrees of responsiveness within a framework, that is, how changes in one country quickly bring costly changes in another, and how great the cost effects are. Vulnerability on the other hand is an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.
According to these theorists, interdependence in its two dimensions could be social, political, economic, military or ideological. This means that interdependence as a theory is not symmetrical.[18]While Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein[19] have viewed interdependence as a relationship of interests such that if one nation’s position changes, other states will be affected by it, Edward Morse[20] has observed that interdependence is the outcome of specified actions of two or more parties when the outcomes of these actions are mutually contingent. Also, according to Olayiwola Abegunrin,[21] interdependence does not only breed crises and various forms of linkages; it also increases the potential for any single party to manipulate a crisis for its own domestic or foreign political ends.
David Baldwin making a concise summary of the various scholastic arguments on the theory of interdependence arrived at the following seven submissions: First, there is a division of labour among dependent nations, since one supports the other. Two, there is the involvement of exchange in the trading of one’s labour for the others. Three, exchange generates mutual benefits. Four, there is the dependence of one on the other and the opportunity costs of severing the relationship are high. Five, the reciprocity of inter-dependence serves as a constraint on the behaviour of one party relative to the other. Six, interdependence is a reality that must be endured. And seven, the degree of interdependence varies inversely with the effectiveness of the force.[22] In addition, according to Baldwin, there are two meanings of ‘economic interdependence’ in the field of international relations. A group of countries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are contingent on those found in the others. The second group is comprised of countries that are considered interdependent “if it would be costly for them to rupture or forego their interdependent relationship.”[23] Since socio-political and economic changes brought about as a result of internal crises in Nigeria could bring costly changes and effects in the immediate neighbouring countries, hence the theory of interdependence suffices because it creates a better framework of analysis for this article.
Domestic Features of Nigerian Foreign Policy
The major factors that composed the domestic feature of Nigeria’s foreign policy include, cultural and historical forces, socio-economic structures, institutional frameworks and processes, and class formations and relations.Objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy contain all aspects of Kalevi Holsti’s categorisation of fundamental, middle-term and long-term goals.[24]Therefore, the fundamental objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy have been set within the background of the promotion and protection of the country’s national interests in relation with the outside world. Initially, the national interests of Nigeria consisted of the following fundamental subjects of concern: the defence of the country’s independence and territorial integrity; the restoration of human dignity to the black race all over the world; the development of global conducive political and economic conditions that promote the preservation of the territorial integrity, security and national self-reliance of all African states; the promotion and improvement of the economic well-being of Nigerians and, the promotion of world peace with justice.[25]Talking about the “national interests” in Nigerian foreign policy, the “core value”[26] or “innermost circles”[27] include the country’s security, territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
Thus, the preservation of Nigeria’s territorial completeness is the most fundamental national interest of Nigeria’s foreign policy.[28]National interests are a ready weapon employed by nation-states to evaluate the sources or the adequacy of their nations’ foreign policies. Also, they utilise national interests as means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies that are best for their nations in foreign affairs.[29] Thus, national interest could not be equated with group, professional or ethnic interests, but reasonably, they are the total of the aggregate of all the interests of individuals and groups within a nation-state. Some factors identifying the domestic structure of a country include the country’s geographical location, the type of neighbourhood, historical evolution and age of the nation, the natural resources contextualized in human and material bases, and the size and level of homogeneity of the diversity of the population. Others are the form, structure and quality of leadership, the quality of diplomacy and type of international organisations the nation belongs to, the Gross National Product (GDP), the degree of the diversification of the economy, agricultural potentiality and military capability.[30] The domestic structure has a strong impact on the conduct of a country’s foreign policy.[31]
The conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy from independence has been guarded by five different principles. These included non-alignment; legal equality of states; non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states; multilateralism, and Africa as the cornerstone and nerve-centre of its foreign policy.[32] While the pursuit of these principles has been influenced from one regime to the other, some of the objectives have become antiquated. For instance, the principle of non-alignment which abhorred formal military or political alliance with the West or the East during the Cold War era is no more valid. Besides that, the objective of eradication of colonialism and white minority rule from Africa has also become obsolete with the institution of multi-racial democracy in the last colonial outpost of South Africa in 1994.
The “concentric circles” principle of national interest[33] has been a cogent factor driving Nigeria’s foreign policy. It has also caused certain issues to dominate across various governments from independence; with each regime having distinctive priorities and style. For example, the Gowon government focused on the complete economic independence of Africa and most especially the integration of the West African countries through ECOWAS.[34] Despite this, the ECOWAS went into rapid decline under Shehu Shagari but was reactivated during the Babangida regime. Under Ibrahim Babangida, Nigeria continued to be the largest donor to the ECOWAS budget, contributing 33.3 per cent of the group’s annual funds. Remarkably, Olusegun Obasanjo’s democratic regime operated within the grand perspective of the policy of cooperation and integration in the sub-region and the rest of Africa.[35] Under General Sani Abacha, Nigeria helped to stabilize the political situation in the sub-region by imposing an uneasy peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone, albeit, at a considerable cost,[36] while the Jonathan administration maintained the process of sub-regional integration.[37]President Muhammadu Buhari assumed the Nigerian presidency with much international goodwill wishing him gravitas in repairing Nigeria’s battered international image.[38]
Relationship Strategies
Within and outside the West African sub-region, Nigeria’s immediate neighbours consist of the Francophone states of the Republic of Benin to the west; the Republic of Cameroon to the east; the Republic of Chad to the north-east, and the Republic of Niger to the north. On the Atlantic coast to the south, Nigeria shares maritime boundaries with the Spanish-speaking Republic of Equatorial Guinea and the Lusophone state of the Democratic Republic of Sᾶo Tomé e Príncipѐ. Nigeria shares nearly 5,000 square kilometres of international borders with these neighbours.[39] While Nigeria’s relations with its neighbours antedated colonial times, it is of note that during the colonial period, the entity known as Nigeria today had close intergovernmental relationships with other parts of West Africa, especially the British colonies. For instance, the four British colonies of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and, the Gold Coast (modern Ghana) were administered jointly under a Governor-General during the inter-World War years. They had a common currency (the British West African Pound), and a common colonial military force, the West African Frontier Force (WAFF).[40]
Nigeria remained inactive in political and economic activities in the sub-region until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967 for various reasons. Nigeria perceived other West African countries as too limited militarily and economically to have required any urgent attention. Since these contiguous neighbouring states were all weak, they did not possess any capability to threaten Nigeria in any serious manner, and therefore, Nigeria did not need to develop either a geographically or strategically based foreign policy with them. Also, it must be emphasised that the first series of governments of post-independent Nigeria, before the oil boom of the 1970s, were preoccupied with the problems of unity and stability as well as economic development and therefore were left with a little time to romance with sub-continental politics.[41] Nevertheless, it dawned on Nigeria during the civil war that it needed a foreign policy based on good neighbourliness with a contiguous neighbour as “weak” as the Republic of Benin. For instance, toward the end of the hostilities, Benin allowed its facilities to be used as a base for the International Red Cross (ICR) to fly relief materials that included munitions to secessionist Biafra.[42]
Nigeria began to show interest in sub-regional affairs after the civil war of 1967-70. The country’s new interest came as a result of two major reasons. First was the increase in oil revenue after the civil war which enabled Nigeria to finance her external obligations better than before. Second, Nigeria suddenly realised that its security could not be isolated from the rest of the sub-region. This realisation came as a reaction to the support given to Biafra by the Francophone countries, especially Cote d’Ivoire and France, their colonial master, during the war. Nigeria’s feeling that there was nothing tangible to be gained from the poorer and weaker neighbouring states was suddenly overtaken by the realities of the civil war. France was also suspected to have perfected a plan to create an exclusive Francophone economic community in the sub-region after the war to the detriment of Nigeria. All these experiences made the military government under Yakubu Gowon work assiduously towards economic integration of the sub-region which culminated in the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). With the establishment of this regional body, the government was able to win the confidence and cooperation of other states in the region.[43] The sudden increase in oil revenue as a result of the “oil shocks” in the Western world created by the Arab members of OPEC in the 1970s[44] had created some unprecedented wealth for Nigeria which the other West African countries would not hesitate to exploit.
By diplomatic principle, the whole countries of West Africa are Nigeria’s neighbours. However, this article is going to look closely at those contiguous neighbours who form the first “concentric circles” in Nigeria’s foreign policy. However, it is important to note that none of Nigeria’s immediate neighbours is Anglophone.Except for Equatorial Guinea which is “Hispanophone” (Spanish-speaking), and São Tomé e Príncipѐ, a Lusophone state, the rest are Francophone countries. The Republic of Benin (known as Dahomey until 1975), is a weak economy largely dependent on Nigeria for economic survival. Benin and Nigeria share much in common. There are many ethnic groups of common ancestors overlapping the border that divides the two countries. These include the Yoruba, the Egun (Gun), the Bariba (Borgawa), and the Hausa and Fulani. These ethnic nationalities provide cultural affinity with their kith and kin in Nigeria. Much of the southern and central parts of what is today the Republic of Benin were for a long time under the powerful old Oyo Empire whose central authority was located in today’s south-west Nigeria.[45] The big population size of the Yoruba in the Republic of Benin might have prompted one of the major political parties in Nigeria during the First Republic, the Action Group (AG), to propose the annexation of the Yoruba-speaking part of Benin with Nigeria in the 1960s. The proposal bred mistrust in the relations between the two countries and infuriated France.[46]
Benin Republic is friendly with Nigeria and has always had an identical stand with Nigeria on most African issues, perhaps for its own economic and political stability. The common border between them has always been a source of tension since the 1960s because of smuggling, illegal immigration, human trafficking and organised cross-border crime that was prevalent.[47]The country has always been accused of allowing small arms and ammunition to be smuggled through it to Nigeria whose business is inimical to Nigeria’s security. The border was always closed to curb the activities of cross-border armed robbers in the 1990s. In 2003, the border had to be shut down when Nigeria demanded the extradition of one Ammani Tijjanni, a Nigerian citizen living in Benin who was notorious for receiving stolen vehicles from Nigeria.[48]Despite the unwholesome incidents of smuggling and cross-border crimes across the border of the two countries, the expanded port facilities in Cotonou have become an entrepôt for goods imported into Nigeria. It is estimated that about 75 per cent of goods handled by Cotonou’s port is meant for the Nigerian market.[49]
Religious (Islam), historical, cultural and ethnic affinity between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger has defied the 1500-kilometre-long border that demarcates the two countries. The borderline like that between Nigeria and Benin was determined by the Anglo-French agreements of 1890 and 1904.[50] Three major ethnic groups in Nigeria: Hausa, Fulani and Kanuri also make up about 50 per cent of the population of Niger and thus, the three share the historical legacies of the Sokoto Caliphate and Kanem Borno Empire between them. There has been free movement of goods and people for centuries across the border that later divided them. Niger, a landlocked country depended solely on Nigerian port facilities for its imported commodities from abroad. Nigeria is also the second-biggest trading partner after France. Not unlike the Benin Republic, the illegal business of smuggling across the border between the two countries is historical. Niger supported Nigeria during the Nigerian civil war, and an attempt by France to sway Nigerien support for Biafra failed. The first President of Niger, Hamani Diori, was keenly involved in brokering peace between the warring factions of the Nigerian civil war. Immediately after the civil war, Nigeria solidified its relations with Niger with the establishment of the Nigeria-Niger Commission. Through this Commission, Nigeria has made available generous grants to Niger which included the supply of 30,000 kilowatts of electricity from the Kainji hydroelectric dam annually since 1972.[51]
Livestock is Niger’s major revenue earner and 97 per cent of it finds its way to Nigeria annually, while Nigeria was Niger’s major supplier of grains, especially millet and corn. The two countries utilise the relative advantages of the proximity of the areas of production between them, cheaper fuel prices in Nigeria and the reduction of transport costs. The Kano–Katsina–Maradi corridor is a major trade area in West Africa linking the Gulf of Guinea to North Africa and the Middle East for a very long time. The complementaryposition between Nigeria and Niger is based on ecological, political and economic factors as well as the integration of sectors of production, marketing, processing and trade policy. It is important to note that food security in the Niger Republic largely depends on trans-border trade in agricultural and livestock products with Nigeria.[52] Nigerian relations with Niger have been anchored on good neighbourliness based on a mutual complementary position most of the time, however, in the course of the history of their relations, Niger had carried out some hostile policies against Nigeria. For example, in 1977, with the assistance of France, Niger constructed two dams on Rivers Lamido and Maggiya which disrupted the irrigation scheme along the River Kalmano in Sokoto State of Nigeria. In the ECOWAS, Niger is known to be a supporter of Nigeria’s moves; nevertheless, at the AU and the UN, there have been occasions when their interests differed. The occasional differences of opinion may be a result of the French influence over Niger.[53]
Chad is a country that suffered much from a long-drawn internal conflict which started immediately after its independence in 1960. The seemingly insurmountable conflict made France enter into a secret arrangement with Nigeria for the country (Nigeria) to have a direct mediation in the crisis. The diplomatic move made by Nigeria solved the problem.[54] The “benign neglect” posture of Nigeria’s foreign policy toward Chad in the early 1960s did not affect personal relationships among the peoples of the two countries as many Chadians flocked to Nigeria as refugees. Also, many Chadians fought as mercenaries on the side of the Federal troops during the Nigerian civil war. It was in Chad that Nigeria discovered that France had openly declared support for the course of Biafra when the latter stationed its fully armed elite troops close to the Nigeria-Chad border in 1969.[55] There have been some periods of unprovoked skirmishes between Nigerian and Chadian military forces at the borderland. The 75-kilometre border between the two countries on the shallow Lake Chad is known to be unreliable because of the shrinking and seasonal fluctuation of the lake due to environmental and ecological factors. This problem made it easier for the Chadian forces to invade Nigerian territory in the early 1980s[56] leading to the 1981 and 1983 border clashes between the Nigerian army and the Chadian gendarmes. It should be rightly observed that the Nigerian military fully understood the national security implications of the incessant attacks from Chad in the early 1980s.[57]Today, Boko Haram insurgents make use of the same borderline to launch attacks inside the Nigerian territory.
Cameroon shares the longest international boundary of 1,700 kilometres with Nigeria and is also the most disputed. The border extended from Lake Chad in the north to the Bakassi Peninsula into the Atlantic Ocean in the south.[58] Cameroon was a German Protectorate until 1916 when Britain and France annexed it from Germany. When an initial joint Anglo-French administration failed,[59] then there was a division of the territory between them in 1919. One-third of the territory was given to Britain and administered as part of its Colony of Nigeria while the balance went to the French. Britain held a plebiscite in its part of Cameroon in 1961 under the auspices of the United Nations as a result of which the northern half opted to join Nigeria and the southern half voted to unite with the Republic of Cameroon.[60] The incessant disputes over the Nigeria-Cameroon border have made relations between the two neighbouring countries thorn over the years. The border dispute was promoted by the issue of the Bakassi Peninsula which has a high potential for hydrocarbon deposits. The disputed territory is some mangrove swamp dotted with small islands occupied predominantly by Nigerian fishermen settlers.[61]
The most important issues that triggered disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon included the rights over the oil-rich peninsula, the sea reserves and the fate of the local populations. There have been efforts by the two countries to put an end to the problem immediately after the Nigerian civil war in 1971.[62] However, the agreement between the two countries collapsed twice in 1981 and 1993, leading to skirmishes that resulted in military and civilians suffering heavy casualties on both sides. The Cameroonian government took legal action in 1994 by filing a lawsuit against Nigeria at the International Court of Justice, (ICJ) at The Hague. The Nigeria-Cameroon case over Bakassi dragged on at the World Court for good eight years until the case was finally decided in favour of Cameroon in 2002, the ICJ ceded Bakassi peninsular to Cameroon.[63] Nigeria’s submission to the ICJ judgement on the Bakassi case has made the country become, in Africa and elsewhere, a model and a mentor in efforts to combine multilateralism with conflict resolution through arbitration and the rule of law.[64] It is noteworthy that Nigeria continues to maintain a level of peace and good neighbourliness with Cameroon regardless of incessant provocation by the Cameroonian gendarme and the army over the issue of the Bakassi peninsula over the years.
Nigeria had to close its land borders with the four immediate neighbouring countries of Benin, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in 2019. The goal according to the Nigerian government was to prevent the smuggling of rice, in particular, and other food items into Nigeria in a bid to encourage Nigerians to purchase local agricultural products. The Nigerian government considered the idea as a way of diversifying the nation’s economy in the face of an oil price slump in the international market. The Nigerian government started reopening the borders in December, 2020. The re-opening of the borders came shortly after the ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement designed to remove trade barriers across Africa and introduce a new era of continental free trade. It has been argued that the closure of land borders by Nigeria with the contiguous countries has not solved the problems that it was meant for but created new ones. Nigeria’s closing of its land borders led to astronomical rise in prices of food and other items. By December 2020, inflation rate was 15.75 per cent.[65] Therefore, going by Baldwin’s postulation about the theory of interdependence, a group of countries is considered interdependent if economic conditions in one are contingent on those found in the others and it would be costly for them to rupture or forego their interdependent relationship.[66]
The two southerly contiguous countries to Nigeria in the Gulf of Guinea are Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Sᾶo Tomé e Príncipѐ. Equatorial Guinea is a Hispanophone country, (Spanish-speaking). The country is made up of a mainland province and five other islands out of which Bioko, (formerly Fernando Po) is about 100 kilometres away to the southeast of the Nigerian coast. The country is close to Nigerian offshore oil fields. The first record of Equatorial Guinea’s relations with Nigeria had to do with the British occupation of Lagos. From this island, Captain John Beecroft mounted the naval invasion of Lagos in the nineteenth century. Shortly after the British occupation of Lagos up until the first half of the twentieth century, colonial Nigeria supplied huge labour to the Spanish plantation economy of the island country.[67]
It is interesting to note that from the opening decades of the nineteenth century, relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea had been majorly economic and strategic. Beginning in 1827, after the abolition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, the island of Bioko had been populated by immigrants, mainly from the Ibo and Ibibio ethnic groups from what later became Nigeria. Cocoa, an important cash crop which later became one of Nigeria’s major export earners was introduced from the island of Bioko. The economic tree got to Bioko in 1854 from Sᾶo Tomé where the Portuguese first introduced it to Africa in 1822.[68] Colonial Nigeria entered into a labour agreement with Equatorial Guinea in 1942 to improve the condition of service of Nigerian immigrant workers in Bioko. Between 1953 and 1957, the pre-independent government of Nigeria sent out three powerful delegations to the country for the same purpose.[69]
Similar in nature to the campaign mounted by the Action Group (AG) for Nigeria’s annexation of the Yoruba districts of Benin Republic in 1960, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens, (NCNC), called for the annexation of the island country in 1961 due to the huge population of south eastern Nigerians over there. Also, a similar action was seriously considered during the regime of General Murtala Mohammed when there was unbroken persecution of Nigerians in the country persisted. Later, thousands of Nigerians were evacuated from the country which action led to a cold relationship between the two countries until 1979when the authoritarian regime of Macias Nguema was overthrown in Equatorial Guinea.[70] However, the importance of the geographical location of Bioko to Nigeria came to the fore during the Nigerian civil war from 1967 to 1970. Apart from the sympathy Nigerian settlers (who were mostly of Igbo stock) and the indigenes had for the course of Biafra, the airport facilities on the island were used by the French and the International Red Cross (ICR) to transfer food, arms and war materials to the Uli Ihiala airstrips of the Biafran secessionists. Nigeria was also alarmed by the country’s romance with the apartheid regime of South Africa, an avowed enemy of Nigeria. However, Equatorial Guinea reassured Nigeria of its loyalty to Nigeria’s security in 1987.[71]
The two dominant factors of labour and strategic location that defined relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea could not be over-emphasised. For instance, Nigerian labour had been very vital to the economy of Equatorial Guinea from colonial times up to the 1970s. In addition to this is the geographical location of Bioko Island which is very strategic to Nigeria. After the defeat of Germany in Cameroon by the combined forces of Nigerian (West African Frontier Force) and the French Equatorial African troops during the First World War, Fernando Po Island (Bioko) was occupied by the defeated German army and from here, Nigeria was threatened until the end of the war. Also, because of the pro-German stance of Spain during the Second World War, the dispositions of the Spanish settlers on the island to Nigerian residents were hostile and antagonistic.[72]
Some domestic, economic and political changes that took place in both countries as well as some changes in global politics in the 1980s and the early 1990s made for a record improvement in relations between the two countries. The end of the brutal regime of President Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and the shift from cocoa to crude oil as the major source of income for example put an end to the maltreatment of Nigerian labourers on its cocoa plantations. The ill-treatment of Nigerian immigrant workers in Bioko had been a baneful to cordial relations between the two countries for decades.The collapse of the Cold War international system, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and reliance on crude oil as the major source of national income by the two countries have sustained their relations. The new regime of Obiang Nguema tried its possible best to improve the relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea by entering into a joint agreement with Nigeria in 1982. The specific areas covered by the joint agreement were cultural, commercial, agricultural and good neighbourliness. However, Nigeria was alarmed by the action of Equatorial Guinea in seeking the military protection of Morocco in 1985 when the country suffered general inflation that culminated in a failed military coup. The situation also opened the gateway for the apartheid South Africa to approach Equatorial Guinea to provide it with the much-needed military protection. In reaction to this development, Nigeria quickly changed its tactics by appointing a resident ambassador who immediately entered into some naval and air force agreements with Equatorial Guinea. These steps were considered diplomatically and strategically necessary by Nigeria for two obvious reasons. First, the country was located close to Nigerian offshore oil fields and other economic installations, and second, the apartheid South Africa was on the ground in Equatorial Guinea![73]
The apartheid regime of South Africa was an avowed enemy of Nigeria due to Nigeria’s activities in thwarting the regime in Southern Africa during this period. Therefore, Nigeria had the cause to be perturbed that Equatorial Guinea might have entered into some anti-Nigerian alliance with South Africa. This development created some tension in the relations between the two countries and prompted Obiang Nguema to pay a visit to Nigeria in 1987 in a bid to reassure Nigeria of its country’s loyalty to Nigeria’s security. The visit was reciprocated the following year by Nigeria’s foreign affairs minister, Ike Nwachukwu and crowned by an exchange visit by President Ibrahim Babangida in 1990. During these visits, some concessions were made to Equatorial Guinea to push away Nigeria’s enemies out of its shores. At the same time in the early 1990s, South Africa courted Sᾰo Tomé and Príncipe and tried to contrive a military coup d’etat to destabilise the country. The failed effort brought Sᾰo Tomé and Príncipe closer in ties with Nigeria.[74]
Republic of Sᾶo Tomé e Príncipѐ, a Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) African country is another southerly neighbour of Nigeria’s in the Gulf of Guinea. The country is an archipelago made up of two major islands of Sᾰo Tomé e Príncipѐ, and several other small islets.[75] Nigeria’s relations with Sᾰo Tomé and Príncipe have been convivial right from its independence from the Portuguese in 1975. A tragedy struck the relations between the two countries on May 26, 1980, when a 12-man delegation from Nigeria, including the Nigerian minister of state for foreign affairs, Abubakar Umar, who was on a defence diplomatic mission to the country perished in a plane crash involving their Nigerian Air Force Fokker F27.[76]Another unforgettable event in relations between the two countries was the reinstatement to power of a toppled government by Nigeria. A military coup had toppled the government of President De Menezes on July 26, 2003 while on a state visit to Nigeria. When the President returned to Sᾰo Tomé e Príncipѐ a week later, President Olusegun Obasanjo helped to restore him to power.[77]
As a result of more crude oil discoveries in the Gulf of Guinea, there has been increased cordiality in relations between Nigeria and its two southerly neighbours, mainly based on joint oil agreements.[78] The reserve–production ratio for Nigerian gas was estimated at 125 years and less than 30 years for oil. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Gulf of Guinea had become one of the most promising global reserves of energy wooed by multinational oil corporations. The use of deep-water drilling technology by these multinationals had resulted in several discoveries in Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Sᾰo Tomé and Príncipe (Bach, 2007: 302).Due to overlapping maritime boundaries between them, Nigeria and Sᾰo Tomé and Príncipe signed a 45-year treaty in 2001, which involved the establishment of a Joint Development Zone (JDZ). The “Treaty on the Joint Exploration of Oil and Other Resources existing on the Existing Exclusive Economic Zone of the two States”, also involved the establishment of a Joint Development Zone (JDZ). The provision of the treaty included a 60:40 per cent ratio of the resources sharing formula to Nigeria and Sᾰo Tomé and Príncipe respectively; the establishment of the Joint Development Authority (JDA) to develop and manage the petroleum and other resources in the JDZ, and the Joint Ministerial Council (JMC) to have the overall political responsibility and supervise the JDA.[79]By October 2003, international oil syndicates had started to bid for offshore oil blocks controlled by the two countries, and by 2005, they had signed their first offshore oil exploration and production-sharing agreement with the oil firms. These were closely followed by the 2007 and 2009 joint maritime military commission agreements to protect their common oil interests in the Gulf of Guinea.[80]
The Question of a Change of Strategies
There are four major principles guiding Nigeria’s policy towards its neighbours from independence in 1960 to 1967 when the civil war broke out. These were: respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of every African state; equality of all states; non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and commitment to functional cooperation as a means of enhancing continental unity. In line with these principles, Nigeria embraced non-alignment. However, despite the foregoing principles, Nigeria remained inactive in political and economic activities in the sub-region until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967. There are several reasons put forward by scholars to explain Nigeria’s lackadaisical and laissez-faire attitude towards political and economic happenings in the sub-region. One of the most popular arguments put forward to explain Nigeria’s initial apathetic attitude toward sub-regional affairs was that those other West African countries were so limited militarily and economically to have required any urgent attention by Nigeria. The argument was expanded by the explanation that since these contiguous neighbouring states were all weak, therefore they did not possess any capability to threaten Nigeria in any serious manner.[81] Furthermore, the argument proffered that based on the weakness of its neighbours, Nigeria did not need to develop a foreign policy with them either geographically or strategically based.[82]
It must be pointed out here that the first series of governments that ruled Nigeria after independence were preoccupied with the problems of unity and stability as well as the economic development of the country.They were left with a little time to romance with sub-continental politics. Also, Nigerian governments before the 1970s oil boon were constrained to operate within limited resources and thus were forced to attend more to internal than external affairs. For instance, the most important external action pursued by the Tafawa Balewa government in West Africa was the concerted prevention of the spread of socialism by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana into the sub-region.[83]However, it dawned on Nigeria during the civil war that it needed a foreign policy based on good neighbourliness with its contiguous neighbours no matter how “weak.”[84]
Nigeria began to show interest in sub-regional affairs after the civil war of 1967-70. The country’s new interest came as a result of two major reasons. The first was the increase in oil revenue after the civil war which enabled Nigeria to finance her external obligations better than before. Secondly, Nigeria suddenly realised that its security could not be isolated from the rest of the sub-region. This realisation came as a reaction to the support given to Biafra by some neighbouring Francophone countries during the war. Nigeria’s feeling that there was nothing tangible to be gained from the poorer and weaker contiguous states was suddenly overtaken by the realities of the Biafran civil war. The truth that the country was not as secure as imagined and the role of France and its former colonies in West Africa during the war alarmed Nigeria.[85] For instance, it was in Chad that Nigeria discovered that France had openly declared support for the course of Biafra when France stationed its fully armed elite troops close to the Nigeria-Chad border in 1969.[86]Also, toward the end of the Nigerian Civil War, the Republic of Benin, another contiguous nation, allowed its facilities to be used as a base for the International Red Cross (ICR) to fly relief materials that included munitions to secessionist Biafra.[87]
Summary
This essay is in total disagreement with the argument that Nigeria does not have a coherent foreign policy and that the country has lost its pre-eminence (perhaps because of its inherited identity). It should be noted that the consistency of Nigeria’s foreign policy is glaring. Because of the basic tenet of good neighbourliness in foreign policy with its immediate neighbours, the country has not for once actually wielded all forces at its disposal against any one of them. Instead of doing this, Nigeria’s security organisations have always worked together in harmony with the intelligence agencies of neighbouring countries to maintain regional stability. The only minor cases that involved Nigeria using some level of power against certain contiguous countries included the 1983 border scuffles with Chad, the 1976 military confrontation with Equatorial Guinea, and the 1988-1989 skirmishes with Cameroon over Bakassi peninsular. Although the colonial legacy that brought close affinity between France and its former colonies in West Africa,(four of which are Nigeria’s immediate neighbours), could not be easily wished away. Nonetheless, Nigeria was able to withstand the French hegemonic tendencies in West Africa from 1960, when Françafrique was still strong until the system started to wane and eventually collapsed in the 1990s. The collapse of the system made France consider forging stronger relations with other non-French-speaking African countries including Nigeria.
Conclusion
Based on the historical relationship with its contiguous neighbours and a need for change of strategies as discussed in this article, there is a measure of consistency in Nigeria’s foreign polic. Nigeria had always had the confident that it was an unassailable country whereas it was surrounded by Francophone countries. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the Nigerian civil war made the country’s leaders always jittery, unsettled and disturbed whenever an external force came to the fore to support any of the neighbouring countries on issues concerning Nigeria. Important examples that readily come to mind in this case, include, the support France and Israel gave to Cameroon over Bakassi in the 1990s; the Moroccan military protection over Equatorial Guinea in 1985; the overtures of Apartheid South Africa to the same country during the same period, and the presence of France, Libya and the United States in Chad at different times. Despite this weakness, however, the sense of maturity in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy must be acknowledged. Nigerian governments from independence have been able to wave aside the often belligerent public opinion about the country’s relations with its immediate neighbours. This has enabled the country to maintain peaceful relations with its next-door neighbours and downplay the tendentious opinion that Nigeria is a bully to their smaller and less powerful countries.
[1]Abdul Raufu Mustapha,“The three faces of Nigeria’s foreign policy,” in Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008), p. 41.
[2]Gilbert M. Khadiagala, and Lyons Terence, “Foreign Policy Making in Africa: An Introduction,” in African Foreign Policies: Power and Process, eds.Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Lyons Terence (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 5.
[3]Ira W. Zartmam,“Decision-Making Among African Governments in Inter-African Affairs,” Journal of Development Studies 2, no. 2 (1966): p. 100.
[4].Akinjide Osuntokun, “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and its Future,” in Nigerian Peoples and Cultures. eds. Akinjide Osuntokunand Ayodeji Olukoju (Ibadan: Davidson Press, 1997), p. 351.
[5]Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Michael T. Snarr,eds. Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective Domestic and International Influences on State Behaviour (London: Sage Publications,2013), p. 2.
[6]Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave McMillan, 2003), p. 2.
[7]Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 45, 210,223.
[8]Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-73 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 9.
[9]Frederick S. Northedge,ed., The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 15.
[10]Cecil Crabb, American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 1.
[11]Olajide Aluko, Essays in Nigerian Foreign Policy(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1981), p. 3.
[12]Ibrahim Gambari, “From Balewa to Obasanjo: The Theory and Practice of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy.” in Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (Scottsville: Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2008), pp. 58, 70-71.
[13]Ibrahim Gambari,Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1989), p. 21.
[14]Sunday A. Akpotor and Osisioma B.C Nwolise, Revolving Issues in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy(Benin: Ilupeju Press, 1999), p. 10.
[15]James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Longman, 2001), pp. 1-6.
[16]James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee, Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World (Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), pp 1-6.
[17]Robert O. Keohaneand Joseph S. Nye, Power and Independence: World Politics in Transition(Illinois: Scott, Foresman, 1989), pp. 9-10.
[18]Harrison R. Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power and Political Influence,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): p. 461.
[19]Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality?” World Politics26, no. 1 (1973): p. 2.
[20]Edward L. Morse, Modernisation and Transformation of International Relations(New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 14.
[21]Olayiwola Abegunrin, Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1999. (Westport,CT: Praeger Publishing, 2003), p, 139.
[22]David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis.”International
Organisation 34 (1980):471–506. p. 484.
[23]Ibid., pp. 471-506.
[24]Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 132.
[25] Gabriel O.Olusanya and Rashid A. Akindele, “The Fundamentals of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and External Economic Relations,” in Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Year, eds. Gabriel O. Olusanya and Rashid A. Akindele(Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986), p. 2
[26]Margaret M. Vogt, “Nigeria’s Defence Policy: An Overview” in Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems, eds. Abednego E. Ekoko and Margaret A. Vogt (Lagos: Malthouse Press, 1990), p. 4.
[27]Ibrahim Gambari, Theory and Reality in Foreign Policy Making(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1989), p. 230.
[28]Munhamu Botsio C. Utete, “Foreign Policy and the Developing State” in African International Relations,Ojo J.C.B Olatunde, ed. (Essex: Longman Group, 1987), p. 47.
[29]Jame N. Rosenau, “National Interest,” in International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences(New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 34.
[30]Ayo Akinbobola, ed., Readings in Foreign Policy Analysis: Issues and Trends in Selected Countries. (Ibadan: Caltop, 1995), p. 12.
[31]Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays(London: Weidenfold and Micolson, 1969), p. 16.
[32] Olusanya and Akindele, “The Fundamentals of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” pp. 3-5.
[33] Gambari, “From Balewa to Obasanjo,” pp. 70-71.
[34]Olayiwola Abegunrin, Nigerian foreign policy under military rule, 1966-1999(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 139.
[35] Akinjide Osuntokun, “Nigeria’s foreign policy and its future,” in Nigerian Peoples and Culture…, pp. 345-355.
[36]Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 141.
[37] Presidential Review on Foreign Policy, 2011.
[38]Akande Laolu, “World leaders line up offers of presidential state visits for Buhari at their capitals.” Premium Times, June 17, 2015, https://ww.premiumtimes.com
[39]Bassey Ate and Bola Akinterinwa, eds., Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-regional Security in the 1990s (Lagos: NIIA, 1992), p. 5.
[40] Jacob F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder, “West Africa 1919-1939: The Colonial Situation,” in History of West Africa, eds. Jacob F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (Essex: Longman, 1987), pp. 588-589.
[41]Toyin Falola and Julius O. Ihonvbere,The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic,1979-1983 (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 191.
[42]Emeka Nwokedi,“Strands and Strains of Good Neighbourliness: The Case of Nigeria and its Francophone Neighbours,”Geneve-Afrique 23, no. 1, (1985): pp. 39-60.
[43]Femi Aribisala, “Nigeria in OPEC: The Weakest Link in the Cartel Chain,” in Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Year, eds. Gabriel O. Olusanya and Rashid A. Akindele(Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986) (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986), pp. 110-125.
[44]Richard R. Duncan, “The Peak of World Oil Production and the Road to the Olduvai Gorge.”Population and Environment 22, no. 5 (2001): pp. 503-522.
[45]Akinjide Osuntokun, “Gulliver and Lilliputians: Nigeria and Its Neighbours,” in Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha (Scottsville, South Africa: Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2008), p. 147.
[46] Ibid.
[47]Oscar Ede, “Nigeria and Francophone Africa,” in Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Year, eds. Gabriel O. Olusanya and Rashid A. Akindele (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986), p. 183.
[48]VOA News 15 August, 2003.
[49] Osuntokun, “Gulliver and Lilliputians,” p. 148.
[50] Ede, “Nigeria and Francophone Africa,” p. 184.
[51] Osuntokun, “Gulliver and Lilliputians,” p. 144.
[52]https://www.africacrossborder.org. (Accessed on May 10 2022).
[53] Ede, “Nigeria and Francophone Africa,”p. 184.
[54]Joseph Garba, Diplomatic Soldiering. (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1991), p. 44.
[55]Alade Fawole W., “Militaries, militias and mullahs: National Security Issues in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” in Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Year, eds. Gabriel O. Olusanya and Rashid A. Akindele (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986), pp. 99-100.
[56] Osuntokun,“Gulliver and Lilliputians,” p. 146.
[57] Fawole, “Militaries, militias and mullahs,” p. 101.
[58]Nicasius A. Check, “Bilateralism and Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts in Africa: Cameroon’s Diplomacy during the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute.” Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA), POLICY brief No 45 (2011): p. 2.
[59]Loveth Z. Elango, ‘The Anglo-French “Condominium” in Cameroon, 1914-1916: The Myth and Reality.” The International Journal of African Studies, XVIII (4): (1985), pp. 656-673.
[60] Check, “Bilateralism and Peaceful Resolution,” p. 1.
[61]Joseph C. Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria, the Framework of an Emergent African nation(London: Longman, 1970), p.56.
[62] Check, “Bilateralism and Peaceful Resolution,” pp. 2, 4.
[63]Nicholas K. Tariebbae and Sam Baroni, “The Cameroon and Nigeria Negotiation Process over the contested oil rich Bakassi peninsula,” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (2010): pp. 198-210.
[64]Daniel C. Bach, “Nigeria’s ‘manifest destiny’ in West Africa: Dominance without Power” in Afrika Spectrum 42, no. 2 (2007): pp. 301-321.
[65]Kelechukwu Iruoma, “Nigeria reopens land borders to trade,” African Business https://african.business/2021/02/agribusiness-manufacturing/nigeria-reopens-land-borders-to-trade/ (Accessed 5 June 2022)
[66]David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,”International Organisation…pp. 471-506.
[67]David Aworawo, “Decisive Thaw: The Changing Pattern of Relations between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, 1980-2005,” Journal of International and Global Studies 1, no. 2 (2010): p. 92.
[68]Enrique Martino, “Clandestine Recruitment Networks in the Bight of Biafra: Fernando Po’s Answer to the Labour Question, 1926-1945.” IRSH 27 (2012): pp. 40-43, 55, 59.
[69] Osuntokun, “Gulliver and Lilliputians,” p. 150.
[70]Ibid., p. 151.
[71] Aworawo, “Decisive Thaw,” p. 91.
[72]Edward Paice, Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2009), p. 299.
[73] Aworawo, “Decisive Thaw,” p. 91.
[74] Osuntokun, “Gulliver and Lilliputians,” p. 151.
[75] Aworawo, “Decisive Thaw,” p. 91.
[76]Aviation Safety Network, ASN: May, 1980.https://www.aviation.safety.net (Accessed June 2 2022)
[77] Osuntokun, “Gulliver and Lilliputians,” p. 153.
[78]Daniel C. Bach, “Nigeria’s ‘manifest destiny’ in West Africa: Dominance without Power” in Afrika Spectrum…p. 302.
[79]Kingsley Jeremiah, “Nigeria-Sᾰo Tomé and Príncipe JDZ at wits’ end 17 years on,” The Guardian, 14 October, 2018. https://guardian.ng
[80]BBC News Archives, 2003-2009.
[81]Falolaand Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall, p. 191.
[82]John P. Mackintosh, “Nigeria’s External Relations.” Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 2, no. 3 (1964): p. 207.
[83]Falola and Ihonvbere, The Rise and Fall,p. 191.
[84]Emeka Nwokedi,“Strands and Strains of Good Neighbourliness: The Case of Nigeria and its Francophone Neighbours,” Geneve-Afrique,… pp. 39-60.
[85]Femi Aribisala, “Nigeria in OPEC: The Weakest Link in the Cartel Chain,” in Nigeria’s External Relations: The First Twenty-Five Year, eds. Gabriel O. Olusanya and Rashid A. Akindele (Ibadan: University Press Limited, 1986), pp. 110-125.
[86] Fawole, “Militaries, Militias and Mullahs,” pp. 99-100.
[87] Nwokedi, “Strands and Strains of Good Neighbourliness,” pp. 39-60.